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THE
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OF
POLYBIUS,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY MR. HAMPTON.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

United Service Institution
of India.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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
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THE
GENERAL HISTORY
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BOOK THE EIGHTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Men who trust themselves to others are to be censured or excused, according to different circumstances. Examples of both cases.

WHEN accidents of this kind happen, it would be dangerous to decide in general, that those who are betrayed into such misfortunes deserve to be blamed; or, on the contrary, that they deserve to be excused. For it frequently is seen, that, when men have employed all the caution that reason could suggest, they still fall into the power of those who scruple not to violate the established laws of mankind. But if we attend, on the other hand, to the particular times and circumstances of such events, it is certain, that by these we may be enabled to judge without reserve; and to declare some generals, among those who have been thus deceived, to be worthy of censure, and others to

be free from blame. The following examples will show the truth of this remark.

Archidamus, one of the kings of Lacedæmon, suspecting the ambition of Cleomenes, fled from Sparta. But being afterwards prevailed on to return, and put himself into the power of his enemy, he lost both his kingdom and his life, and left not the least excuse for his imprudence to future times. For while the condition of things remained the same, and the ambition of Cleomenes had even acquired new strength, how was it possible that he should avoid this fate, if he threw himself again into the hands of those, from whom he had escaped by flight, and with the greatest difficulty? Pelopidas also of Thebes, who was well acquainted with the wicked disposition of the tyrant Alexander, and who knew likewise, that every tyrant considers those who defend the cause of liberty as his greatest enemies, when he not only had prevailed on Epaminondas, to take arms in support of the democratical government of Thebes, and of all Greece, but had himself led an army into Thessaly, in order to subvert the monarchy of Alexander, ventured to go on a second embassy to this very tyrant. By this imprudence, having most absurdly reposed a confidence in those whom he had the greatest reason to distrust, he brought great loss upon his country, and destroyed the reputation also which he had before acquired. A like misfortune happened to the Roman consul, Cnæus Cornelius, who, in opposition to all

reason, delivered himself to the enemy, in the time of the war of Sicily. Many other examples also might be found of the same imprudence. And, from these it may fairly be concluded, that whoever, without due consideration and inquiry, throw themselves into the power of their enemies, are very greatly to be blamed.

On the other hand, when men have before employed every necessary kind of caution, they cannot be thought to deserve any censure. Never to place a confidence in any one, is absolutely impracticable. It is sufficient, if we take some proper pledges for our security, and act afterwards as reason shall require. The best pledges of safety, upon such occasions, are oaths; wives and children given as hostages; and, above all, the former life of the persons whom we are inclined to trust. If these are employed to betray and ruin us, the reproach must fall upon the authors of the treachery, and not upon those who are deceived. The first step therefore should be, to gain assurances of such a kind, that those with whom we treat may be compelled by them to observe their faith. But, as these are not always to be obtained, the next course is, to take every measure with such prudence, that, if we fall afterwards into misfortunes, it may not be imputed to us as a fault. Many examples of this sort might be drawn from former ages. But there is none more illustrious, than that which is found in the very times of which we are writ-

ing, the example of Achæus. For this prince, after he had employed the most perfect foresight that human wisdom could suggest, and neglected no precaution that was necessary for his safety, fell into the power of his enemies. But so far was he from incurring any blame, that, on the contrary, his misfortune was pitied and excused; while the authors of it were condemned to bear the curses, and the detestation of mankind.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

Reflections on the greatness of the designs of Rome and Carthage, and the persevering obstinacy of the two republics. The advantages of general history.

IT will by no means be foreign to my first design, or to the general intention of this work, to desire the reader to pause a while, and to consider the greatness of the actions of the Carthaginians and the Romans, and the stubborn constancy with which they severally persisted in their enterprises. For is it not astonishing, that, when they were engaged in so great a war in Italy, and in another not less important also in Spain, when the prospect of success in these two wars was to both equally uncertain, and the present danger alike terrible to both, as if these were not sufficient, they at this very time should maintain another, both in Sardinia and in Italy, and not only should extend their views at once to all these wars, but should be able also to complete the preparations, and furnish the supplies that were necessary to all? But our admiration must still increase, if we take a view of things in a more particular detail. The Romans had in Italy, two complete armies, under the

command of the two consuls. In Spain they had two more: one upon land, at the head of which, was Cnæus Cornelius; and another upon the sea, commanded by Publius. On the side of the Carthaginians likewise, the armies were the same. Beside these, the Romans had also a fleet, that was stationed on the coasts of Greece, to observe the motions of king Philip. At the same time, Appius, with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius, at the head of a land army, supported the war in Sicily; while Amilcar did the same on the side of the Carthaginians.

From these facts very clearly will appear, the truth of that which we have often taken occasion to affirm in the former parts of this work: that it is not possible to obtain an entire view and knowledge of the whole of things from particular histories. For how can the bare reading of what passed in Sicily only, or in Spain, be sufficient to instruct us, either in the greatness of the things that were transacted, or more especially, in what manner, and through what kind of government, that most astonishing event was perfected, which has happened in the present age, and of which there is no example in former times; that all the known parts of the earth have been reduced beneath the power of a single state. In what manner Syracuse was taken by the Romans, and by what measures they gained possession of Spain, may be known perhaps, in some degree, from particular histo-

ries. But general history alone can show, by what steps they arrived at the sovereignty of the whole; what circumstances counteracted them in their pursuit of that great design; and what again, at certain times, co-operated with them. There is, therefore, no other way by which we may be enabled to discern, either the greatness of the transactions themselves, or the force of the Roman government. For when we read, that the Romans attempted the conquest of Sicily only, or of Spain, and maintained vast armies both upon land and sea; such projects, considered singly in themselves, contain nothing very great or wonderful. But when it is seen, that not these enterprises only, but many others likewise, were at the same time formed and executed by the same republic; and that this very people, even while they carried into execution these designs, were involved in various difficulties, and sustained many dreadful battles, in their own proper country; it is then only that these transactions will appear in their just light; that our admiration will indeed be raised; and that we shall obtain a full conception of all that we desire to know. Let this, then, serve to show the mistake of those, who think that separate, and particular relations, will instruct them in the knowledge of general and universal history.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The siege of Syracuse. The Romans are forced to desist from their attempt, by the wonderful inventions of Archimedes.

THE consul Appius, having taken upon himself the command of the land forces, and stationed the army round the Scythian porticoe, from whence the wall was continued along the shore even to the mole of the harbour, resolved to make his approaches on that side. As the number of his artificers was very great, he prepared, in five days only, a sufficient quantity of blinds and darts, with every thing besides that was proper for the siege: and was persuaded, that by this celerity, he should be able to attack the enemy before they had made the necessary preparations for their defence. He had not at this time made due reflection upon the great skill of Archimedes; nor considered, that the mind of a single man is, on some occasions, far superior to the force of many hands. But this truth was soon discovered to him by the event. For as Syracuse was in itself a place of very great strength; the wall that surrounded it being built upon lofty hills, whose tops hanging

over the plain, rendered all approach from without, except in certain parts, extremely difficult; so, within the city likewise, and against all attempts that might be made on the side of the sea, so great a quantity of instruments of defence had been contrived by the person just now mentioned, that the besieged were at no time idle; but were ready, at every new attack, to meet the motions, and repel the efforts of the enemy. Appius, however, advancing with his blinds and ladders, endeavoured to approach that part of the wall which was joined to the Hexapylum, on the eastern side of the city. At the same time, Marcellus directed his course towards Achradina, with a fleet of sixty quinqueremes, all filled with soldiers, who were armed with bows, slings, and javelins, in order to drive the enemy from the walls. There were also eight other quinqueremes, from one side of which the benches of the rowers had been removed; from the right side of some, and from the left of others. These vessels, being joined two and two together, on the sides from which the benches had been taken, were rowed by the oars on the opposite side, and carried to the walls certain machines called sackbuts, the construction and use of which may be thus described.

A ladder is made, which has four feet in breadth, and such a length as may make it equal, when raised, to the height of the walls. On either side of it is a high breast-work, in the form of a balustrade. This ladder is laid at

length, upon the sides in which the two vessels are joined, but extending far beyond the prows; and at the top of the masts of the vessels are fixed pullies and ropes. At the proper time, the ropes are fastened to the top of the machine. And while some, standing on the stern of the vessels, draw the ladder upwards by the pullies, others on the prow, at the same time assist in raising it with bars and levers. The vessels being then rowed near to the shore, endeavours are used to fix the machine against the walls. At the top of the ladder is a little stage, guarded on three sides with blinds, and containing four men upon it, who engage with those upon the walls that endeavour to obstruct the fixing of the machine. And when it is fixed, these men, being now raised above the top of the wall, throw down the blinds on either side, and advance to attack the battlements and towers. The rest at the same time ascend the ladder, without any fear that it should fail; because it is strongly fastened with ropes to the two vessels. The name of sackbut is bestowed not improperly upon this machine. For when it is raised, the appearance of the ladder and the vessels, joined thus together, very much resembles the figure of that instrument.

In this manner then, when all things now were ready, the Romans designed to attack the towers. But Archimedes had prepared machines that were fitted to every distance. And while the vessels were yet far removed from the walls employing catapults and balistæ, that were

of the largest size, and worked by the strongest springs, he wounded the enemy with his darts and stones, and threw them into great disorder. When the darts passed beyond them, he then used other machines, of a smaller size, and still proportioned to the distance. By these means the Romans were so effectually repulsed, that it was not possible for them to approach. Marcellus therefore, perplexed with this resistance, was forced to advance silently with his vessels in the night. But when they came so near to the land as to be within the reach of darts, they were exposed to new danger from another invention, which Archimedes had contrived. He had caused openings to be made in many parts of the wall, equal in height to the stature of a man, and to the palm of a hand in breadth. And having planted on the inside archers, and little scorpions, he discharged a multitude of arrows through the openings, and disabled the soldiers that were on board. In this manner, whether the Romans were at a great distance, or whether they were near, he not only rendered useless all their efforts, but destroyed also many of their men. When they attempted also to raise the sackbuts, certain machines which he had raised along the whole wall on the inside, and which were before concealed from view, suddenly appeared above the walls, and stretched their long beaks far beyond the battlements. Some of these machines carried masses of lead, and stones not less than ten talents in weight. And when the

vessels with the sackbuts came near, the beaks, being first turned by ropes and pullies to the proper point, let fall their stones; which broke not only the sackbuts, but the vessels likewise, and threw all those that were on board into the greatest danger. In the same manner also, the rest of the machines, as often as the enemy approached under the cover of their blinds, and had secured themselves by that precaution against the darts that were discharged through the openings of the wall, let fall upon them stones of so large a size, that all the combatants upon the prow were forced to retire from their station.

He invented likewise a hand of iron, hanging by a chain from the beak of a machine, which was used in the following manner. The person, who like a pilot guided the beak, having let fall the hand, and caught hold of the prow of any vessel, drew down the opposite end of the machine that was on the inside of the walls. And when the vessel was thus raised erect upon its stern, the machine itself was held immoveable; but the chain being suddenly loosened from the beak by the means of pullies, some of the vessels were thrown upon their sides; others turned with the bottom upwards; and the greatest part, as the prows were plunged from a considerable height into the sea, were filled with water, and all that were on board thrown into tumult and disorder.

Marcellus was in no small degree embarrassed

when he found himself encountered in every attempt by such resistance. He perceived that all his efforts were defeated with loss; and were even derided by the enemy. But, amidst all the anxiety that he suffered, he could not help jesting upon the inventions of Archimedes. This man, said he, employs our ships as buckets to draw water; and boxing about our sackbuts, as if they were unworthy to be associated with him, drives them from his company with disgrace. Such was the success of the siege on the side of the sea.

Appius also, on his part, having met with the same obstacles in his approaches, was in like manner forced to abandon his design. For while he was yet at a considerable distance, great numbers of his army were destroyed by the balistæ and the catapults. So wonderful was the quantity of stones and darts, and so astonishing the force with which they were thrown. The machines indeed were worthy of Hiero, who had furnished the expense; and of Archimedes, who designed them, and by whose directions they were made. If the troops advanced nearer to the city, they either were stopped in their approach by the arrows that were discharged through the openings in the walls; or, if they attempted to force their way under the cover of their bucklers, were destroyed by stones and beams that were let fall upon their heads. Great mischief also was occasioned by those hands of iron that have been mentioned; which lifted men with their armour

into the air, and dashed them against the ground. Appius, therefore, was at last constrained to return back again to his camp. And when he had held a consultation with the tribunes, it was with one consent determined by them, that every other method should be tried to obtain possession of Syracuse, but that they would no more attempt to take it by assault. Nor did they afterwards depart from this resolution. For though they remained eight months before the city, and during that time invented various stratagems, and carried into execution many bold designs, they never had the courage to attack the place in the regular forms. So wonderful, and of such importance upon some occasions, is the power of a single man, and the force of science properly employed. With so great armies both by land and sea, the Romans could scarcely have failed to take the city if one old man had been removed. But while he is present they dare not even to make the attempt, in the manner at least which Archimedes was able to oppose. Being persuaded therefore, that, as the city was crowded with inhabitants, it might at last most easily be reduced by famine, they resolved to have recourse to this as their only hope; and to intercept by their fleet the provisions that should be brought by sea, while the army cut off all approach on the side of the land. And that the time employed in the siege, might not pass wholly without action, but be attended with advantage in

some other place, the consuls divided the army. And while Appius, with two parts of the forces, invested the city, Marcellus with the rest, advancing through the country, wasted the lands of the Sicilians who had joined the Carthaginians in the war,

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

The death of Aratus, who was poisoned by the order of Philip.

THOUGH Philip attempted to waste the territory of the Messenians, who were now his enemies, the mischief which he occasioned to them was very inconsiderable. But the same prince found better success in carrying into execution the impious designs which he had contrived against the nearest of his friends. For not long afterwards Aratus was poisoned by his orders, with the assistance of Taurion who presided over the affairs of Peloponnesus. This infamous action was not for some time discovered to the world. For the poison was not of that kind which procures immediate death ; but was one of those which weaken the habit of the body, and destroy life by slow degrees. Aratus himself was very sensible of the injury that he had received : and the manner in which the thing was made known was this. The old man, who had kept it secret from every one besides, could not restrain himself from letting fall some words in the presence of a favourite servant whose name was Cephalo.

For when this domestic, who attended him with great fidelity during the course of his illness, had one day desired his master to remark, that some of the spittle that hung upon the wall was mingled with blood: "Such, Cephalo," said Aratus, "is the reward of the friendship which I have had for Philip." So great and excellent a thing is moderation: which disposed the sufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greatest shame; when he found that all the glorious actions which he had shared with Philip, in order to promote the service of that prince, had been at last so basely recompensed.

Such was the end of this magistrate; who received after his death, not from his own country alone, but from the whole republic of the Achæans, all the honours that were due to a man, who had so often held the administration of their government, and performed such signal services for the state. For they decreed sacrifices to him, with the other honours that belong to heroes; and, in a word, omitting nothing that could serve to render his name immortal. If the dead therefore retain any sense, it is probable that Aratus must now contemplate with a pleasing satisfaction not only the gratitude of the Achæans, but all the difficulties also and the dangers which himself encountered in his life.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

The manner in which Philip took the citadel of Lissus, and the city.

PHILIP had for a long time before revolved in his mind the design of rendering himself master of the city of Lissus and the citadel. Beginning his march, therefore, with the army, and having after two days passed the defiles, he encamped upon the banks of the river Ardaxanus, at no great distance from the city. But when he saw that the whole circuit of the city, both on the side of the land, and on that also towards the sea, was strongly fortified both by nature and by art; and that the citadel, which stood near, was of so great height and strength that it was scarcely possible that it ever should be taken by assault; he laid aside all hopes of being able to reduce the last, but judged the conquest of the city to be not absolutely impracticable. Between Lissus and the foot of the mountain upon which the citadel was built, there was an open space which seemed very proper for his intended attack upon the city. The king, therefore, after some slight skirmishing with the enemy upon this ground,

contrived the following stratagem. Having allowed the army to repose themselves during one whole day, and encouraged them as the occasion required, he sent away in the night the greatest and most serviceable part of the light-armed troops, with orders that they should conceal themselves in certain valleys covered with wood, which were on the side of the country, at a little distance from the open space that has been mentioned. On the following day, taking with him the peltastæ, and the remaining part of the light-armed forces, and beginning his march on the side towards the sea, he advanced round the city to the ground upon which he before had skirmished, as if his intention had been to make an attack from thence upon the place. The city was filled with people, who had thrown themselves into it from all the neighbouring parts of Illyria, upon the first arrival of Philip in the country. But the citadel, because it seemed sufficiently secured by its own natural strength, was defended by a very small garrison. As soon then as the Macedonians approached, the enemy, confident in their numbers as well as in the advantage of the ground, came out in crowds against them from the city. Philip, having stationed the peltastæ in the plain, commanded the light-armed forces to advance towards the heights, and to engage with vigour. At first the contest was on both sides equal. But after some time, these troops being pressed by numbers, and disordered by the difficulties of the ground, were forced to

turn their backs, and retired towards the heavy forces. The besieged pursue with eagerness, and attack the heavy forces in the plain. At the same time, the troops that were in the citadel, perceiving that Philip drew away his army in small divisions, and that some of the cohorts alone sustained the fight, while others seemed to retreat, were persuaded that he was preparing altogether to leave the field. Leaving therefore their post by stealth, as if the situation of the place was alone sufficient to defend it, they descended in small bodies, and through private roads, into the plain, expecting to obtain some share in the plunder of those that fled. In this moment, the troops that had been placed in ambuscade in the valleys advanced unperceived, and attacked the enemy with vigour. At the same time likewise, the heavy forces returned back again to the charge. The Illyrians were soon thrown into disorder. Those that had advanced from Lissus fled back again by different ways, and saved themselves within the city. But the garrison of the citadel was intercepted by the forces that had risen from the ambuscade. Thus the event happened which was the least expected: and Philip gained possession of the citadel without any danger. On the following day, after many violent and terrible attacks, the city also was taken by the Macedonians. This sudden and unexpected conquest struck so great terror into all the neighbouring parts, that almost all the cities of Illyria submitted themselves vo-

luntarily to the king. For when he had taken two places of such uncommon strength by assault, it seemed that there would be now no fortress able to withstand his efforts, nor any hope of safety for those that should resist his arms.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

Achæus, who was besieged in the citadel of Sardes by Antiochus, is delivered into the power of his enemies by the treachery of Bolis.

THERE was a man whose name was Bolis, a Cretan by birth, who had long lived in the court of Ptolemy, and held a military command. He had the reputation of possessing, together with a good understanding, a most enterprising courage; and was supposed to be inferior to none in the experience which he had gained in the affairs of war. Sosibius, having endeavoured in many conferences to obtain the confidence of this man, and to render him devoted to his interests, at last disclosed to him, that he could not at this time perform any service more acceptable to the king, than by contriving some method to save Achæus. Bolis, when he had heard him, said that he would consider what he had proposed, and then retired. And when he had examined the thing by himself, after two or three days he returned, and told Sosibius that he would undertake the business: that he had passed some time in Sardes, and was well acquainted with the

place; and that Cambylus, who commanded a body of Cretans in the army of Antiochus, was not only his fellow-citizen, but his kinsman also, and his friend. Now Cambylus was stationed in one of the advanced posts that were behind the citadel of Sardes. For the ground on that side not being fortified with works, was defended only by a line of Cretans. Sosibius received this account with joy; and was persuaded either that Achæus was not to be rescued from his present danger, or that Bolis alone could save him. And as the latter showed on his part also the greatest eagerness, the affair was soon determined. Some money was immediately furnished by Sosibius, that nothing might be wanting that was necessary to the design. He gave him an assurance likewise of much larger sums if the attempt should be attended with success. And, by exaggerating also in the amplest manner the rewards that might be expected both from Ptolemy and from Achæus, he raised the hopes of Bolis to the greatest height.

The Cretan, impatient to begin the work, furnished himself with the proper instruments of credit, and sailed away immediately to Rhodes, to find Nicomachus; whose affection for Achæus, and his fidelity towards him, were like those of a father towards a son. From thence he went to Ephesus, and joined Melancomas. For these were the persons whom Achæus had long employed, to transact his affairs abroad both with Ptolemy and all other states. Bolis, therefore,

arriving first at Rhodes, and afterwards at Ephesus, communicated to these men the whole design. And finding them ready to lend all the assistance that he desired, he then sent Arianus, one of his own officers, to Cambylus, with orders to acquaint him, that Bolis had been sent from Alexandria to raise some foreign mercenaries; but that having some business of great importance to communicate to Cambylus, he desired that this general would appoint a certain place and time, in which they might meet together without the knowledge of any other person. Arianus soon discharged his commission, and was sent back again by Cambylus; who consented to all that was proposed, and fixed the hour and the place in which he would meet Bolis in the night.

In the mean time Bolis, who was a true Cretan, versatile in his nature, carefully examined the thing in all its circumstances, and considered it on every side. At last however he joined Cambylus at the appointed place, and delivered a letter to him. Upon this letter, they immediately held a consultation that was worthy of two Cretans. For the object of their deliberation neither was the safety of the unhappy prince, nor the fidelity which they owed to those who had employed them; but their own security alone, and their own advantage. With these base views, it was not long before they concurred in the same opinion: that they would first divide between themselves the ten talents that had been given by

Sosibius, and afterwards disclose the whole matter to Antiochus: and that, when they had obtained some present money from the king, together with an assurance also of such future rewards as might be suitable to so great a service, they would engage, with his assistance, to deliver Achæus into his hands. When they had thus determined, Cambylus took upon himself the part of communicating the business to Antiochus. Bolis on the other hand engaged, that after some days he would send Arianus to Achæus, with letters from Nicomachus and Melancomas. But he left it to the care of Cambylus to take such measures, that this officer might enter the citadel, and return back again with safety. At the same time it was concerted, that, if Achæus should fall into the snare, and send back an answer to the letters, Bolis should then join Cambylus, and assist in the execution of the design.

When they had in this manner regulated all their plan, they separated; and each prepared himself to perform the part which he had undertaken. Cambylus took the first occasion that was offered, and disclosed the project to the king. Antiochus, surprised by an assurance so unexpected and so pleasing, was agitated by different passions. In one moment, transported with joy, he promised every thing that was required of him. In the next, being diffident of the success, he demanded an account of every

part and circumstance of the design, and of the measures that were taken for carrying it into execution. At last, giving full credit to the whole, and being persuaded that the thing had happened by the special favour of the gods, he pressed Cambylus with repeated earnestness to accomplish what he had begun. At the same time Bolis addressed himself in such a manner to Nicomachus and Melancomas, that they entertained not the least suspicion with respect to his sincerity. They gave letters therefore to Arianus, to be delivered to Achæus; and advised this prince to place an entire confidence in Bolis and Cambylus. The letters were written in a certain cipher, which they had always used; and were so composed, that, if they had fallen into any other hands, the contents would have remained unknown.

Arianus having introduced himself into the citadel with the assistance of Cambylus, delivered the letters to Achæus; and, as he had been employed in the affair from the beginning, gave also a distinct and accurate account of all that had been done. Being closely examined concerning various matters, respecting Bolis and Sosibius, Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most especially Cambylus, he answered every question without any hesitation, and with an air of the most genuine truth. And this he was the better enabled to do, because he was a stranger to the secret consultations that had

passed between Bolis and Cambylus. Achæus being satisfied with his answers, but chiefly because he gave credit to what was written by Nicomachus and Melancomas, sent back Arianus with an answer to the letters. And when the same thing had been many times repeated, he at last resolved to embrace the measure which his friends advised: the rather indeed, because he had now no other hopes of safety. He desired therefore, that Bolis and Arianus might be sent to him, in a night in which there would be no moon; and said that he would deliver himself into their hands. His intention was, first to remove himself from the present danger; and, immediately after his escape, to take the route of Syria. For he had reason to be persuaded, that his sudden and unexpected appearance among the Syrians, while Antiochus still remained before the citadel of Sardes, would occasion some commotion in the country; and be received with the greatest joy by the people of Antiochia, Cœle-syria, and Phœnice. Animated by these flattering hopes, he now expected, with impatience, the time in which Bolis should arrive.

As soon as Melancomas had received these letters, he urged Bolis to depart; having first recommended the business to him again in the most pressing words, and given him an assurance of great rewards, if the design should be attended with success. Bolis, having dispatched Arianus to Cambylus with notice of his coming,

met the latter in the night at an appointed place. They passed a whole day together in adjusting all the parts of their design; and then entered the camp by night. The manner in which they regulated their plan was this. If Achæus should leave the citadel alone, or with only one companion, together with Bolis and Arianus, it was certain that no resistance could be expected from him; and that it would be an easy thing for those to whom he had intrusted himself to seize his person. But in case that he should be attended with a greater number, it would then be a matter of some difficulty: especially because the intention was, to take him alive if it was possible, in order the more to gratify Antiochus. Upon this account it was determined, that, in bringing Achæus from the citadel, Arianus should go the first, as being acquainted with the track by which he had often passed and returned: and that Bolis should follow behind the rest; that, as soon as they should arrive at a certain place, where Cambylus had engaged to conceal some men in ambuscade, he might then seize Achæus, and hold him fast; lest, in the tumult and the darkness of the night, he should either save himself by flight into the adjoining woods, or throw himself in despair from the top of some precipice, and not fall alive, as they had designed, into the power of his enemies.

When all things were thus concerted, Cambylus, unattended by any person, conducted

Bolis in the same night to Antiochus, who also was alone. The king received him with great marks of favour; confirmed the promises which he had made; and earnestly entreated both of them to carry the project into execution without delay. They then returned back again to their own part of the camp: and when the morning approached, Bolis and Arianus went towards the citadel, and entered it before it was yet day.

Achæus received Bolis with eager transports of affection; and asked many questions concerning every circumstance and part of the design. And as he judged, both from his appearance and discourse, that he was equal to the weight of such an enterprise, he was filled with joy, from the prospect of so near a safety. But this joy again was mingled with no small anxiety and doubt, when he looked forwards to the greatness of the consequences. In this uncertainty, as he had joined to an excellent understanding a long experience also in affairs, he resolved not to repose an entire confidence in the integrity of Bolis. He told him, therefore, that it was not possible for him at this time to follow him; but that he would send with him three or four of his friends; and, when these should have joined Melancomas, he would then be ready himself to leave the citadel. Thus Achæus did all that was possible to be done: but considered not that he was practising the arts of a Cretan against a Cretan. For Bolis had attentively examined every circumstance that

could arise in the course of such an undertaking.

When the night was come in which Achæus had promised to send out his friends, he ordered Bolis and Arianus to wait at the gate of the citadel till they should be joined by those whom he had appointed to go with them. And being now ready to depart, he first communicated the design to his wife Laodice; who was so struck with the surprise that she lost her senses. Achæus, having employed some time in soothing and calming her disorder, and encouraged her to expect a happy success, chose four of his friends, and clothing them in plain habits, himself also taking a simple and vulgar dress, and appearing to be a person of mean condition, set forwards on his way towards the gate. He had ordered, likewise, that one alone of these attendants should answer all the questions that should be asked by Arianus, as well as ask of him whatever might be necessary; and should say that the others were barbarians. When they had joined the traitors, Arianus went the first, as being acquainted with the way: and Bolis, as it had been concerted, followed behind the rest, but not without great perplexity and doubt. For though, as a Cretan, he was ready enough, upon any ill occasion, to penetrate through the artifice of others, yet in the darkness of the night he neither knew which of the persons was Achæus, nor whether he was indeed among them. But, as the path was rough and difficult,

and many parts of the descent very slippery and full of danger, the pains which the rest employed, sometimes to support Achæus in such places, and sometimes to wait his coming, not being able altogether to abstain from that attention which they had been used to pay to their prince, soon discovered to the artful Cretan the person whom he desired to know. When they came, therefore, to the place appointed by Cambylus, the signal being given by a whistle, those that were in ambuscade suddenly seized the four attendants, while Bolis himself grasped Achæus, whose hands were wrapped within his garment, and held him fast; being apprehensive, that, perceiving what had happened, he would otherwise destroy himself with his sword, which he had brought with him. The rest soon surrounded him on every side; and making themselves masters of his person, conducted him, together with his friends, immediately to Antiochus.

The king had long been in suspense, and impatiently expected the event. Having dismissed his company, he remained alone in his tent without going to rest, attended by two or three guards. When he saw Cambylus enter, and place Achæus bound upon the ground, his astonishment took from him the power of speech, so that he remained for a long time silent. At last he melted into tears; being struck, as I suppose, with seeing in this signal instance how difficult it is to guard against the

preposterous accidents of fortune. For this Achæus, who was the son of Andromachus, the brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus; who himself had married Laodice the daughter of king Mithridates; who was sovereign of all the country on this side of mount Taurus; who in this very moment was thought, both by his own troops and by those of his enemies, to be secure in a fortress of the greatest strength; this very Achæus is now seated bound upon the ground, and thrown into the power of his greatest enemies; while every person is ignorant of the transaction, except those alone who had accomplished it. On the morrow, when the courtiers, as the custom was, came to the royal tent at break of day, and beheld Achæus; they were no less astonished than the king had been, and could scarcely give credit to what they saw. The council was then assembled; and, after long deliberation concerning the punishment that should be inflicted upon the unhappy prince, it was at last determined that his hands and feet should be first cut off, and afterwards his head: that the latter should be sewed up in the skin of an ass; and the body be fixed upon a cross. When this sentence was executed the whole army was so strongly agitated by surprise and terror, that Laodice, who alone knew that her husband was gone, conjectured what had happened to him, when she beheld from the citadel the great commotion and disorder that was spread through all the camp. Soon after-

wards, a herald being sent to inform her of the death of Achæus, and to command her to relinquish all affairs, and retire from the citadel; the garrison at first answered only with loud lamentations and extravagant cries; not so much on account of the affection which they had borne towards Achæus, as because the event itself was most unexpected and astonishing. When their grief had ceased, they found themselves involved in great perplexity. For Antiochus pressed the citadel closely without any intermission; being persuaded that, as Achæus was now removed, the garrison itself would most probably furnish some occasion by which he might become master of the place. And this indeed soon happened. The soldiers fell into sedition, and formed two parties; one of which joined themselves to Ariobazus, while the other adhered to Laodice. And as each of these factions distrusted the other, they in a short time surrendered both themselves and the citadel to Antiochus.

In this manner died Achæus; vanquished by the treachery of those whom he had trusted, after he had employed every kind of caution that reason could suggest. His fate may afford two useful lessons to posterity. The first, that we ought not too easily to place a confidence in any person; and the other, that we never should be much elated by prosperous fortune; but remember that, as men, we are subject to the power of every accident.

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

Annibal takes Tarentum by surprise, and with the assistance of some of the citizens.

THE young men at first left the city in the night, as if they designed to make an excursion in search of booty. But when they approached near to the Carthaginian camp, the rest having concealed themselves in an adjoining wood, Philemenus only and Nico advanced close to the intrenchment. Being taken by the guards, and neither declaring who they were, nor from whence they came, but only that they had something to communicate to the general, they were soon brought to Annibal; and when they saw him, they desired that they might have some discourse with him alone. To this request he readily consented. And when they were alone with him, having first endeavoured to excuse their own conduct and that of their fellow-citizens, they then entered into a long and various accusation of the Romans; that the design which they had formed, to desert their party, might appear to have been suggested to them by just reasons. Annibal received what they had said with great marks of favour, applauded their resolution, and then dismissed

them; commanding them after a short time to return, and discourse with him again upon the business; and that, for the present, as soon as they had gained a little distance from the camp, they should boldly drive away the cattle that were within their reach, and the men that were with them: that he would give such orders, that they might do it without danger. His intention was both to gain time for himself to examine more closely what had been proposed; and to induce the Tarentines also to believe that the young men had left the city with no other design than to obtain some booty. The young men followed these directions. And as Annibal on the one hand was greatly pleased, that an occasion had at last been offered to him of becoming master of the city; so Nico also and Philemenus were encouraged to persist in their design with double ardour: not only because they had opened a way to converse with Annibal in full security, and had found him ready to embrace what they proposed; but because the quantity of the booty likewise which they carried back secured them against all suspicion on the part of their own citizens. For such was the abundance, that it served both for sacrifices and for feasts. The Tarentines, therefore, not only entertained not any suspicion; but many of them were desirous also of bearing a part in these excursions.

Not long afterwards they again went out of the city, and having observed the same cau-

tion as before, concluded with Annibal a solemn treaty upon these conditions; that he should leave the Tarentines in full enjoyment of their liberty, and neither should exact any tribute from them, nor impose upon them any law; and that, as soon as the city should be taken, the Carthaginians should be allowed to pillage the houses that were occupied by the Romans. They received from him likewise a signal by which they might obtain admission from the guards, as often as they should come to the camp. From this time, therefore, they had frequent opportunities to see and converse with Annibal: sometimes leaving the city as if they were going in search of booty, and sometimes under the pretence of hunting.

When the measures were thus prepared that were necessary to accomplish the intended project, the rest of the conspirators, while they waited for the proper time of action, advised Philemenus to be assiduous in his hunting. For this young man had through all his life been so devoted to the diversions of the field, that the general opinion of him was, that he had almost no other passion. It was concerted, therefore, that he should endeavour to gain the favour both of Caius Livius who commanded in the city, and of the guards also that were stationed at a certain gate, which was below the gate called Temenis, by presenting to them from time to time some part of the game which he should take.

Philemenus, having taken upon himself this

part of the design, brought back continually some game to the city; either such as himself had taken, or what had been prepared for him by Annibal; and gave one part to the commander, and another part to the guards, that they might be ready to open to him the wicket of the gate. For he both left the city and returned, most usually in the night: on pretence indeed of danger from the enemy; but in reality, because this season was most suitable to the design. When the guards then had been so long accustomed to this practice, that, as soon as Philemenus appeared, and gave the signal by a whistle, they were ready without any delay to open the gate; the conspirators, having received notice that the Roman governor designed on a certain day to give a feast to a large company in the Musæum, which was near to the citadel, resolved, in concert with Annibal, to choose that day for carrying their project into execution. This general, who for some time before had feigned himself to be sick, that his long continuance in one place, might not seem strange to the Romans, pretended now that his sickness was worse, and remained with the army at the distance of three days' journey from Tarentum. But when the appointed time was come, he selected from all the cavalry and infantry, about ten thousand of the most active and bravest soldiers, and, commanding them to take provisions for four days, began his march with the greatest haste, just before the break of

day: having ordered a body of eighty Numidian horse, to advance at the distance of thirty stadia before the rest, that the main body might not be discerned by any; but that all those whom they should meet, might either be taken prisoners by them, or, flying into the city, discover only that the Numidians were making incursions in the country. And when they were now distant from the city about a hundred and twenty stadia, he commanded the troops to rest, and to take their supper upon the banks of a river, where some precipices covered them from open view. He then called together the officers; and, not communicating to them the design, exhorted them only to acquit themselves like men of courage, and to be assured, that their bravery never would receive more ample rewards. In the next place, he commanded them to keep the order of the march with the greatest strictness; and to punish every soldier with severity that should leave his rank. And lastly, that they should carefully attend to all his orders, and do nothing except what should be commanded. With these orders, he dismissed them; and, as soon as the evening approached, again began his march, designing to arrive at the foot of the walls about the time of midnight. He took Philemenus with him as a guide; and had prepared a wild boar, which was to be used in the execution of the design.

Livius had assembled his friends together in the Musæum on that day, agreeable to the

notice which the conspirators had before received. About the time of sun-set, when the feast was at the height, some messengers arrived with the news, that the Numidians were making incursions in the country. The governor, not apprehending any thing besides, and being diverted indeed by this very account, from any suspicion of the truth, gave orders to some officers, that, as soon as the day should appear, they should take one half of the cavalry, and endeavour to stop the ravages of the enemy.

When night was now come, Nico, Tragiscus, and all the rest that were engaged in the design, having collected themselves together in the city, expected the return of Livius; which, as the feast had been celebrated in the day, soon happened. The rest of the young men then remained together in their place at a certain distance. But some of them advanced forwards to meet the company; and, assuming a dissolute and sportive air, began to mimic the gestures of those that were returning from the banquet. And when they had joined the governor, whose senses were greatly disordered by the wine, they gave a free scope to their mirth. They laughed with him; received and retorted his jests; and, turning back with him, conducted him in that manner to his house; where, with a mind dissolved in joy, and free from every anxious and disquieting thought, he soon sunk into that deep sleep, which drinking in the day is so ready to procure. Nico and Tragis-

cus then returned back again to their companions: and, dividing themselves into three bodies, took possession of the avenues that led towards the forum; that from thence they might be able to observe whatever should happen either within or without the city. There were some also that were stationed near to the house of the governor. For they well knew, that, if any suspicion should arise of their design, it would be first conveyed to Livius; and that every measure that could be taken to prevent the execution, must begin from him. But when the several companies of the evening had at last retired, and all the tumult of the city ceased; when the inhabitants were fast in sleep, and the night far advanced; the young men, finding that nothing had appeared to obstruct their hopes, again united themselves in one body, and prepared to begin their work.

The measures which they had concerted with the Carthaginians were these: that Annibal, having approached the city on the eastern side, and directing his march towards the gate called Temenis, should kindle a fire upon a certain tomb, which by some was called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and by others of Apollo Hyacinthus: that Tragiscus, on the other hand, as soon as he should perceive this fire, should answer by another within the city: and that Annibal, having then extinguished the fire which he had made, should advance slowly towards the gate. Agreeably to this plan, the young men, having

traversed the streets of the city, came to the place of the tombs. For the eastern side of Tarentum is filled with sepulchres of the dead; who, in obedience to an ancient oracle, are all buried, even to the present age, within the gates. The words of the oracle are said to have been these: "That the fortune of Tarentum would be happier and more prosperous, in proportion to the numbers that should inhabit it." The Tarentines, therefore, in order to obtain a full accomplishment of the prediction, from that time kept their dead also within the city. The young men then, arriving at this place, stood near the tomb of Pythionicus, and waited for the event. Annibal soon approached, and made the signal that had been concerted. Nico and Tragiscus, filled with confidence, immediately answered by another fire. And when that of Annibal was again extinguished, they then ran with the greatest haste towards the gate, that they might be able to kill the guards, before the Carthaginians should arrive. For it had been concerted, that the troops should advance leisurely, and with a deliberate pace. The whole thing succeeded as they desired. The guards were taken by surprise: and while one part of the conspirators were employed in killing them, the rest broke the bars; and, the gate being soon set open, Annibal also arrived in the very moment that was requisite: having conducted his march with so great prudence, that no discovery had been made of it in the

city. Making his entry, therefore, without any tumult or resistance, as he had at first designed; and being persuaded that the chief part of the work was already finished, he advanced boldly from the lower side of the city, through the street that led to the forum: leaving only a body of two thousand of his cavalry without the gate; that they might be ready either to intercept any enemy that should appear from without, or to serve in the case of any of those sudden accidents, which frequently arise in the course of such enterprises. When he came near to the forum, he ordered the troops to halt, and waited for the arrival of Philemenus; not without some solicitude with respect to this part of the design. For when himself, after he had made the signal of the fire, began his march towards the gate called Temenis, he at the same time sent Philemenus, with a wild boar, and a thousand Africans, to another gate that was near; being desirous to employ more means than one, and not to trust the success of the project to any single measure.

After some time, Philemenus approached the walls, and made the accustomed signal by a whistle. The guard immediately descended to the gate. Philemenus called to him to open without delay; and said, that they carried a heavy load, having brought with them a wild boar. The guard, being pleased with what he heard, and hoping to receive, as at other times, some share of the fortunate chase, hastily open-

ed the wicket of the gate. Philemenus then entered, carrying the foremost part of the barrow; and with him another, who appeared to be a peasant, and wore the dress of a shepherd. Two others also followed, and supported the burthen behind. When the four had entered, they first killed the guard; who, not suspecting any harm, was employed in viewing and in handling the boar. At the same time thirty Africans, who had advanced before the rest, passed leisurely through the wicket, and without any interruption. And while one party began to break the bars of the gate, others killed the rest of the guards. The signal being then made, the whole body of the Africans that were without entered through the gate, and directed their march towards the forum, as they had been before commanded.

When Annibal saw these troops approach, being overjoyed to find that the design had thus far been attended with success, he made haste to carry into execution what remained. Having divided the Gauls, who were in number about two thousand, into three separate bodies, he placed at the head of each two of the young men who had joined in the conspiracy, together with two Carthaginian officers; and commanded them to take possession of the most commodious avenues that led into the forum. He ordered the young men to save from slaughter all the citizens that they should meet; and to proclaim aloud, that the Tarentines should remain in their place, and be assured of safety. But he com-

manded the Carthaginian and Gallic officers to kill every Roman that should fall in their way. Immediately these bodies separated, and marched by different ways to execute these orders.

As it now began to be known that the enemy had entered, the whole city was filled clamour and confusion. Livius, being informed of what had happened, and finding himself so much inebriated as to be incapable of acting, immediately with his domestics left his house; and having ordered the wicket of the gate that led to the harbour to be opened to him, went on board one of the vessels that were at anchor there, and sailed round to the citadel. About the same time Philemenus, having prepared some Roman trumpets, and some persons who had learned to blow them, ordered them to be sounded near the theatre. The Romans, in obedience to a signal to which they had been accustomed, immediately took arms, and running towards the forum, afforded the occasion which their enemies desired. For as they spread themselves through the streets without any order, they fell, some of them among the Carthaginians, and some among the Gauls, and were destroyed by them in very great numbers.

The day began now to appear, and the Tarentines, who had remained quiet in their houses, were not able to understand the truth of what had happened. For, as on the one hand they heard only the Roman trumpets, and saw no attempt made to plunder or insult the city, they

were ready to persuade themselves, that the Romans themselves had occasioned the disorder. But when they perceived on the other hand, that many of the Roman soldiers were killed in the streets; and that the Gauls were busy in spoiling them, they then began to suspect, that the Carthaginians had found means to enter the city. But when it was now clear day, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, in which there was a garrison; Annibal, having drawn up all his forces in order of battle in the forum, ordered proclamation to be made, that the Tarentines should all meet together in the forum, likewise without arms. At the same time, the young men who had joined in the conspiracy, ran through the city, crying liberty, and exhorting the citizens not to fear, but to consider the Carthaginians as their deliverers and friends. When they heard these words, as many of the citizens as remained firm in the interests of the Romans fled also into the citadel. The rest obeyed the order, and came to the forum without arms. As soon as they were assembled, Annibal harangued them in a discourse that was full of favour. And when the Tarentines on their part, having obtained so unexpected a deliverance, received all that he said with loud and general applause, he then dismissed them; commanding that each of them should inscribe the word TARENTINE upon the door of his house; and forbidding them, under pain of death, to make the same inscription upon any

house that belonged to a Roman. Having afterwards divided into several bands, the troops that were most proper for this service, he sent them away to pillage all the houses upon which they should see no inscription: and kept the rest of his forces drawn up in order; that they might be ready to support the first. The Carthaginians, having collected together in this pillage great quantities of plunder of every kind, and obtained a booty that fully answered all their expectations, remained under their arms during that whole night.

On the following day Annibal, after he had held a consultation with the Tarentines, resolved to separate the city from the citadel by a wall, that the inhabitants might have nothing to dread from the sallies of the Roman garrison. He began, therefore, with first throwing up an intrenchment parallel to the wall and the ditch of the city. But as he well knew that the enemy would employ all their power to obstruct him in this design; and judging likewise, that nothing was more necessary with respect to the future time than that he should strike a terror into the Romans, and inspire the Tarentines with confidence; he held in readiness some of the bravest of his forces. As soon as the work was begun the Romans sallied out, and began the attack with great impetuosity and courage. At first Annibal only skirmished, in order to provoke still more the ardour of the enemy. But when a sufficient number of them had advanced beyond the ditch, he then gave the

signal to his troops, and fell with fury upon the Romans. The fight was for some time sharp and obstinate; and such as might be expected upon a narrow ground, and in a place that was enclosed with walls. But the Romans, being closely pressed, were at last forced to fly. Many of them had fallen in the action; but the greatest part, flying in disorder, were pushed into the ditch, and perished there.

After this success, Annibal continued the work of the intrenchment in full security; and was pleased to find that the event had fully answered all his expectations. For as the Romans were now forced to remain quiet behind their walls, and began to fear that the citadel, as well as themselves, would be exposed to danger; the Tarentines, on the other hand, were so filled with confidence, that they were persuaded, that, without any assistance from the Carthaginians, they should be able to defend themselves against the Romans. When this work was finished, at a little distance from the intrenchment, and on the side towards the city, he ordered a ditch to be made, parallel to the intrenchment, and to the wall of the citadel; and, on the side of the ditch which was next to the city, a rampart; which was covered also on the top with a palisade, and was itself almost as secure as a wall. At a moderate distance from this rampart, in a line with it, and on the side also that was next to the city, he ordered a wall likewise to be built, from the place called Sotira

to the street that was named the Lower Street. With such fortifications the Tarentines wanted not the presence of an army to secure them against the insults of the enemy. Annibal therefore, leaving only a sufficient garrison, with a necessary guard of cavalry, went and encamped at the distance of forty stadia from the city, upon the banks of a river which is sometimes called Galesus, but most commonly Eurotas, from the river of the same name which flows near to the city of Sparta. For there are many appellations of this kind, both in the city and through the whole territory of Tarentum, which the Tarentines, who are allowed to have sprung from the Spartan stock, brought with them from the country from which they migrated.

By the great zeal and diligence of the Tarentines, who were assisted also by the Carthaginians in the work, the building of the wall was in a short time finished. Annibal then resolved to attempt to take the citadel. But when the necessary preparations were completed, the Romans, having received some succours by the sea from Metapontum, in some degree resumed their courage; and, making a sally in the night, destroyed all the machines and works. The Carthaginians, therefore, were forced to abandon that design. But as the wall was now finished, Annibal assembled the Tarentines together, and told them, that the thing of greatest importance in the present circumstances was, that they should render themselves masters of the sea: that, as

the citadel commanded the entrance of the harbour, their vessels, not being able to sail out of the port, were altogether useless; that the Romans, on the other hand, would receive all necessities by the sea in full security: and that, as long as the enemy should be possessed of this advantage, the liberty of the city must still be exposed to danger. But if the Romans, he said, could be but once excluded from the means of receiving any supplies by the sea, they would immediately have recourse to a voluntary submission, and surrender the citadel. The Tarentines assented to this discourse; but were not able to conceive by what way the thing now mentioned could be accomplished; unless perhaps by the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet. But this was not to be expected at the present time. They knew not, therefore, nor were they able to conjecture, to what this discourse of Annibal could lead. And when he farther told them, that it was manifestly in their own power, by themselves alone, and without any assistance from the Carthaginians, to become masters of the sea, they were still more surprised, and unable to comprehend his meaning.

But this general, having remarked that the street that was on the inside of the wall, and which led from the harbour to the exterior sea, might easily be accommodated to the purpose, had conceived the design of transporting the vessels over this ground from the port to the southern side of the city. As soon then as he disclosed

this project, the Tarentines not only acknowledged that the thing was practicable, but expressed also the highest admiration, and were persuaded that nothing was too difficult for the sagacity and courage of this great commander. Immediately, therefore, they prepared some carriages with wheels; and applied themselves with such alacrity, and in so great numbers, to the execution of this design, that the work was accomplished almost as soon as it was proposed. The Tarentines then, when they had thus drawn their vessels over the land into the open sea, and cut off all supplies from the Romans, invested the citadel without any danger. Annibal, having left a sufficient garrison in the city, began his march back again with the army; and, arriving on the third day in his first camp, continued there during the remainder of the winter.

BOOK THE NINTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Different kinds of history. The most useful is that which relates public actions.

THESE then are the most remarkable transactions that were included in the Olympiad before mentioned, and in the course of four years complete; which, as we have said, is to be considered as the proper term of an Olympiad. These transactions we shall endeavour to describe in the two following books.

I am not ignorant, indeed, that the manner in which I write this history has something in it displeasing; and that the uniformity of the composition must render it suitable to the taste and judgement of only one sort of readers. For all other historians, or at least the greatest part of them, employ together all the several branches of history, and by the means of that variety, attract many different persons to the reading of their works. Thus those, for example, who seek only a present satisfaction, are gratified with an account of the origin and descent of families.

Others again, more curious and inquisitive, have a pleasure in tracing the settlement of colonies, the foundation of cities, and the migrations of people, as they are found in the work of Ephorus; and the attention of the political reader is fixed by the recital of the public actions of nations, cities, and kingdoms. With regard, therefore, to myself, as I have confined my labours simply to these actions, and excluded every other subject from my work, this history, as I have said, is properly adapted only to one sort of men, and has nothing in it that can allure the minds of the greatest part of readers. The reasons that induced me to choose this branch of history alone, and to reject the rest, have been shown at large in other parts of this work. It may not, however, be improper, for the sake of impressing them again more strongly upon the memory, to give a short recapitulation of them in this place.

As these genealogies then, with all the fabulous stories that attend them, as the establishments of colonies, the relations of people one to another, and the foundations of cities, have already been recounted by many writers, and in a very copious manner: the necessary consequence must be, that whoever at this time resumes these subjects, either must appropriate to himself the labours of another, which of all actions is the basest; or, not claiming them as his own, must appear to be engaged in a very useless undertaking; since, by his own acknowledgement, he is only busied in compiling an

account of those very matters, which have already been sufficiently explained, and transmitted to posterity by former writers. For this reason, therefore, as well as for many others, I have rejected all such subjects. With regard to actions there are two reasons, likewise, that determined me to adopt them as the only subject of my work. First, as actions happen in a continually new succession, the relation of them also must be always new; nor is there any need, in composing a recital of late events, to go back to others that have already been recounted. In the next place, this kind of history, as it has been in all times the most instructive, is such most eminently in the present age. For so great is the perfection to which all arts and sciences have been raised, that those who are acquainted with them may now examine every thing that happens by some certain rule. Upon these accounts then, I have confined myself, as I have said, to the recital of actions only: and I am persuaded that those who shall read my work with due attention, will be ready to bear the strongest testimony to the truth of these reflections.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

Annibal, having in vain endeavoured to force the Romans to raise the siege of Capua, advances with the same design towards Rome, but is disappointed in his expectation. A comparison of Annibal with Epaminondas; and of the Lacedæmonians with the Romans.

ANNIBAL, having extended his army in a circle round the whole camp of Appius, at first endeavoured by light skirmishing to draw him out to an engagement. And when no answer was returned to this invitation, he then invested the camp as in a regular siege. The cavalry, advancing together in troops, threw their javelins with loud cries into the very camp; while the infantry, ranged also in just cohorts, attempted to tear away the pallisade of the intrenchment. The Romans, however, were not moved from their purpose even by these attacks; but opposed their light forces only to those who came near to the intrenchment; while the heavy armed troops, drawn up in cohorts, and covering them from the javelins that were thrown, remained quiet in their ranks. Annibal, therefore, being grieved to find that he neither could throw himself into the city of Capua, nor draw the Romans to an engagement, was at last forced to

have recourse to other counsels, and to consider with himself what measures were most proper to be taken.

The state indeed in which things now appeared, might well fill the Carthaginians with perplexity, since it cannot but occasion some embarrassment even to those who read only a relation of it. For is it not almost incredible, that the Romans, who had been so often defeated by the Carthaginians, that they dared not to engage them again in set battle, should yet refuse to retire, or to leave the field? Is it not astonishing, that those very troops, who in former times had never left the sides of the hills, should now descend into the plains, and lay siege to the noblest city, in the most conspicuous part of Italy; while their camp also was surrounded by those very enemies, whom they had feared to look deliberately in the face? The Carthaginians on the other hand, who had gained victory after victory without any intermission, were at this very time perplexed with no less difficulty than the vanquished. In my judgement however, the conduct both of the one and of the other was founded simply upon this opinion, which was common to them both; that the cavalry of Annibal was the only cause, to which the Carthaginians owed all their victories, and the Romans their defeats. Upon this account it was, that the latter, immediately after every action, had been accustomed to lead

their armies along the sides of the hills, in sight indeed of the enemy, but in places where the cavalry was not able to act against them. And with respect particularly to all that now passed in the neighbourhood of Capua, the same persuasion very clearly explains the motives that determined either army. For the Romans, while they refused to draw out their forces to a battle, through dread of the cavalry of the enemy, at the same time remained with confidence in the post which they had taken; as being well assured, that this very cavalry, which had occasioned their defeat in every set engagement, was not able to make any impression upon their camp. The Carthaginians again considered, and with no less reason, that it would not be possible for them to keep their cavalry long together in a body. For the forage had been purposely destroyed by the Romans through all the country. Nor was it possible to bring from any great distance those supplies of hay and of barley, which so large a number of horses and beasts of burthen would require. And if, on the other hand, they should dismiss their cavalry, and remain afterwards in their camp; they never could attack, without manifest hazard, an enemy who was strongly intrenched, and against whom every engagement, not supported by their cavalry, must be attended with very doubtful success. They were apprehensive likewise, that some new forces might

arrive; and encamping close behind them, might involve them in the greatest difficulties by intercepting their supplies. Annibal therefore, having concluded from these reasons, that it was not possible to draw the Romans from the siege by open force, resolved to attempt it in a different way.

He considered with himself, that, if he could make a secret march, and appear suddenly in the neighbourhood of Rome, either some advantage might perhaps be gained against the city, before the inhabitants should be recovered from the consternation into which so unexpected an event would throw them; or, on the other hand, that Appius would be forced to raise the siege of Capua, and hasten to the assistance of his country; or, sending away one part at least of his army for that purpose, would afford the opportunity of an easy victory, both against the forces that should be so separated from the rest, and those also that would be left behind. Having formed then this design, he engaged an African to pass as a deserter into the Roman camp, and from thence into the city, with letters which he had taken care to secure. For he had reason to fear that the inhabitants, as soon as they should perceive that he was gone, would despair of receiving any farther succour, and surrender themselves to the Romans. He contrived, therefore, that these letters should be delivered to them on the very day following his departure: that, being acquainted

with his purpose, they might be encouraged still to sustain the siege.

At Rome, when the news arrived of what passed in the neighbourhood of Capua; and that Annibal had encamped close to the Roman army, and even invested them in their camp; the minds of all men were raised in suspense, and were filled with anxiety and dread. For it seemed that the very moment that would decide the war was now approaching. The citizens therefore, in general, and every one particularly, were occupied with no other care, than to complete the preparations for that side, and to send all the necessary succours.

The people of Capua, when they had received the letters from the hands of the African, and were informed of the design of Annibal, resolved to wait the event, and sustain the siege. In the mean time, this general, on the fifth day after he had first encamped, having ordered the troops to take their supper, and leaving his fires lighted, decamped in the evening with so great secrecy, that the enemy knew not that he was gone. With continual and forced marches, he passed through the territory of the Samnites, taking care always to send some troops before, to examine the country, and to occupy the proper posts. And while the attention of the Romans was wholly fixed on the affairs of Capua, and the condition of the siege, he passed the river Anio before he was discovered, and, advancing still nearer towards Rome, fixed his camp at

the distance of no more than forty stadia from the city. The first news of this approach filled all Rome with terror and confusion. For, beside that the event was sudden, it was most distant likewise from every expectation; because Annibal never had approached so near before. Add to this, that an opinion also immediately prevailed, that he would not even now have ventured to approach, unless the legions that were employed in the siege of Capua had been first defeated. The men therefore made haste to mount the walls, and to take all the advantageous posts that were without the city: while the women went round to the temples, offering supplications to the gods, and sweeping the pavements of the holy shrines with their hair. For such is the custom of this people, whenever their country is threatened with any great and unusual danger.

Annibal then, having encamped in the place that has been mentioned, had resolved to make an attempt against the city on the following day; when an accident, as fortunate as unexpected, occasioned the safety of Rome. The consuls, Cneus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, who had before enrolled one legion, had ordered the soldiers to attend at Rome with their arms upon this very day, to take the military oath. At this very time likewise, they were employed in selecting and enrolling men for another legion. Thus a great body of troops was assembled, as it were spontaneously, in the mo-

ment that was requisite. The consuls, placing themselves with confidence at their head, went and encamped without the city; and by this measure gave an effectual check to the ardour of the Carthaginians. For Annibal had at first advanced, and was not without hopes that he should be able to take the city by storm. But when he saw that the Romans were drawn up in battle against him; and being informed also of the true state of things by a prisoner that was taken, he desisted from the attempt: and leading his army through the country, set fire to the houses and plundered all that was within his reach. The booty that was gained even in the first excursions was such as exceeded all account: being drawn from a country, into which it never had been expected that an enemy would at any time come.

The consuls however were now so filled with confidence, that they had the boldness to encamp at the distance of ten stadia only from the Carthaginian army. But Annibal, having considered that his troops were loaded with an immense booty; that he had failed in his attempt against the city; and, above all, that the time was now elapsed, in which he had supposed that Appius, informed of the danger with which Rome was threatened, would either raise the siege of Capua, or, leaving there a small part only of his forces, would hasten with the rest to defend his country; and that, in either case, he should meet him on his way with some ad-

vantage; resolved to begin his march back again, and decamped early in the morning. But Publius, having before broken the bridges that were upon the river, so that the Carthaginians were obliged to ford the stream, pressed closely upon the rear of the army in their passage, and threw them into no small disorder. The numbers indeed of the Carthaginian cavalry, and the readiness of the Numidians in assisting every part that was attacked, prevented the action from being in any manner general. The Romans however recovered again a great part of the plunder; and, having taken prisoners also about three hundred men, they then returned back to their camp. And being afterwards persuaded, that fear alone had determined Annibal to make so precipitate a retreat, they followed closely after him, leading their army along the sides of the hills.

The Carthaginian general, keeping in view his first design, for some time continued his march with the greatest haste. But, after five days, being informed that Appius had not left the siege, he halted, till the Romans who were following him were come near: and then falling suddenly upon their camp in the night, he killed great numbers of them, and forced the rest to fly out of the camp. And when the morning was come, perceiving that they had retreated to a strong eminence that was near, he resolved not to attack them in that post: but continued his route through Daunia and the Brutian dis-

strict, appeared so unexpectedly in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, that he had almost made himself master of the city. For all that were found in the country upon his approach fell into his hands; and among them many of the inhabitants of Rhegium.

Is there any one now that can withhold his admiration, or refuse the testimony that is due to the emulation and the courage that were so signally displayed upon this occasion both by the Carthaginians and the Romans? The conduct of Epaminondas in an action not unlike to that which we have now described has received the applause of all mankind. This general, arriving at Tegea with his allies, perceived that the Lacedæmonians had drawn together all their forces, as well as those of their allies to Mantinea, with design to offer battle to the Theban army. Having ordered his troops, therefore, to take their supper at an early hour, he led them out in the beginning of the night, under the pretence of occupying certain posts, that were most proper for the approaching battle. But when this persuasion was spread through all the army, he directed his march straight to Sparta, and arrived most unexpectedly about the third hour of the night. Finding the place destitute of all defence, he penetrated as far as to the forum, and made himself master of all the parts of the city that were on the side of the river. But this fortune soon was changed. For Agesilaus having been informed of what had hap-

pened, by a deserter who had gone in the night to Mantinea, immediately began his march, and arrived at Sparta with all his forces in the very moment when the city was taken. Epaminondas, therefore, being thus forced to abandon his design, ordered his troops to take their repast upon the banks of the Eurotas; and, having allowed also some time for rest, he resolved to march back again in haste by the same way by which he had arrived; being persuaded that, as the whole Lacedæmonian army had come in haste to protect their country, Mantinea in its turn was now left without defence. And this indeed was the truth. He therefore encouraged his troops; and continuing his march all night with the greatest haste, arrived about the middle of the day in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, which had no force sufficient to make resistance. But it happened that the Athenians, who were desirous to bear a part in the intended action against the Thebans, arrived at this very time, with design to join the Lacedæmonian army. And when the advanced guard of the Thebans had just reached the temple of Neptune, which stood at the distance of seven stadia only from Mantinea; in the same instant the Athenians, as if by concert, appeared upon the top of the hill that commanded the city. On the sight of these succours the Mantineans were at last encouraged to mount the walls, and oppose the entrance of the Thebans. It is not without good reason, therefore, that historians blame these accidents.

and say of Epaminondas, that he performed every thing that was to be expected from a skilful general; and while he showed himself to be superior to his enemies, was vanquished only by ill fortune.

The same reflections may be made with respect to the conduct of Annibal in the present instance. For when it is considered, that this general first attempted to raise the siege of Capua, by encamping near to the enemy, and attacking them in many little combats; that, when this design had failed, he then marched, with the same intention, into the very neighbourhood of Rome; that, when accident alone had prevented the success of this bold project, and forced him to return back again with his army, he still kept his attention fixed upon his first design, and stood ready to take advantage of any motion that should be made by the army that was employed in the siege; and lastly, when it is remembered that he did not even in the end desist from his undertaking, till he had dispersed the Romans with great slaughter, and almost taken the city by surprise; who can behold such actions, and not bestow upon this great commander the strongest testimony of admiration and applause?

With regard to the Romans, they must be allowed indeed to have deserved upon this occasion even a higher degree of praise than the Lacedæmonians in the instance that has been mentioned. For the Lacedæmonians, as soon

as they knew that Sparta was attacked, marched away in haste, and saved indeed their own city, but suffered Mantinea, as far as it depended upon themselves alone, to be lost. But the Romans preserved their country; and yet drew not away their army from the walls of Capua: but remaining immoveable and fixed in their first purpose, continued to press the siege with the same confidence as before.

But let it not now be imagined that my purpose in falling into this digression was barely to extol the Carthaginians and the Romans. Their great actions have already been often celebrated in the course of this work. My design was rather, by displaying the conduct of the leaders in these two states, to afford a lesson to all those who may hereafter be placed at the head of affairs in any country. That, when they call to their remembrance the fame of these commanders, and place their actions in full view before them, they may be led to emulate such great examples: and be persuaded that many things which appear to be beyond measure daring and full of danger, are not less safe in the execution than admirable in the attempt; and that the design itself, as well when frustrated as when attended with success, will draw after it immortal honour, if it be conducted only with ability and skill.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The ill policy of the Romans censured, in carrying into their own country the ornaments of the cities which they had conquered.

SUCH then was the reason that determined the Romans to remove into their own country the ornaments that have been mentioned, and not to leave any part behind. Whether this resolution was right and agreeable to their interests, or the contrary, would afford room perhaps for much dispute. It seems, however, that the strongest reasons might be brought to show, that they acted, and still continue to act, very imprudently in this matter. If the cultivation indeed of arts like these had been the means of their first advancement to strength and power, they might then, with good reason, have transferred into their own possession, such ornaments as had been found effectual to promote the greatness of their country. But as in truth it was a kind of life that was destitute of all superfluous wealth, and manners far removed from elegance and splendour, which enabled them to subdue continually those very nations which possessed the most, as well as the most beautiful, of these embellishments; how can it be doubted,

but that they erred in judgement upon this occasion? Nor are they to be blamed in this respect alone, that, when they were conquerors, they relinquished their own manners, and adopted the spirit of the conquered in exchange. There is also a certain kind of envy, which never fails to accompany such actions; and which, of all things, a powerful empire has the greatest cause to dread. For when men behold a state in possession of the riches that belonged to others, instead of applauding the good fortune, they view it, on the contrary, with secret jealousy; and are at the same time moved by sentiments of compassion towards those who have been thus despoiled. And when in the farther progress of success, the whole wealth of every foreign state is drawn together to one city, and the people themselves are invited, as it were, to take a view of that magnificence which so lately was their own; the evil then becomes greater than before. For the spectators, not actuated, as in the former instance, by compassion for the sufferings of their neighbours, are now exasperated by a sense of their own losses: and begin to glow, not with envy alone, but with resentment also against those whom fortune has so favoured. For the remembrance of the calamities which men have felt, will naturally excite their hatred against the authors of them. If the Romans indeed had only carried away the silver and the gold from the countries which they conquered, they would have de-

served no blame. For they could not in general have held the vanquished in subjection, unless they had deprived them of that source of their strength, and added it to their own. But with respect to the riches of a different kind, it would certainly have been far more prudent, to have suffered them to remain where they were found, together with the envy which they inspire: and to have established the glory of their own country, not by the vain ornaments of pictures and statues, but by a gravity of manners, and a magnanimity of conduct. But these reflections are sufficient. They may serve perhaps as instruction at least to future conquerors; not to strip the cities which they subdue; nor to think it possible, that the calamities of other nations, can ever become the ornament of their own countries.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

A digression concerning the proper manner of conducting any enterprise. What things are necessary to be known by the commander of an army. The application and use of astronomy and geometry. Examples of generals who failed in their attempts, from being unacquainted with the principles of those sciences. A censure of some common errors, arising from the same defect.

CHAP. I.

IN the affairs of war, much consideration is indeed required, to guard against the accidents that may arise in the course of such an undertaking. And yet in every project there is good reason to expect success, if the means of carrying it into execution be conducted only with sound sense and judgement.

If we examine then the accounts of former wars, it will be very obvious to perceive, that those actions, which are accomplished openly and by force alone, are much less frequent, than those that are concerted with some stratagem, and upon some occasion that is offered. From the same view likewise it will be no less evident, that, among these last, the number of those that

fail, is greater than of those that are attended with success. And that the want also of success, upon such occasions, is almost always to be ascribed to the ignorance or the negligence of the commanders, cannot reasonably be doubted. I shall endeavour therefore to point out the proper method of conducting enterprises of this sort; not taking into the consideration things that happen without foresight or intention, which deserve the name of chance or accident rather than of actions, and which are in their nature too unsettled to be fixed by any rule; but confining myself wholly to those actions which are undertaken with some certain purpose and design.

Every action then, of the kind here mentioned, must have a determinate point of time; a certain portion of time; and a certain place. It requires also secrecy; certain persons, through whom, and by whom, it must be accomplished: and lastly, a certain manner of carrying it into execution. When a commander has formed his measures right with respect to all these circumstances, it is manifest, that his attempt will be attended with success. But, on the other hand, the neglect of any one of these, will most assuredly defeat the whole design. For such is the nature of all concerted enterprises: a failure in any single part, however inconsiderable, shall have force to overthrow them; while all the measures together scarcely are sufficient to conduct an undertaking to its destined end. It

is clearly therefore a matter of the last importance, not to leave any thing neglected upon such occasions.

Now, of all the precautions that have been mentioned, the first to which a commander should attend, is that of observing secrecy. That neither the joy which springs from an unexpected prospect of success, nor yet the dread of a miscarriage; that neither friendship nor affection may prevail upon him, to communicate his design to any persons, except those alone without whose assistance it cannot be carried into execution: and not even to these, till the time in which their services are severally required obliges him to disclose it. Nor is it necessary only that the tongue be silent; but much more, that the mind also make not any discovery. For it has often happened, that men, who have carefully restrained themselves from speaking, have sometimes by their countenance alone, and sometimes by their actions, very clearly manifested their designs. A second thing to be considered are the different routes, either by day or by night, and the manner of performing them, both upon land and sea. The third, and indeed the greatest object is, to know the differences of the times that depend upon the heavens; and to be able to accommodate them to the execution of any design. Nor is the manner of executing any enterprise to be regarded as a point of small importance. For this alone has often made things practicable,

which appeared to be impossible, and ordered others impracticable, which were easy to be performed. In the last place, great attention should be paid to signals and countersignals; as well as to the choice of the persons, through whose means, and with whose assistance, the undertaking is to be accomplished.

The knowledge that is requisite in the things now mentioned, is to be acquired, partly by experience, partly by inquiry, and partly by the rules of science. With respect to the several routes; the place that is the object of the march; the nature of that place; and the persons fit to be employed in the execution of the enterprise; it is best, indeed, when a commander is himself acquainted with these things from his own proper knowledge. But if it be otherwise, his duty then is, to use the greatest care in his inquiries: not trusting rashly to any information that is offered; nor following any guides, without leaving behind him some pledges of their fidelity. In these things then, and in others similar to these, a general may obtain sufficient light, by consulting that experience which is gained in armies; by employing his own industry; and by making the necessary inquiries. But there are others that demand skill and knowledge, and some acquaintance with the rules of theoretical science, especially with those of astronomy and geometry. For, without having recourse to the more difficult branches of these two sciences, there are

certain parts of them, which, though they require but little labour, are of the greatest use upon such occasions, and serve principally to promote the success of all such enterprises as have here been mentioned.

Among the things that are to be learned in this method, one of the most necessary, is the investigation of the theory of the days and nights. If, indeed, the days and the nights were at all times equal, there would be no need of study, in order to acquire a knowledge which would in that case be common and obvious to all. But since they are different, not only each from the other, but also from themselves, it is plainly a matter of great importance, to know the laws by which they are severally diminished or increased. For, unless he be acquainted with these differences, how shall a commander be able to measure with exactness the time of a concerted march, either by night or by day? How can he be assured, without this knowledge, that he shall not either arrive too early, or too late? It happens also upon such occasions, and indeed upon such alone, that the first of these mistakes is more dangerous than the other. For he who arrives too late, is only forced to abandon his design. Perceiving his error, while he is yet at a distance, he may return back again with safety. But he who comes before the appointed time, being discovered by the enemy upon his approach, not only fails in the intended enterprise, but is in danger also of suffering an

entire defeat. It is time indeed, which generally governs in all human actions; and most particularly in the affairs of war. A commander, therefore, should be perfectly acquainted with the time of the summer and the winter solstice; the equinoxes; and the different degrees of the diminution, or increase of the nights and days, as they fall between the equinoctial points. For this is the only method that can enable him to adjust his motions to the course of time, either by land or sea.

Nor is it less necessary that a commander should also know distinctly the several portions of the day and of the night; in order to determine the proper hour of rising, and of putting the troops in march. For without beginning well, it is not possible to obtain a happy end. Now the time of day may easily be known: by the shadow from the sun; by the course which the sun takes; and by the different degrees of his elevation above the earth. But it is not so easy to distinguish the time of night: unless to those who are versed in the doctrine of the sphere; and are able to follow the course of the twelve signs, and to mark their disposition in the heavens. With this knowledge, it is a matter of no difficulty. For, though the nights are unequal, yet, since in the course of every night six of the twelve signs are raised above the horizon, it necessarily follows, that at the same times of the night, equal parts of the twelve signs must always appear. When it is known then

what part of the zodiac the sun occupies in the day, nothing more is requisite, than, at the time of his setting, to draw a line diametrically through the circle. When this is done, as much as the zodiac shall afterwards rise above the horizon, so much also of the night will have passed. And if the number only and the magnitude of the signs be known, the different parts of the night will be also known.

When the nights are cloudy, recourse must be had to the moon. For this planet is of such a magnitude, that, in whatever part of the heavens it may happen to be, the light of it may always be discerned. It is sometimes from the time and place of its rising, and sometimes from those of its setting, that the hours of the night are to be computed. But it will first be requisite to know with exactness, the different times of its rising upon each several day. Nor is this knowledge difficult to be obtained. For as the course of the moon is completed in a single month, the right apprehension of its progress in that period will serve equally in all the rest.

Upon these principles it may be observed, how well the poet deserves our praise, when he represents Ulysses, who possessed all the qualities of a great commander, forming conjectures from the appearances of the heavens, not only concerning the course of navigation, but with respect also to actions upon land. For even those sudden and unexpected events, by which men frequently are thrown into the greatest

difficulties, may by this method be apprehended with exactness before they happen. Such are violent rains and inundations; the fall of snows; a black and clouded air; and other similar accidents. If we are, therefore, negligent with respect even to things of this kind, which are possible to be foreseen, must we not fail, through our own fault alone, in almost every thing that we attempt? But indeed there is scarcely one of all those precautions which have been before recited, that can with safety be neglected; if we would avoid falling into those absurdities of conduct into which many others are reported to have fallen. I shall here mention some of them as examples.

Aratus, the Achæan prætor, having resolved to attempt to take Cynætha by surprise, concerted the following plan with the citizens that were engaged in the design. That, on a certain day, having before advanced silently in the night, he should take his post near to the river that ran down from the city, and for some time remain quiet with his army. That, about the middle of the day, the citizens, when all things were prepared, should secretly send out one of their number, dressed in a mantle; who should take his stand upon a certain tomb that was without the city. That the rest should then attack the guards of the gate; who, according to their custom, would be sleeping at that hour; and that Aratus, in this very moment, should rise from his concealment, and advance with haste towards the

gate. The matter being thus regulated, Aratus came at the appointed time; and, having stationed his troops in secret along the river, waited for the signal. It happened that one of the inhabitants, who was the master of some of those delicate sheep that were usually pastured near to the city, having occasion to give some sudden orders that concerned them, came out at the gate, about an hour before the middle of the day, dressed in a mantle; and, standing upon the very tomb that had been named, looked round the country in search of his shepherd. Aratus, being persuaded that this was the signal that had been concerted, advanced in haste towards the gate. But the gate was immediately shut by the guards; for things were not yet ready within the city. Thus this general not only failed in his attempt, but brought destruction also upon the citizens that were engaged in the design. For being now discovered, they all lost their lives in torture. What now was the cause of this misfortune? It was only that Aratus, who was at this time extremely young, and not acquainted with the singular advantage of double and respondent signals, was satisfied with having concerted a single signal. So slight is the difference upon which the good or ill success of any military enterprise depends.

In the same manner also Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, when he had resolved to make an attempt of this kind upon Megalopolis, agreed with some of the garrison, who were to be stationed

upon that part of the wall that was called Colæum, that he would come with his forces in the night, about the time of the third watch. For this was the hour in which these men were appointed to take the guard. But not having before considered, that at the time of the rising of the Pleiades the nights were extremely short, he did not begin his march from Lacedæmon till about the setting of the sun. It was therefore full day before he arrived at the destined place. He had the rashness however to attempt to storm the city; but was repulsed with disgrace and loss, and was even in danger of suffering an entire defeat: whereas, on the other hand, if he had only been exact in the computation of his time, his friends might have secured his entrance into the city, and the design have been attended with success.

Thus again king Philip, when he attempted to take Melite in the manner that has before been mentioned, was guilty of a double error. For not only the ladders which he carried were too short; but he failed also with respect to the time. Instead of coming to the place in the middle of the night, as it had been concerted, when the people would have been all fast in sleep, he began his march from Larissa at an early hour; and, having entered the territory of the Melitæans, as it was neither safe for him to halt, lest the enemy should gain notice of his approach, nor possible to return back again without being perceived, he was compelled by necessity to advance,

and arrived at the city before the inhabitants were yet gone to rest. But as he could not scale the walls, because the ladders were not proportioned to the height, so neither was he able to enter through the gate, because the time of the attack prevented his friends that were within the city from favouring his entrance. At last, therefore, having only provoked the rage of the inhabitants, and lost many of his men, he was forced to return back without accomplishing his purpose; and instructed all mankind, for the time to come, to be suspicious of his designs, and to set themselves on their guard against him.

Another example occurs in the example of Nicias, the Athenian. This general, having found a fair occasion for withdrawing his army from the siege of Syracuse, made choice of the proper time of night, and had retreated to a safe distance undiscovered by the enemy, when it happened that the moon was suddenly eclipsed. Being struck by this event, and vainly imagining that it portended some misfortune, he immediately suspended his march. The consequence was, that when he designed to continue his retreat on the following night the Syracusans, having now gained notice of his motions, fell upon him as he marched, and rendered themselves masters both of the army and of all the leaders. And yet, if he only had inquired of men that were acquainted with these matters, he might not only not have lost his own proper time, but have rendered the accident itself subservient to

his purpose, on account of the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of others is the surest way for conducting skilful men to the accomplishment of their designs. It is manifest then, that so much of astronomy should be acquired as may be necessary upon such occasions.

With regard to the measure of ladders, the method of determining it is this. If the height of the walls be known, by the means of some communication with those that are in the city, the proportion of the ladders is then most easy to be ascertained. For if the walls, for example, contain ten certain parts of any measure in height, the height of the ladders must include at the least twelve such parts. The distance of the foot of the ladders from the walls should be equal to one half of their height. For this is the most just proportion with respect to the men that are to mount upon them. If the distance be greater, the ladders will too easily be broken under the weight. If less, they will then be so erect, that the soldiers, as they ascend, must be continually in danger of falling headlong down. If the walls are not to be approached, and the measure of them is unknown, the height of any body that stands perpendicularly upon a plane surface may be taken at a distance. The method of doing this is not only practicable but easy to those who are acquainted with the mathematics. And thus again it is evident that, in order to obtain success in military operations, the study of geometry will be also requisite; not indeed in its whole extent,

but so far as it teaches to investigate the theory of relations and proportions. For it is not only in measuring the height of walls that this science is so necessary ; but in changing also the figure of a camp as occasions may require. By this method it is that a general is enabled sometimes, taking every kind of figure, to keep still the same proportion between the several parts that are contained within the camp ; and sometimes retaining the same figure to vary the proportion of the parts according to the number of those that enter, or that depart from the camp. But these matters have already been treated by us at large in our discourse on the orders of battle.

It will not, I think, be objected to me by any reasonable man, that I require too much, in making astronomy and geometry a necessary part of study for the general of an army. To join indeed to any profession those foreign and superfluous acquisitions, which only serve to furnish matter of ostentation and idle talk, is a labour which I entirely disapprove. But as much as I condemn such unnecessary diligence, so much on the other hand must I contend for the necessity of drawing even from a distant source some knowledge of those things which are of constant and notorious use. For is it not absurd that persons who profess the arts of dancing and of music should submit to be instructed in the theory of measure and of harmony, and even to be trained in the gymnastic exercises ; because these are all

considered as the necessary means of obtaining perfection in their respective arts ; and that those who aspire to the command of armies should be displeased to find, that an acquaintance in some degree with other sciences is necessary in their profession ? Shall the men that exercise illiberal arts exert greater pains, and show a stronger emulation to excel, than those who are ambitious to obtain distinction in the noblest and most splendid of all employments ? There is no man of sense that will avow such sentiments. But enough has been said upon this subject.

CHAP. II.

THE greatest part of men form their opinion of the size of a camp, or of a city, only from the circumference. When they are told therefore that Megalopolis contains in circumference fifty stadia, and Lacedæmon no more than forty-eight, and yet that this last city is twice as large as the former, they know not how to believe it. And if any one, designing to increase the surprise, should affirm that it is possible that a city or a camp, which contains only forty stadia in circumference, may be twice as large as another that contains a hundred stadia, they are struck

with the greatest astonishment. The cause of this surprise is, that men forget those principles of geometry which they learned in their youth. And I was the rather inclined to take some notice of these matters, because not the vulgar alone, but some even of those who are employed in the administration of states, or placed at the head of armies, are sometimes astonished, and not able to conceive, that Lacedæmon is a much greater city than Megalopolis, though it be less in its circumference; and again, in the same manner likewise are persuaded, that, by only viewing the circumference of a camp, they can easily determine the number of the troops which it contains. There is also another error in judging of cities, not unlike to that which has been mentioned. Many men imagine, that an unequal and hilly ground will contain more houses, than a ground that is flat and level. This however is not the truth. For the houses, being raised in a perpendicular line, form right angles, not with the declivity of the ground, but with the flat surface which lies below, and upon which the hills themselves also stand. This also may be learned from the very first elements of science. Suppose a number of houses to be so built upon the sides of a hill, as to rise to an equal height; it is manifest that the roofs of all of them together will form a surface exactly parallel and equal to the surface of the ground which lies under the foundations of the houses and the hill. Let this then serve as a lesson to those persons, who,

though they are so ignorant as not to conceive how these things can be, are desirous of commanding armies, and of presiding in the government of states.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

Agrigentum in Sicily described.

AGRIGENTUM excels almost all other cities not only in the advantages that have been mentioned, but in strength likewise, and especially in ornament and beauty. Situated at the distance of only eighteen stadia from the sea, it possesses all the conveniences which the sea procures. The whole circuit of the city is rendered uncommonly strong both by nature and art. For the walls are built upon a rock, which partly by nature, and partly from the labour of art, is very steep and broken. It is surrounded also by rivers on different sides. On the side towards the south, by a river of the same name as the city: and on the west and south-west, by that which is called the Hypsas. The citadel, which stands upon a hill on the north-east side, is secured all round the outside by a deep and inaccessible valley; and has one way only by which it may be entered from the city. On the summit of the hill is a temple dedicated to Minerva; and another to Jupiter Atabyrius, as at Rhodes. For as the Agrigentines were a colony from Rhodes, they gave to this deity, not improperly, the same appellation

by which he was distinguished in the island from which they came. The city also itself, which is indeed in all respects magnificent, is adorned with porticoes and with temples. Among these, the temple of Jupiter Olympius, though not finished, indeed, with so great splendour, is equal in size and in design to any of the temples of Greece.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The discourse of Chlæneas, ambassador from the Ætolians to the Lacedæmonians; in which he inveighs against the conduct of the kings of Macedon. He is answered by Lyciscus, ambassador from the Acarnanians: who defends the Macedonians, and warns the assembly of the fatal consequences of bringing the Romans into Greece.

CHAP. I.

*** “NOW, that the kings of Macedon have from the first been enemies to the liberties of Greece, there is no man, O Lacedæmonians, that will have the boldness to deny. Let me enter, however, into the proof of this fact. Among the various colonies of Greeks that migrated from Athens and from Chalcis, that of Olynthus was the first, both in consideration and in power. Philip, having subdued this city, ordered the inhabitants to be sold; and, by the terror of that example, not only obtained possession of all the other cities of Thrace, but forced Thessaly also to receive his yoke. Some time afterwards, when he had defeated the Athenians in battle, he displayed indeed great generosity after his victory; not from any desire of showing kindness to the vanquished, for that

was far from his intentions, but that others might be induced by such an instance of his clemency to submit themselves voluntarily to his commands. At that time, however, the power of your republic was so great, that it seemed probable that at some convenient season you would not fail to place yourselves at the head of all the states of Greece. He seized every occasion therefore of declaring war against you. He invaded your country with his armies: he wasted your lands, and destroyed your houses: and at last, having torn both cities and whole provinces from your dominion, he bestowed one part of the spoil upon the Argians; gave another to the Tegeans and the Megalopolitans; and another to the Messenians; and showed a willingness to gratify all mankind, if he could only do it with your loss. From him Alexander received the sovereignty. This prince again, being persuaded that, as long as Thebes remained, some little ray of hope might be still left to Greece, destroyed that city in the manner which is known to all. There is no need that I should enter into a particular detail of the conduct which his successors have held with respect to Greece. For no man is so little versed in the transactions of his country as not to have heard, that when Antipater had gained a complete victory in the Lamian war, he treated the Athenians, as well as the rest of the Greeks, with the greatest insult and indignity. For to such excess did he carry his oppression and

injustice, that he appointed persons to hunt out the exiles; and to destroy in every city all those that had opposed his party, or were upon any account obnoxious to the house of Macedon. And thus many of those unhappy men, taken away by violence from the temples, and torn even from the altars, lost their lives in torture: while others were compelled to fly, and found no safety for themselves in any part of Greece. Ætolia alone afforded to some of them a place of refuge. The actions of Cassander and Demetrius, and those of Antigonus Gonatas, are still recent in the memory of all. Under these princes garrisons were established, and tyrants supported in every place. Not a single city was exempted from the name of servitude. But let me now pass on to that last action of Antigonus: which, while it is viewed without suspicion, may lead some of you perhaps to think that you owe an obligation to the Macedonians. Was it then to save the Achæan states that this prince took arms against you in the Social war? Or was it to free the Lacedæmonians from the tyranny of Cleomenes? By no means surely: it would be too great simplicity to suppose it. But he foresaw, that, if you ever should obtain the supreme command in Peloponnesus, his own kingdom would be exposed to danger. He had remarked also the great talents of Cleomenes; as well as the success with which fortune seemed to favour your designs. It was fear, therefore, on the one hand, and jealousy on the other, that

urged him to enter Peloponnesus with an army; not to succour the inhabitants of that country, but to destroy your expectations, and to humble your growing power. If the Macedonians therefore, when they were masters of your city, did not suffer it to be pillaged; yet you ought not so much to love them on account of that kindness, as you ought to hate, and to consider them as your enemies, because they have been upon many occasions the only obstacle that prevented you from obtaining the sovereignty of Greece. With respect to the profligacy of the present Philip, this also is too notorious to need any long discussion. The ravages which he committed in the temple of Thermum are a sufficient proof of his impiety towards the gods: and his perfidious treatment of the Messenians his allies, an example no less evident of the cruelty of his disposition with respect to men. Now the Ætolians alone, of all the Greeks, had the courage openly to defy Antipater; and afford a refuge to those who had been rendered miserable by his injustice. The Ætolians alone opposed the invasion of Brennus and the barbarous Gauls. And lastly, they alone of all whom you invited were willing to assist you with their arms, in recovering again that supreme dominion which your ancestors had held over the rest of Greece. But enough has been said upon this subject. With regard to the present deliberation, your votes indeed and your decrees must import a declaration of war. And

yet it is by no means probable that a war will be the consequence. For it is not to be supposed that the Achæans, weakened as they are by former losses, will attempt to invade your territory: but rather, that they will esteem it as a favour from the gods, if, when they find themselves surrounded on every side by the Eleans and Messenians our allies, as well as by our armies, they may be able to preserve their own. I am persuaded likewise that the ardour of Philip will be at last abated; when the Ætolians shall attack him upon land, and the Romans and king Attalus upon the sea. It is easy indeed to conjecture what will happen, from that which has already been experienced. For if this prince, when the Ætolians only were his enemies, was never able to subdue them; how is it to be imagined that he can maintain a war, in which so many different powers are combined against him?

“Thus then have I endeavoured to show, that, even if you had not been bound by any treaty, and the matter had been still entire, you ought rather to join your arms with the Ætolians, than with the Macedonians. But since, in fact, you already are engaged, and have determined on the part that you would take, what room is there left for any more debate? If indeed the treaty which now subsists between you and us had been earlier than the kindness that was shown towards you by Antigonus; there might then perhaps have been some pretence to doubt,

whether, in favour of more recent benefits, you ought not to overlook in some degree your former obligations. But if, after you had received this so much boasted liberty and safety, these benefits with which you are continually reproached, you assembled your council to deliberate, whether you should enter into an alliance with the Ætolians or the Macedonians; if, after frequent consultation, you gave the preference to the former; if you confirmed your alliance with them by exchanging mutual pledges of fidelity; and even assisted them with your forces in the late war against the Macedonians; what reasonable doubt can now remain? By these transactions, your obligations to Antigonus and to Philip all were cancelled. It should therefore now be shown, that, since that period, you either have received some injury from the Ætolians, or some new favour from the Macedonians. But since neither of these can be pretended, what folly is it to suppose, that, in violation of oaths and treaties, the very strongest bands that unite mankind, you will now become confederates with a people, whose alliance you before rejected with justice, even when you might have embraced it without reproach."

Here Chlæneas ended his harangue, which seemed not easy to be refuted. Lyciscus, the ambassador of the Acarnanians, then came forwards in the assembly. For some time he paused; observing that the people were dis-

coursing together on what they had heard. But as soon as they were silent, he began in the following manner.

CHAP. II.

“ I AM sent to you, Lacedæmonians, by the states of Acarnania, on the part of that republic. But as we have been almost always joined together with the Macedonians in the same common hopes, we consider this embassy also as common both to them and to ourselves. For as, in the time of war, the superior strength and greatness of the Macedonian power has made our state to be dependent on the prowess of their arms; so, in the business of negociation likewise, the interests of the Acarnanians are by consequence included in the Macedonian rights. You will not therefore think it strange, if a great part of my discourse should be employed on Philip and the Macedonians.

“ Chlæneas then, in the conclusion of his harangue, very shortly stated the nature of your present obligations. ‘If,’ said he, ‘since the time when you entered into treaty with the Ætolians, you had either suffered any injury or insult from that people, or received any new kindness from the Macedonians, this matter would then

perhaps have remained entire for your deliberation. But as nothing of that kind has happened, it is the very height of folly in us to believe, that, by alleging only those old benefits which you had before experienced from Antigonus, we can prevail upon you to violate oaths and treaties.' For my part, indeed, I am ready to confess, that, if nothing new had happened, and if the affairs of Greece had remained still in the condition in which they stood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, there would be great weakness in the attempt; and all that I am prepared to say would be impertinent and vain. But if things are now in a different state, as I shall show in the progress of this discourse, you will then, I doubt not, be convinced, that I am able to point out to you your true interest, and that Chlæneas is unacquainted with it. For the sole design and purpose of this embassy, is to demonstrate to you, if it be possible, from a view of the dangers with which Greece is threatened, that the part most suitable and advantageous, the part most honourable and most worthy for you to take, is to join yourselves now with us in the same common hopes: or, if that cannot be obtained, at least to remain quiet during these disputes. But since those who oppose us have dared to load the house of Macedon with various accusations from the earliest time; I must also first look backwards, and endeavour to remove the

false persuasion of those persons, who may have yielded an implicit credit to all that they have heard.

“ It was asserted then by Chlæneas, that Philip the son of Amyntas, having rendered himself master of Olynthus, took occasion from that success to reduce all Thessaly beneath his yoke. But I, on the contrary, affirm, that not the people of Thessaly alone, but all the rest of the Greeks were indebted to Philip for their safety. For when Onomarchus and Philomelus had taken Delphi, and seized with sacrilegious violence all the treasures of the god; who does not know, that their power appeared so formidable, that not a single state had the courage to stand before them: and that it was even feared, that this impious outrage would be soon followed also by the conquest of all Greece? At this time it was, that Philip offered himself uncalled; destroyed the tyrants; secured the temple against future insults; and preserved the Grecian liberty. That this is the truth, the fact that followed will serve as a testimony to all posterity. For the Greeks, not regarding him as the oppressor of Thessaly, as Chlæneas had the confidence to affirm, but as the benefactor of all Greece, conferred an honour upon him which had no example, and with one voice declared him general of their armies both by land and sea. But Philip also invaded the Lacedæmonian territory with an army. Yet you all know, that it was not with any purpose of his

own that he took this measure. But having been invited, and often called upon by name, by his allies and friends in Peloponnesus, he at last consented to it with reluctance. And what was his conduct, Chlæneas, after he arrived? Instead of complying with the desires, instead of gratifying the resentments of the neighbouring states, by wasting the lands, and humbling the power of Sparta, he forced his allies, as well as his enemies, to embrace such measures as the common interest required, and to submit their several pretensions to a fair discussion. Nor did he even assume to himself the right of judging in their disputes: but referred them all to the decision of the general states of Greece. How proper a subject is this for censure. Thus again, you have loaded Alexander with reproaches, because he inflicted that punishment upon the Thebans, which their ill conduct seemed to have deserved: but have passed over in silence, in what manner he revenged the injuries with which the Persians had insulted Greece: and that he delivered you all from the greatest evils, by conquering those barbarians, and by taking from them the riches which they had employed to corrupt the Greeks, and to set one state in war against another; sometimes the Athenians against the ancestors of these very Lacedæmonians, and sometimes again, the Thebans; and in a word, that he reduced all Asia beneath the Grecian yoke? And how is it that you have the confidence to mention like-

wise the succeeding princes; who, as conjunctures varied, have been the authors indeed of evil as well as of good to different people. But, whatever resentment may be allowed upon this account to others, it never can be borne, that you, the *Ætolians*, should of all men be suffered to complain: you, by whom so many have been injured, and who never have been the occasion of good to any. For who were those, that invited *Antigonus*, the son of *Demetrius*, to assist them in dissolving the confederacy of the *Achæan* states? Who entered into treaty with *Alexander* of *Epirus*, to share with him the cities of *Acarnania*, and to sell the inhabitants as slaves? Was it not you? Who ever placed at the head of their armies such generals as your nation has employed? men, who dared to plunder even those sacred temples which have always been esteemed to be most secure from violence. Such was *Timæus*, who pillaged the temple of *Neptune* at *Tænarum*, and that of *Diana* at *Lussi*. Such were *Pharycus* and *Policritus*; the first of whom spoiled the temple of *Juno* at *Argos*, and the other that of *Neptune* in *Mantineæ*. Such also were *Lattabus* and *Nicostratus*; who, with a perfidy equal to that of *Gauls* or *Scythians*, attacked the *Bœotians* in the midst of peace, when they were met together in their general assembly. Have the successors of *Alexander* ever committed outrages like these? Being conscious therefore that such actions can neither be defended nor excused, you now pretend to boast,

that you withstood the irruption of the Gauls at Delphi, and were the means of preserving Greece. But if the Greeks owe any thing to the Ætolians on account of that single service, how greatly must they be indebted to the Macedonians, who employ continually their whole life and strength, in securing them against the efforts of barbarous nations? For who does not know, that Greece would be exposed to perpetual danger, if the zeal of the Macedonian kings, and the bulwark of their empire, were not our protection. Let me mention only one single instance. When the Gauls, after they had defeated Ptolemy surnamed Ceraunus, had no longer any cause to dread the Macedonians, they despised all other powers, and immediately led their army, with Brennus at their head, into the very midst of Greece. The same misfortune must frequently have happened, if the Macedonians had not, in all times, been the barrier of this country. Much more might be urged concerning the transactions of those ancient times: but this that I have said may be sufficient. You object impiety to the second Philip, because he destroyed a single temple: but make no mention of the sacrilegious violence which yourselves had exercised against the holy shrines in Dium and Dodona, and against the edifices of the gods. And yet this should have been first recounted. But you, reciting only your own sufferings, and exaggerating them far beyond the bounds of truth, pass over in silence

those much greater evils which you had before inflicted upon others; as well knowing, that, in the judgement of mankind, all subsequent injuries are with reason ascribed to those who set the first example of outrage and injustice. With respect to the conduct of Antigonus, I shall so far only mention it, that I may not appear to think too lightly of what was then transacted, or to set too small a value upon so great a service. A greater indeed is scarcely to be found in history. It was, in a word, an action that can never be surpassed. For consider it, Lacedæmonians, as it happened. Antigonus was engaged in war against you. He defeated your army in a set battle. Your city and all your territory were wholly in his power. It might then have been expected that he would have used all the rights of conquest. But so far was he from employing against you any act of hardship or oppression, that on the contrary, beside other benefits, he drove out your tyrant, and restored again those laws, and that form of government, which your ancestors had established. In return for this great kindness, yourselves also publicly proclaimed him your benefactor and your preserver, in the presence of all the states of Greece. What then, O Lacedæmonians, should have been your conduct after such an action? Suffer me, I entreat you, to speak my sentiments with freedom: not for the sake of loading you with any unseasonable reproach; but because the present conjuncture obliges me

to declare what the common interest requires. What is it then that I must say? That, even in the former war, the Macedonians, and not the Ætolians, were the people with whom you should have joined your arms: and that now again, when you are invited, your alliance should be made with Philip, and not with the Ætolians. But this, it will be said, would be a violation of the faith of treaties. Which then is the greatest crime? to pay no regard to a convention which you concluded privately with the Ætolians; or to transgress a treaty that was ratified in the presence of all the Greeks; was inscribed upon a column; and consecrated with religious rites? And how is it that you are more afraid of slighting a people from whom you have received no benefit; than of being wanting in respect to Philip and the Macedonians, to whose favour you are indebted even for the power of holding this assembly? Can you think it necessary that you should satisfy your engagements with your friends; and not rather that you should discharge your obligations to those who have preserved you? To observe a written treaty, is certainly an action not so pious, as it is impious to take arms against those who have saved you from destruction. Yet this is what the Ætolians now solicit you to do. But I shall add no more upon this head. What I have already urged, may be thought perhaps, by those who judge according to their prejudices, to be too distant from the present subject. I return, therefore, to the

principles that were first assumed; and to that which themselves acknowledge to be the chief point in this debate: That, if the affairs of Greece remain still in the same condition in which they stood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, you ought to consider yourselves as bound by those engagements. But if, on the contrary, the state of things be entirely changed, you may then with justice deliberate freely on the part which you are now pressed to take. I ask you then, Cleonicus and Chlæneas, who were then your allies, when you prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to act in conjunction with you? Were they not all Greeks? And with whom are you at this time joined? And into what confederacy do you now invite this people? Is it not into a confederacy with barbarians? Is the condition then of your affairs the same as before? Is it not entirely the reverse? At that time, you contended only for the honour of obtaining the supreme command in Greece, against others of the same race and country; the Achæans, and the Macedonians, with Philip at their head. But the end and tendency of the present war is to bring the Greeks themselves into a subjection to a foreign enemy: to an enemy whom, in appearance indeed, you have invited only to oppose the designs of Philip; but whom in fact you have armed, without perceiving it, both against yourselves, and against all the inhabitants of Greece. For, as it is often seen in the time of war that those

who, with a view to their present safety, admit too strong a garrison within their walls, at the same time that they secure themselves against their enemies, become subject to the power of their friends; just so will it happen, from the conduct which the Ætolians now pursue. For, while their design is only to weaken Philip, and to humble the power of the Macedonians, they observe not, that the cloud which they are drawing hither from the west, though at first perhaps it may only darken Macedon, will in its progress, shed the heaviest evils upon all the Greeks. It is the duty therefore of them all, to foresee in time the approaching storm: and upon none is this duty more incumbent than upon you, O Lacedæmonians. For what, do you suppose, were the sentiments of your ancestors, when they thrust into a well, and threw earth upon the head of the messenger that was sent to them by Xerxes to demand earth and water; and then bade him tell his master, that the Lacedæmonians had given him earth and water agreeably to his demand? What again was their intention, when Leonidas and all his army exposed themselves by their own free choice to certain death? Was it not to declare, that the Lacedæmonians would stand the foremost, in maintaining not only their own liberty, but that also of all the Greeks? And shall now the descendants of men like these, conclude a treaty with a barbarous nation; and join them in making war against the Epirots, the Achæans, the Acarna-

nians, the Bœotians, the Thessalians; in a word, against almost every people of Greece, except the Ætolians? Let the Ætolians themselves commit such baseness; for they are accustomed to think no action dishonourable, that can satisfy their desire of gain. But these are not the manners of the Lacedæmonians. And what may it not be expected that the Ætolians will attempt, when joined in an alliance with the Romans: they, who, with the assistance of the Illyrians only, made an attack upon Pylus from the sea, in contempt of treaties; and, by land, laid siege to Clitor, and carried the inhabitants of Cynætha into slavery? Can it be doubted that, as they before formed the project of sharing with Antigonus the cities of Acarnania and Achaia, they have now concluded a like agreement with the Romans with respect to the whole of Greece? Can any one be warned of such designs, and not dread the arrival of the Romans? And must we not detest that senseless profligacy, which has led the Ætolians into this alliance? They have already taken Naxus and Oeniade from the Acarnanians. Not long before, they attacked Anticyra in conjunction with the Romans. And when the city was subdued, the women and the children were carried away captives by the Romans, and reserved for all that wretchedness, which those who fall into the power of a foreign enemy are condemned to suffer; while the Ætolians divided the houses among themselves by lot. Is this then an al-

liance worthy to be approved? Or can the Lacedæmonians, above all others, determine to embrace it? those Lacedæmonians who, when the Persians invaded Greece, resolved by a public decree, that, as soon as they should have conquered the barbarians, they would devote a tenth part of the Thebans victims to the Gods, because this people alone, though compelled by necessity to remain quiet, had taken no part in the war. Consider, therefore, I entreat you, what your own honour and your own dignity require. Let the remembrance of your ancestors, your apprehension of the power of the Romans, your jealousy of the pernicious conduct of the Ætolians, and, above the rest, your sense of the great kindness that was shown towards you by Antigonus, prevail with you still to be the friends of virtuous actions. In a word, reject all alliance with the Ætolians, and join yourselves to the Achæans and the Macedonians. Or, if those who possess the greatest power among you should obstruct that measure, resolve to remain quiet in this conjuncture, and make not yourselves confederates in the unjust designs of the Ætolians."

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

The siege of Echinus by Philip.

PHILIP, having resolved to make his approaches against Echinus in the part of the two towers, ordered a tortoise and a battering-ram to be raised before each of them, and a gallery to be conducted from one ram to the other, opposite to the space that was between the towers, and parallel to the wall. The work, being completed according to this design, was in its form and aspect not unlike to the city. For as the buildings upon the tortoises, from the structure of the hurdles of which they were composed, had the figure and appearance of towers; so the gallery that was between, being formed into battlements at the top, bore no less resemblance to a wall. In the lowest part of these towers were placed some pioneers, who filled up the inequalities of the ground with earth, that the rollers might move freely. Here also the motions of the rams were regulated. Upon the second stage, together with some catapults, there were vessels filled with water; and other preparations for securing the building against fire. Upon the third, which was equal in height to the towers of the city, stood a body

of soldiers, ready to engage with those that should attempt to obstruct the motions of the rams. From the gallery that was between the towers two trenches were opened, and carried forwards to the wall of the city; and in these there were three batteries of balistæ; one of which threw stones of the weight of a talent, and the other two, stones of thirty pounds. From the camp to the towers on either side was a covered passage; that the soldiers might pass from the army to the works, or return back again from the works to the camp, without being exposed to the darts of the besieged. These works were all completed in very few days, because the country afforded all things that were necessary for the purpose in the greatest plenty. For Echinus is situated upon the Malian gulf, opposite to Thronium, and looks towards the south. The soil also around it is extremely fertile. Philip, therefore, was readily supplied with all things that were requisite for such an undertaking. And when he had completed his works in the manner that has been now described, he began without delay to attack the city.

EXTRACT THE EIGHTH.

The sources and course of the Euphrates.

THE river Euphrates has its sources in Armenia; and flowing from thence through Syria and the neighbouring country, passes on to Babylon. It is thought that it discharges itself at last into the Red sea. But this is not the truth. For it spends itself in channels which are cut through the country, and is exhausted before it can reach the sea. This river is different in two respects from almost all other rivers. The streams of other rivers are usually increased in proportion as they flow through a larger tract of country. Their waters also are fullest in the winter, and lowest in the height of summer. But the Euphrates, on the contrary, is fullest at the time of the rising of the dog-star; is no where so large as in Syria; and in its farther progress is continually diminished. The cause of this difference is, that the increase of its waters is not made by the winter rains, but by the melting of the snows in summer. And the stream, as it advances, is diminished, by being turned aside, and divided into other streams, for the purpose of watering the country. From hence also it happens, that the transportation of armies down

the Euphrates is in those parts extremely tedious; the vessels being so deeply loaded, and the river so low, that the force of the stream affords but little assistance in the navigation.

BOOK THE TENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

The advantages of Tarentum with respect to commerce.

ALONG that whole side of Italy which looks towards the sea of Sicily and the coasts of Greece, though the extent of it, from the straits of Rhegium to Tarentum, be more than two thousand stadia, there is not to be found a single harbour except that of the last mentioned city. But the country itself is inhabited by a very numerous people; composed partly of barbarians and partly of some of the most considerable colonies from Greece. Among the former are the Brutians, the Lucanians, a part of the Samnites, the Calabrians, and many other nations. The Grecian cities are Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurium. The merchants, therefore, that come from Greece to trade with any of the people who are situated along this coast, are obliged to bring their vessels into the harbour of Tarentum, and to make all their exchange and traffic in that city. It may be judged what great advantages must arise from such a situation, if

we consider only the flourishing condition of the inhabitants of Croton. For this people, with the convenience only of some places which afford an anchorage in the summer, and which cannot be compared in any respect with the harbour of Tarentum, though they are visited but by a very small number of ships, have drawn to themselves great wealth. The advantages also of its situation, with respect to the ports of the Adriatic sea, are still very considerable; though not so great as in former times. For before Brundisium was built, all the vessels that came from the opposite coast, which lies between Sipontum and the Iapygian promontory, towards this part of Italy, directed their course always to Tarentum, and used that city as the market for vending all their merchandise. Fabius, therefore, considering this passage as an object of great importance, neglected every other care, and employed all his thoughts to guard it.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

The character of Publius Scipio illustrated by some of the earliest actions of his life. His expedition into Spain. He renders himself master of New Carthage. Instances of his humanity, moderation, and continence.

CHAP. I.

AS I am now going to relate the things that were performed by Publius Scipio in Spain, and to give also a short and general account of all the other actions of his life, it will first, I think, be necessary to lead the reader into some acquaintance with the character and the natural disposition of this commander. For as he has surpassed almost all that lived before him in the celebrity of his name, there are scarcely any that have not a desire to know what manner of man he was; and by what abilities, natural or acquired, he accomplished so many and such great exploits. But they are forced either to remain in ignorance, or to form at least a very false opinion concerning him, because the writers of his life have wandered themselves widely from the truth. That this censure is not ill grounded,

will be manifest to every one who is able to consider with a just attention the account which I shall give even of the greatest and the most astonishing of all his actions.

These writers, then, have all of them concurred in representing Scipio to us as one of those favourites of fortune, who by a kind of spontaneous hazard, and in seeming opposition to the rules of reason, conduct all their undertakings to the desired end. They think that men of this sort have something in them more admirable and more divine than those who follow the guidance of reason in every action. They consider not that one of the things here mentioned is barely to be fortunate; and that the other is worthy of praise; that the first is common even to the most vulgar of mankind; while the latter is the portion of those alone who excel in sense and understanding: and that these last are to be regarded as approaching nearest to divine, and as the highest in favour of the gods.

To me it seems that there is a great resemblance, both in character and in conduct, between Scipio and Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedæmonians. For it must not be imagined either that Lycurgus, by superstitiously consulting upon all occasions the Pythian priestess, was taught to frame the Spartan government; or that Scipio was directed by dreams and omens to those great actions which so much enlarged the empire of his country. But because they both were sensible that the greatest

part of men are not easily engaged in new and unusual designs, and fear to expose themselves to manifest danger, unless they have some reason to expect that they shall be assisted by the gods; the first, by joining the authority of the priestess to all that he proposed, rendered his own designs more worthy of credit, and more easy to be received; and the other, by cherishing an opinion in the multitude that he was supported in all his undertakings by a supernatural aid, inspired those that were under his command with greater confidence, and made them more eager to engage even in the most difficult attempts.

That this great commander was conducted in every action by sound sense and prudence, and that his undertakings always were attended with success, because in reason they deserved it, will sufficiently appear from the facts that will be hereafter mentioned. The generosity and magnanimity that were so conspicuous in his character, are indeed acknowledged by all. But the readiness of his conception, the sobriety of his judgement, and the extreme attention with which his understanding was directed to the object which it had in view, have remained still unknown; or been known to those alone who lived in friendship with him, and had the opportunity of beholding him in the nearest light. Among those was Caius Lælius: who was a witness to all his words and actions from his childhood to his death. And he it was who first

raised in me that opinion of this general which I now have mentioned. For all that he related to me concerning him was extremely probable, and perfectly consistent with the actions which he performed.

The first thing, as he informed me, which distinguished Scipio, was his behaviour at the time of the engagement between Annibal and his father with the cavalry near the river Po. He was then but seventeen years old: and, because this was his first campaign he was attended by a troop of select horsemen as a guard. In the battle, perceiving that his father, with only two or three of the cavalry, was enclosed by a large body of the enemy, and was already dangerously wounded, he at first exhorted his little troop to go to his assistance. And when these for some time hesitated, because the numbers that had surrounded the consul were so great, himself with the most desperate fury drove his horse into the middle of the combatants. His attendants also being then forced to join him in the charge, the whole body of the enemy was parted by the shock: and the consul, being thus unexpectedly rescued from destruction, was the first to proclaim aloud that he owed his preservation to his son. As by this action he acquired the reputation of a man whose courage was not to be doubted; so, in the subsequent parts of his life, whenever his country reposed all her hopes upon him, he was ready to throw himself without reserve into every

kind of danger. This surely is not the conduct of a man who trusts himself to fortune; but of a commander who is guided by sound sense and prudence.

Some time after this action, his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the ædileship; which is one of the most honourable dignities among the Romans. The custom was, to elect two patricians into this office: and at this time there were many candidates. At first Scipio had not the confidence to offer himself a candidate for this magistracy in conjunction with his brother. But as the time of the election came near, perceiving that the people were not disposed to favour the interests of his brother, but that himself stood very high in their esteem, he judged that the only way of obtaining the ædileship for his brother would be that both of them should sue for it together. He employed therefore the following method. As his father was at this time gone to take the command in Spain, the consent of his mother alone was necessary to be gained. Observing then, that she was busied every day in visiting the temples, and in offering sacrifices to the gods in favour of his brother; and that her mind was filled with anxious expectation concerning the event; he told her, that he had dreamed the same dream twice. That it had seemed to him, that he was chosen ædile with his brother; and that, as they returned home from the forum together, she had met them at the door, and had embraced and

kissed them. The female heart was touched in a moment by this story. Oh, she exclaimed, that I might but see that day! Do you consent then, mother, continued he, that we make the trial? And when she replied, that she consented; not suspecting, as he was then extremely young, that he would have the boldness to attempt it; but believing only that he spoke in jest; he ordered a white gown to be prepared, such as the candidates for offices are accustomed to wear. His mother reflected no more on what had passed. But Scipio, in the morning while she was asleep, for the first time put on the gown, and went into the forum. The people, struck with the unexpected sight, and who before had entertained strong prejudices in his favour, received him with acclamations and applause. He advanced to the place in which the candidates were ranged; and, standing on the side of his brother, obtained not only his own election, but that of his brother also in consideration of himself. They then returned home together ædiles. The news being carried to the mother, she ran full of joy, and meeting them at the door, kissed both her sons with transport.

From this accident, an opinion prevailed among all who heard the story of these dreams, that Scipio, not only when he was asleep, but in his waking moments also, and in the time of day, held familiar converse with the gods. It was no dream however, that gave him any as-

sistance in this business. But being by nature generous, magnificent, and courteous in his address, he had before conciliated the favour of the multitude. Add to this, that he had also the skill to choose his proper time, both with the people and his mother. By these means it was, that he not only obtained his purpose; but was judged to have acted under the impulse of a divine admonition. For it is usual with men, who, through the fault of their own nature, and from a want either of activity or of skill, are unable to view distinctly the times, the causes, and the course of actions, to ascribe those events to the gods and fortune, which are accomplished only by the ready and dexterous management of sound sense and reason. I thought it necessary to make these reflections, that my readers might not be so far misled by the opinion which is falsely propagated concerning Scipio, as to overlook what was brightest and most admirable in his character: I mean his dexterity and his unwearied application to affairs. In how high a degree he possessed these qualities, will be more clearly seen from the transactions of the history, to which I now return.

CHAP. II.

SCIPIO, having assembled the troops together, exhorted them not to be disheartened by the loss which they had sustained. "That their defeat was by no means to be ascribed to the superior courage of the Carthaginians: but was occasioned only by the treachery of the Spaniards, and the imprudent division which the generals, reposing too great a confidence in the alliance of that people, had made of their forces. That the Carthaginians themselves were now in the same condition with respect to both these circumstances. For, besides that they were divided into separate camps, they had also alienated by injurious treatment the affections of their allies, and had rendered them their enemies. That from hence it had happened that one part of the Spaniards had already sent deputies to the Romans; and that the rest, as soon as the Romans should have passed the river, would hasten with alacrity to join them; not so much, indeed, from any motive of affection, as from a desire to revenge the insults which they had suffered from the Carthaginians. That there was still another circumstance, even of greater moment. That the dissension which prevailed among their leaders, would prevent the enemy from uniting their whole strength in an engage-

ment: and, if they should venture on a battle with divided forces, that they would then most easily be defeated. That, with all these advantages in prospect; they should now, therefore, pass the river with the greatest confidence; and leave to himself, and to the rest of the commanders, the whole care of what was afterwards to be done."

After this discourse, he left Marcus, who was joined with him in the command, with a body of three thousand foot and five hundred horse, to protect the allies that were on this side of the Iberus; and then passed the river with the rest of the forces, having concealed from every person his true intention. For he had determined not to do any of those things which he had suggested to the army. His real design was suddenly to invest New Carthage.

And here we may first remark a most signal proof of that peculiar disposition which I have ascribed to Scipio. For first, though he was now no more than twenty-seven years old, he took upon himself the conduct of a war, which, from the ill success that had attended it, all other persons had concluded to be desperate. In the next place, when he had engaged himself in this design, instead of pursuing the most obvious and common measures, he formed a plan of action, which was alike impenetrable to his own army, and unsuspected by the enemy. And with respect to both these points, he was determined by the most solid reasons. While he was still at

Rome he informed himself of the true state of things, by a most careful and exact inquiry. And being assured that the treachery only of the Spaniards, and the division of the Roman armies, had occasioned the misfortune of his father, he neither feared the Carthaginians, nor yielded to that despondency with which others were possessed. When he was afterwards also told that the allies on this side of the Iberus remained still constant in the Roman friendship; that the Carthaginian generals were broken by dissensions; and that they treated the people who had submitted to them with great severity; he set out upon the expedition with full confidence of success; not building his expectations upon fortune, but upon the views which reason had suggested to him. As soon as he arrived in Spain, renewing his inquiries in every part with the greatest diligence, he was informed that the Carthaginian army was divided into three separate bodies. That Mago, at the head of one, was posted beyond the pillars of Hercules, in the territory of the Conians; that the second, under the command of Asdrubal the son of Gesco, was encamped in Lusitania, near the mouth of the river; that the other Asdrubal, with the third, was laying siege to a town in the Carpetanian district; and that each of these different bodies was distant full ten days' march from the city of New Carthage. He considered, therefore, with himself that, as it would be much too dangerous, both on account of the late defeats, and because

the enemy also were far superior to him in their numbers, to venture on a set engagement against their united forces; so, on the other hand, if he should attack either of these separate bodies, there was reason to fear that, while the body attacked might retire and decline the fight, the rest also would be able to advance; and that, being thus enclosed on every side, he should fall into the same calamity which had been so fatal to his father and his uncle. Upon these considerations he rejected the design of an engagement, and turned all his thoughts towards New Carthage; a place which, as he very well knew, brought many advantages to the enemy, as well as great detriment to the Romans, in the progress of the war.

For, while he remained in winter quarters, having endeavoured to obtain from the prisoners a minute and particular knowledge of every thing that related to this city, he found that it was almost the only place upon the coast of Spain that afforded a harbour capable of receiving a fleet and naval forces; that it was so situated that the Carthaginians might pass over to it from Africa with the greatest ease; that large sums of money also, and all the baggage of the army were at this time in it; together with all the hostages which the Carthaginians had taken from the cities of Spain. He learned likewise, what was still of greater importance, that the garrison consisted only of a thousand soldiers, appointed to defend the citadel. For it never had been con-

ceived that, while the Carthaginians were masters of almost the whole of Spain, any attempt would be made to lay siege to this city. That the multitude of the other inhabitants indeed was very great; but that they were all artificers, labourers, or seamen; destitute of all experience in the affairs of war; and who would rather facilitate than obstruct his attempt against the city, if he should appear unexpectedly before it. He knew the manner likewise in which the city was situated; the fortifications by which it was defended; and the nature of the lake that surrounded it. For some fishermen, who frequented the place, had informed him that the lake in general was marshy; and that it was also fordable as often as the tide retired, which usually happened every day near the time of evening. From all these circumstances he concluded that success in this attempt would not only bring a heavy loss upon the enemy, but tend greatly to advance his own affairs; and that if he should fail, he might at least be able, as he was master of the sea, to withdraw the troops in safety; taking care only to secure his camp against any insult. And this it would be easy to accomplish, because the forces of the enemy were at so great a distance. Laying aside, therefore, all other thoughts, he employed himself, while he was in winter quarters, in making preparations for the siege. And though he had formed so great a design, and was only of the age that has been mentioned, he concealed his intention from every person, except

from Caius Lælius, till the time came in which he judged it necessary to disclose it.

Now it is generally acknowledged by historians, that these were the reasons which determined the conduct of Scipio upon this occasion. And yet when they had gone thus far, they, in the end, I know not how, ascribe the success that followed not to the prudence of the commander, but to the interposition of the gods and fortune. But this opinion, as it is destitute of all support from probability, or from the testimony of those who lived at the time, is refuted also by the letters which Scipio himself wrote to Philip; in which he expressly declares, that in every thing that concerned his expedition into Spain, and more particularly in his resolution to attack New Carthage, he was determined wholly by those considerations which have been here recited. Let us now attend to the siege.

CHAP. III.

SCIPIO then, having given secret orders to Caius Lælius, who alone, as we have said, was acquainted with his design, to sail to New Carthage with the fleet, began his march with the land forces, and advanced with the greatest haste. His army consisted of twenty-five thousand foot, and of two thousand and five hundred horse. After seven days' march he arrived and encamped on the side of the city that looked towards the north. The hinder part of the camp he fortified with a ditch and a double intrenchment, which was drawn from one sea to the other. The side that was towards the city he left without any fortification, because the nature of the place alone sufficiently secured it against all insult. But before we enter into a particular description of the siege, it will be proper to give the reader some conception of the manner in which the city was situated, and the country that was round it.

New Carthage then is situate near the middle of the coast of Spain, upon a gulf that looks towards the south-west, and which contains in length about twenty stadia, and about ten stadia in breadth at the first entrance. The whole of this gulf is a perfect harbour. For an island lying at the mouth of it, and which leaves on

either side a very narrow passage, receives all the waves of the sea ; so that the gulf remains entirely calm ; except only that its waters are sometimes agitated by the south-west winds blowing through those passages. All the other winds are intercepted by the land, which encloses it on every side. In the inmost part of the gulf stands a mountain in form of a peninsula, upon which the city is built. It is surrounded by the sea, upon the east and south ; and on the west by a lake, which is extended also so far towards the north, that the rest of the space, which lies between the lake and the sea, and which joins the city to the continent, contains only two stadia in breadth. The middle part of the city is flat ; and has a level approach to it from the sea, on the side towards the south. The other parts are surrounded by hills, two of which are very high and rough ; and the other three, though much less lofty, are full of cavities, and difficult of approach. Of the former two, the largest is that which stands on the side of the east. It extends itself into the sea, and has a temple consecrated to *Æsculapius* upon the top. The other is in like manner situated opposite to the former upon the west. Upon this last is a magnificent and royal place, which was built by *Asdrubal*, when he designed, as it is said, to declare himself sovereign of the country. The other three hills, which are of smaller size, enclose the city on the side towards the north. The first of these, which stands nearest to the east, has the appellation of *Vulcan*. The second,

that of Aletes; who is said to have obtained divine honours, from having first discovered the silver mines. The third is called the hill of Saturn. For the conveniency of those who use the sea, a communication is made by art between the lake and the sea. And across the narrow channel, which joins the two together, there is also a bridge, which serves for the passage of carriages and beasts of burthen, as they come loaded with necessaries from the country in the city. By this situation of the places, the front of the Roman camp was secure without any fortification; being covered by the lake and the sea. Even in the part that was opposite to the narrow neck that ran between the lake and the sea, and which joined the city to the continent, Scipio had neglected to throw up any intrenchment; either because, by thus leaving the very middle of his camp open, he designed to intimidate the enemy; or that, when he should be ready to attack the city, he might advance, and return back again to his camp, without any impediment. This city formerly contained not more than twenty stadia in circumference. Many writers indeed affirm it to have been forty. But in this they are mistaken. For my own part, I can speak of this matter with assurance. For I take not my account from what I have heard; but have myself seen and examined the place. At this time the circumference is less.

The fleet then being arrived at a proper time, Scipio assembled the troops together, and ex-

plained to them the reasons that had determined him to engage in the present undertaking, and which were no other than those that have now been mentioned. He showed them, that the enterprise itself was practicable. And having enumerated all the advantages which would arise to themselves from this conquest, together with the great loss which the enemy would sustain, he promised crowns of gold to those who should first mount upon the walls, and the other customary rewards to all who should perform any signal service in the attack. In the end he told them, that the design had first been suggested to him by Neptune: who stood near him as he slept; and promised that he would so visibly assist him in the very time of the action, that the whole army should acknowledge the efficacy of his presence. The justness of the reasons that appeared in this discourse, the promise of the golden crowns, and, above all the rest, the expected assistance of the god, raised in all the soldiers the highest ardour and alacrity.

On the following day, having stored the fleet with missile weapons of every kind, he ordered Lælius, who commanded it, to press the city on the side of the sea. By land, he collected two thousand of the strongest soldiers, together with the men who carried the ladders, and advanced to the assault about the third hour of the day. Mago, who commanded in the city, divided the garrison of a thousand men, and, leaving one half in the citadel, drew up the rest in order of

battle upon the hill that stood towards the east. He stationed also two thousand of the citizens, to whom he had given the arms that were in the city, near the gate that led to the narrow neck, which joined the city to the continent, and which was opposite to the Roman camp. The rest of the inhabitants were ordered to assist with their utmost strength, in every part in which the walls should be attacked.

As soon as the Roman trumpets had given the signal for the assault, Mago ordered the two thousand citizens to advance through the gate; being persuaded that he should strike a terror into the enemy, and force them to desist from their design. They advance accordingly, and vigorously charge the Romans, who were drawn up in battle between their camp and the isthmus. At first the engagement was extremely fierce; and vehement cries were made on either side, as the numbers increased that came both from the city and from the camp. But the assistance that was sent to either side was very unequal; the Carthaginian succours coming only through a single gate, and having the length of two stadia also to pass; while the Romans on the contrary were near to the place, and poured in their troops from every side. For Scipio had designedly ranged his forces in battle near to the camp, that he might draw the enemy to a greater distance from the city: as well knowing, that if this body, which was the very strength of the inhabitants, should be once defeated, the whole

city would be thrown into so great confusion, that none would afterwards dare to appear without the walls. As the combatants however were all chosen men, the victory remained for some time doubtful. But the Carthaginians, unable to sustain the weight of the Romans, who came continually from the camp, were at last forced to fly. Many of them fell in the engagement, and in their flight. But the greatest part were crushed, as they entered together in crowds through the gate. The inhabitants, on the sight of this defeat, were so struck with consternation, that they immediately abandoned the walls: and the Romans, who indeed had almost entered the city with those that fled, fixed their ladders in full security.

In this action, Scipio himself was present; but used all the caution that was possible, with respect to his person. For he was attended by three soldiers carrying bucklers; who, when any thing was thrown from the walls, joined their bucklers together, and covered him from the danger. Under this protection, moving from side to side, or placing himself upon some eminence, he greatly promoted the success of the action. For, as by this method, he saw every thing that passed, so, being seen also by all the army, he inspired the combatants with courage. From hence also it happened, that nothing that was necessary was neglected in the course of the engagement: and that whatever

the occasion suggested to him was immediately carried into execution.

The Romans, who began now to mount the ladders with the greatest confidence, found much less danger in the resistance of the enemy than from the height of the walls. The difficulties indeed which this alone occasioned were so great, that the besieged began to resume their courage. For some of the ladders, being of so large a size as to admit many to ascend together, were broken by the weight. Upon others, the first who mounted lost their sight upon so great a height; and, as soon as they were opposed by the least resistance, threw themselves headlong down. When any beams also, or other things of the same kind, were thrown from the battlements, whole bodies of men were torn away together, and carried to the ground. These difficulties, however, though so many and so great, were none of them sufficient to restrain the ardour and the impetuosity of the Romans. No sooner were the first thrown down, than those who followed immediately ascended into the vacant place. But as the day began now to decline, and the soldiers were almost exhausted by fatigue, the general ordered the trumpets to sound the signal of retreat.

The besieged, persuading themselves that they had repelled the danger, began to exult with joy. But Scipio, expecting now the time when the sea would retire, stationed five hundred men,

together with ladders, upon the border of the lake. At the same time he selected also a body of fresh troops; and, having exhorted them to perform their duty, he sent them again towards the gate upon the isthmus, and gave them a greater number of ladders than before, that the whole length of the walls might be attacked. When the signal then was made, and the troops began to ascend the ladders in every part, the inhabitants within were thrown into the greatest confusion and disorder. At the very time when they conceived that they had nothing left to dread, behold a new danger just beginning from a new assault. Their darts also began to fail: and the numbers of men which they had already lost had sunk their courage. Their embarrassment therefore was very great. They defended themselves however against the assailants with their utmost strength.

While this contest was at the height, the tide began to retire, and left only a very shallow water upon the upper side of the lake: at the same time running through the mouth of it, into the adjoining sea, with such rapidity and force, that those who were unacquainted with the nature of the thing, regarded it as a kind of miracle. Scipio, who had some guides also ready, exhorted the troops that were selected for this service, to enter the lake, and to fear nothing. For this, among his other talents, was that in which this general principally excelled: the art of inspiring his troops with courage, and of making them feel

all the passions which his discourse endeavoured to infuse. They immediately obeyed his orders, and pushed their way with eagerness through the lake; the whole army being persuaded, that what they had beheld was undoubtedly the work of some divinity. It was now that they remembered what Scipio had said to them in his harangue, concerning the interposition of Neptune in their favour. Animated therefore by this persuasion, one part of them formed the tortoise; and, advancing with impetuosity to the gate, began to break it with bars and hatchets; while the rest, as they approached the walls, finding the battlements deserted, not only fixed their ladders in full security, but gained also the top of the wall without any resistance. For, as the besieged, not having any suspicion that the city ever could be approached on the side of the lake, were wholly employed in other parts, and especially near the gate that led to the isthmus; so the cries also, and the confusion, that arose from the disordered multitude, prevented them from hearing, or discerning any thing that was proper to be done. The Romans ran from side to side upon the walls, in order to attract the enemy: a kind of service, which the manner in which they are armed enables them to perform with singular dexterity. And when they arrived at the gate, they descended, and breaking the bars, gave entrance to those that were without. The body that had attempted to scale the walls on the side towards the isthmus, had now

also gained the battlements. Thus the whole walls were at last in the possession of the Romans. The hill likewise, that stood on the eastern side of the city, was seized by a part of those who entered through the gate, and who attacked and routed the Carthaginians that were left to guard it.

As soon as a sufficient number of the troops had entered, Scipio sent away the greatest part to destroy the inhabitants; commanding them to kill all that they should meet, without sparing any; and not attempt to pillage till they should receive the signal. Such is the custom among the Romans when they have taken a city by storm. And their design, as I suppose, is to strike the greater terror. It is common, therefore, to see not men alone lying slaughtered, but dogs also cut in two, and other animals divided limb from limb. Upon the present occasion especially, there was much of this kind of carnage, because the numbers that were in the place were great. The general himself then marched with a thousand men to attack the citadel. At his first approach Mago seemed determined to make some resistance. But when he had considered that the city was entirely in the power of the Romans, he sent and obtained a promise of safety for himself, and delivered up the citadel. The signal being then made, the slaughter ceased, and the pillage was begun. When night came on, those who had received such orders remained in the camp. The general, with his thousand men, was lodged

in the citadel. The rest of the soldiers, having been called out of the houses by the tribunes, were ordered to bring the booty, all of them in their several cohorts, into the forum, and to guard it during the night. The light-armed forces were drawn from the camp, and were posted upon the hill that was on the eastern side. In this manner the Romans became masters of the city of New Carthage in Spain.

CHAP. IV.

ON the following day, the baggage of the Carthaginian garrison, and all that had been taken both from the citizens and the artificers, being collected together in the forum, was distributed by the tribunes among the respective legions, according to the usual custom of the Romans. The method which this people observe, when they have taken a city, is this. They every day select, for the purpose of pillage, a certain number of cohorts, according to the size of the city; taking care always, that not more than half of the forces be employed in this work. The rest all remain in their several posts; either within or without the city, as occasion requires. As their armies usually are composed of two Roman legions with an equal number of allies, and some-

times, though but rarely, of four legions; the men, who are employed in pillaging, bring all the booty, each of them to his respective legion. A sale is then made of all that has been taken; and the money divided by the tribunes into equal shares, which are allotted to all alike: not only to those who were stationed under arms in the several posts; but to those that were left in the camp; to the sick likewise; and even to those that had been sent away from the camp upon any distant service. And that no part of the plunder may be concealed, the soldiers, before they begin to march, and at the time of their first encampment, are obliged to swear, that whatever they shall take from the enemy they will bring faithfully to the camp: as we have already more particularly mentioned, in our discourse on the Roman government. Now by this precaution, of employing one half of the army only in the pillage, while the rest remain under arms in the several posts, the Romans are secured from any danger that might happen to them from the greediness of the soldiers. For as the hope of having a share in the booty is never lost to any of the troops, but remains as certain to those who are fixed in the several posts as to those who are employed in pillaging; every man remains quiet in his station; whereas, among other nations, a contrary method is frequently attended with very fatal consequences. So powerful is the desire of gain that, in general, it is this alone which encourages men to suffer hardships, or to throw themselves

into dangers. When occasions, therefore, of this kind arise, it is not to be supposed that those who are left in the camp, or stationed in any post, will contentedly forego the opportunity that is offered; if every man, as the custom is in almost all other armies, be allowed to retain the booty which he takes. For though a prince perhaps, or a general, may at such times give the strictest orders for bringing all the spoil together in a common heap; yet, whatever the soldiers are able to conceal they are accustomed to consider as their own. And while they all pursue this object with an ardour which it is not possible to restrain, the safety of the whole is often brought into the greatest danger. Very frequently it has been seen, that commanders, when they have succeeded in their first design, and have either taken a city, or forced their way into the camp of the enemy, have, from this single cause alone, not only lost all the fruits of their victory, but even suffered an entire defeat. There is nothing, therefore, that more deserves the foresight and attention of the leader of an army than to make such provision, that all the troops may be assured of obtaining an equal share of the plunder upon these occasions.

While the tribunes were employed in making a distribution of the spoil, the general, having ordered all the prisoners, who were not much fewer than ten thousand men, to be brought before him, divided them into two separate bodies. In the first were the free citizens, toge-

ther with their wives and children: and the artificers of the city in the other. Having exhorted the former to embrace the friendship of the Romans, and to bear in remembrance the favour which they now received, he dismissed them to their several habitations. A deliverance so unexpected melted them into tears of joy. They prostrated themselves before him, and retired. He then told the artificers that for the present they were the public slaves of the Roman people: but that, if they would show an affection towards this people, and serve them with alacrity in their respective trades, they might be assured of obtaining their freedom, as soon as the war with Carthage should be brought to a happy end. He then ordered them to be enrolled by the quæstor; and having divided them into bands of thirty men, appointed a Roman to take the charge of every band. The whole number amounted to about two thousand men. From the rest of the prisoners he selected those that were in the vigour of their age, and of the strongest bodies, and joining them to his naval forces, so that the whole now consisted of a half part more than double the former number, he not only furnished the ships that had been taken from the enemy, but allotted to every vessel in the fleet almost twice as many seamen as they had before. For the vessels that were taken were eighteen in number; and his own fleet consisted of thirty-five. To these men, likewise, upon condition that they would only discharge their duty with diligence and zeal, he

gave the same assurance of their freedom as soon as the Carthaginians should be conquered. In this manner, by his indulgent treatment he entirely gained the confidence of the citizens, and secured their affection both to himself and to the common cause. The artificers, encouraged by the hopes of freedom, applied themselves to their work with the greatest cheerfulness. And the fleet, by the prudent disposition which he made, was increased in the proportion that has been mentioned.

When this business was finished, he separated Mago, and the other Carthaginians that were of rank, from the rest. For among those that were taken, there were two that were of the council of the ancients, and fifteen of the senate. All these he committed to the care of Lælius; and ordered them to be treated with particular attention. He then commanded all the hostages, who were in number more than three hundred, to be brought before him. And calling the children to him one by one, he caressed and soothed them; telling them that in a short time they should see their parents. The rest he ordered to write to their several cities that they were safe and well; and that they should soon be permitted to return to their respective habitations, if their friends would only consent to embrace the alliance of the Romans. With these words, having before selected from the spoil what was most proper for his design, he presented all of them with such ornaments as were suitable to their sex and

age. To the girls he gave bracelets and little pictures; and swords and poniards to the young men and boys.

At this time, one of the female captives, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Andobalis, king of the Iltergetes, fell at his feet, and entreated him with tears to give such orders concerning the women that were prisoners, that they might obtain more decent treatment than they had experienced from the Carthaginians. Scipio was moved at this sight: for the woman was advanced in years, and had something venerable in her appearance. He asked her therefore, whether they were in want of any necessaries. And when she made no answer, he ordered those that were appointed to take care of the women to be called; and was told by them, that the Carthaginians had always furnished them with necessaries in the greatest plenty. But as she still embraced his knees, and continued to repeat the same request, Scipio, being more perplexed, and suspecting that the men had told him an untruth, and had undoubtedly been negligent in their charge, bade her and the rest of the women take courage; and assured them, that he would appoint other persons, who should take care that they should be in want of nothing. You understand not our request, replied the woman after a little silence, if you think that we are thus importunate with you for the sake of meat and drink. In a moment Scipio understood her meaning:

and, when he saw before him the daughters of Andobalis, and of many other princes, all in the flower of their age, he was unable to refrain from tears. The whole distress of their condition was disclosed to him by a single word. He signified therefore to the woman, that he now knew perfectly what she intended: and taking her by the hand, he again bade her to take courage, and all the rest that were with her: assuring them, that he would be no less careful of them, than if they were his own sisters or his daughters; and that he would give them in charge to persons of approved fidelity, whose behaviour should agree with this assurance.

After this, he delivered to the quæstors all the public money that had been taken from the Carthaginians. The amount of it was more than six hundred talents. He had brought also with him from Rome four hundred: so that, with both sums together, he had now more than a thousand talents, to defray the expenses of the war.

About the same time also it was, that some young soldiers, having found a virgin of a most uncommon bloom and beauty, and knowing that Scipio was inclined to the love of women, brought and placed her before him, and entreated him to receive her as a present. Scipio was struck with the sight; and, having expressed his admiration of her beauty, "If I were a private man," said he, "you could

not have offered to me a more acceptable present; but, in the station in which I am now placed, it is quite otherwise." Intimating, as I suppose, by this discourse, that, in the hours of leisure and repose, young men may sometimes agreeably amuse themselves with these enjoyments; but that, in seasons of business, the activity both of the mind and body is too much obstructed by such indulgence. He therefore thanked the soldiers; and having called the father of the virgin, he delivered her into his hands, and exhorted him to marry her to any one of her own citizens whom he should choose. By this instance of his continence and moderation, the character of Scipio was raised high in the opinion of all who were under his command.

When he had thus regulated all things, and committed the rest of the prisoners to the care of the tribunes, he sent Lælius, with the Carthaginians, and some others of the most eminent rank that were taken, in a quinquereme to Rome, to carry the news of this success. For he very well knew, that as the affairs of Spain had been considered as almost desperate, an account of this important conquest could not fail to infuse new courage into the people, and engage them to apply themselves with much greater earnestness to the business of the war. With respect to himself, remaining for some time in New Carthage, he exercised continually the naval forces; and instructed the tribunes

also to exercise the land army in the following manner.

On the first day, the legions were commanded to run the space of thirty stadia with their arms. On the second, to scour and brighten their arms, and to examine in open view their whole armour. The third day was allotted to relaxation and repose. On the fourth, they fought together with wooden swords cased with leather, and guarded with a button at the end; and threw javelins, which were covered also with a button. On the fifth day, they returned again to the same course of running with which they had begun.

He employed also a principal part of his attention upon the artificers; that the arms might be finished in the completest manner, both for the exercises in the field, and for real service. With this view, he not only appointed skilful men to regulate the workmen, as we have already mentioned; but himself went every day among them, and saw that they were supplied with necessaries. And thus, while the legions were exercising themselves continually before the walls, and the naval forces upon the sea contending together in rowing and in mock engagements; while the workmen in the city were sharpening weapons, or labouring in brass and wood; and, in a word, while all without exception were employed in preparing arms; whoever had beheld the sight, might have observed in the words of Xenophon, that this city was

in truth the very working-shop of war. When all things seemed at last to be in the condition which he desired, and the troops were perfect in their exercise; having secured the city also by placing guards, and making the fortifications that were necessary, he put both the army and the fleet in motion, and began his march towards Taraco, carrying the hostages also with him.

The motions which Scipio judged to be most useful for the cavalry upon all occasions, and in which he commanded them to be exercised, were these. To turn every man singly his horse to the left, and again to the right, and then to make him fall back. With respect to whole troops, they were also taught to turn to one side at once, and to recover again their first position: to turn their backs to the enemy in two motions, and to face about again in three: to make little bodies of ten or of twenty men, go off with speed from the wings, or sometimes from the centre; and return again to their place in the main body without breaking their ranks: to extend themselves upon the wings, in order to prevent the camp from being attacked, or to cover the rear of the army. The breaking of the whole body into loose and separate bands, was a thing which he thought deserved but little attention; because it was nothing more than the order into which troops would naturally fall upon a march. In the last place, they were instructed so to advance against the enemy, or

to retire again, in all the different movements, that, even when running with full speed, they might keep their ranks entire, and preserve the same distance between the troops. For his opinion was, that nothing was more dangerous or fatal, than for a body of cavalry to charge with disordered ranks.

When he had communicated these instructions to the officers and soldiers, he afterwards went round to the several cities, and examined, in the first place, whether the men comprehended his plan of discipline; and, secondly, whether those who commanded in the cities were clear and perfect in their manner of teaching it. For he judged that the success of this new method would principally depend upon the skill of the particular commanders. As soon as every thing was perfected, he drew out all the cavalry from the cities to one place; and himself directed them in all the movements, and made them perform the whole exercise in his presence. Nor did he, upon this occasion, take his station at the head of all the troops, as the generals of this age are accustomed to do; imagining that the foremost place is the proper place for a commander. But in truth they both show a want of judgement, and bring much disadvantage upon the service itself, by choosing a post, in which, while they are seen by every one, they can themselves see nothing. For the business in question, at such a time, is not to display the power and dignity of the com-

mander, but to show ability and skill ; to attend to the soldiers in all their movements; and, for this purpose, to be sometimes at the head, sometimes again in the rear of all, and sometimes in the centre. It was thus that Scipio acted. He rode from rank to rank, and saw all the troops himself. He instructed those that were less ready; and corrected in the beginning whatever was amiss. But as so great attention had been used before in exercising each particular body, the mistakes that now appeared were very few and inconsiderable. For this indeed, as Demetrius Phalereus has very justly observed, is the only method that can render a body of troops perfect in their discipline. As a building, says this writer, will be firm and solid, if every scantling, and every joint, and each single apartment, has been disposed and finished with the necessary care; so an army likewise will have its proper strength, when every troop, and every soldier, have first been separately trained, and rendered perfect in their duty.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

An observation on the policy of the Romans with respect to Greece.

THE present state of things very much resembled, it was said, the disposition of an army drawn up in battle. Upon such occasions the light-armed and most active of the troops are placed always in front, and are the first attacked; but the event of the battle is decided by the phalanx of heavy forces that stand behind them. In the same manner the Ætolians, and the people of Peloponnesus their allies, are now first exposed to danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, keep themselves in reserve. If the first should be defeated, the latter will withdraw themselves in safety from the fray. But if they should be victorious, which the gods avert, the Romans will then be able to subdue not only the Ætolians, but all the rest also of the people of Greece.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

A description of Ecbatana, the capital city of Media. The expedition of Antiochus against Arsaces.

MEDIA is the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia; whether we consider the extent of the country, or the numbers and goodness of the men, and also of the horses, which are there produced. For these animals are found in it in so great plenty, that almost all the rest of Asia is supplied with them from this province. It is here also that the royal horses are always fed, on account of the excellence of the pasture. The whole borders of the province are covered with Grecian cities; which were built as a check upon the neighbouring barbarians, after the country had been subdued by Alexander. Ecbatana only is not one of these. This city stands on the north side of Media, and commands all that part of Asia which lies along the Mæotis and the Euxine sea. It was, even from the most ancient times, the seat of the royal residence; and seems, in splendour and magnificence, very greatly to have exceeded all other cities. It is built on the declivity of the mountain Orontes; and not enclosed with any walls.

But there is a citadel in it, the fortifications of which are of most wonderful strength: and below the citadel stands the palace of the Persian kings. With respect to other particulars I am in doubt whether I should speak, or be entirely silent. To those who love exaggeration, and to strike their readers with something wonderful in their descriptions, this city would afford ample matter for such digression. But others, who go not without great diffidence into things that exceed the common apprehension, will, for this very reason, be the more perplexed. Thus much, however, I shall say. The palace contained seven stadia in circumference. And the magnificence of the structure in every part was such as must have raised a very high opinion of the wealth and power of those who built it. For though the wood was all of cedar, or of cypress, no part of it was left naked: but the beams, the roofs, and the pillars that supported the porticoes and peristyles were all covered, some with plates of silver, and some of gold. The tiles likewise were all of silver. The greatest part of these riches was carried away by the Macedonians who attended Alexander: and the rest was pillaged in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus. At this time, however, when Antiochus arrived, there were still remaining in the temple of Æna some pillars cased with gold, and a large quantity of silver tiles laid together in a heap. There were also some few wedges of gold, and a much greater

number of silver. These were now coined into money with the royal stamp; and amounted to the sum of almost four thousand talents.

Arsaces had expected that Antiochus would advance as far as to this city; but was persuaded that he never would attempt to lead so great an army through the desert that was beyond it: especially because he could not fail of being in great want of water. For, in these parts, no water is ever seen above the surface of the ground. But, through the whole of the desert, there are many subterraneous wells and streams, which are known only to those who are acquainted with the country. The account which the inhabitants give of these are true: That the Persians, when they were masters of that part of Asia, gave to those who brought a stream of water into places in which there was none before, the free inheritance of the ground for five generations; and that the natives, encouraged by this advantage, spared no labour or expense to bring the water, which falls from mount Caucasus in many large streams, through subterraneous channels to a very great distance; so that, in the present times, those who use the waters know not the beginning, nor the course, of the channels through which they flow. When Arsaces saw, however, that the king had determined to pass through the desert, he ordered the wells to be broken and filled up. But Antiochus, being informed of this design, sent away Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who,

finding on his arrival that Arsaces had retreated, and that a small body of cavalry only was employed in stopping the mouths of the streams, forced them to fly upon his first approach, and returned back again to Antiochus.

The king, having passed the desert, arrived at Hecatompylus, a city situated in the middle of the Parthian territory, and which takes its name from the great number of roads which lead from it into all the neighbouring parts. In this place he allowed the army some time to rest. And when he had considered with himself, that, if Arsaces had been inclined to venture on a battle he never would have left his country, or have looked for any ground more proper for his own army than that which lay round Hecatompylus; and that it was evident from his retreat that he had no such design; he resolved to advance into Hyrcania. Arriving at Tagæ, and being informed by the inhabitants that the whole way leading to the summit of the mountain Labutas, which overlooked Hyrcania, was extremely difficult, and that great numbers of barbarians also had already possessed themselves of all the passes; he divided his light-armed forces into many little bodies, and sent them away under different leaders, assigning to each the route which they should take. The pioneers of the army were separated also into little bands; and were ordered to attend the light-armed troops, and, in every part, as they arrived, to make the ascent practicable for

the heavy forces, and the beasts that were loaded with the baggage. When he had made this disposition, he gave to Diogenes the van of the army; which was composed of archers and slingers, and those mountaineers who are very skilful in throwing darts or stones; and who, not keeping any rank, but engaging man with man, as time and place may require, perform the greatest service in such difficult passes. Next to these marched a body of two thousand Cretans, armed with bucklers, and led by Polyxenidas of Rhodes. And in the rear of all were the heavy forces under the command of Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus an Ætolian.

As the army advanced, the way was found to be much more rough and difficult than it had been before conceived. For as the whole length of the ascent was not less than three hundred stadia, so the greatest part of the way also was through a deep and hollow road, formed by the winter torrents, and filled with trees and fragments of rocks which had fallen from the mountains that hung over it. The barbarians, likewise, not only had increased these difficulties, by laying trees together in heaps, and stones of the largest size; but had spread themselves upon all the eminences that were most proper for their purpose, along the whole border of the road. And, indeed, if they had not wholly been mistaken in their judgement, the king must have been forced to desist from his design. For having persuaded themselves, that the whole

army must necessarily pass along this road, they had taken the measures that were most agreeable to this persuasion, and secured the posts that were most proper for defending the passage. But they never had considered, that, though the baggage and the heavy forces must pass indeed along this way, because it was not possible for them to ascend the neighbouring mountains, yet the light-armed troops might advance along the very summit of the rocks. No sooner, therefore, was the first of their posts attacked, than the whole face of things was entirely changed. For Diogenes, perceiving in the very first conflict what was necessary to be done, led his troops out of the hollow way, and having gained the heights that were above the enemy, galled them with darts and stones. The stones especially, that were discharged by the slingers from a considerable distance, spread among them so great disorder, that they were forced to abandon their post. The pioneers then cleared the ground in full security; and as the number of them was great, this task was soon accomplished. And thus, as the archers and slingers, with the rest of the light-armed troops, still continued to advance; sometimes spreading themselves along the sides of the rocks, and sometimes uniting in a body, and seizing all the advantageous posts; while the Cretans, as a reserve, marched slowly and in good order through the hollow road; the barbarians, unable to sustain these different attacks, abandoned their

several stations, and retreated together to the top of the mountain. In this manner, Antiochus at last conducted his army through the passes, though very slowly, and with great difficulty: for he had scarcely gained upon the eighth day the summit of the mountain. As the enemy had assembled all their forces together in this place, and were persuaded that they should still compel him to desist from his design, a new and fierce battle ensued. But the barbarians were defeated in the following manner. They had formed themselves into a close body, and maintained the fight with courage, against the heavy forces that attacked them in front; when they perceived that the light-armed troops, having made a circuit in the night, had possessed themselves of the eminences in their rear. At this sight they were struck with terror, and began to fly with great precipitation. The king would not suffer them to be pursued, but ordered the trumpets to sound a retreat; that he might descend with all his army, in good order, into Hyrcania. Having regulated his march as he desired, he arrived at Tambracus; a city not enclosed with walls, but of great extent, and in which there was also a royal palace. In this place he encamped: and being informed that the greatest part of the routed army, together with many of the neighbouring people, had retired to Syrinx, which was at no great distance from Tambracus, and, on account both of its strength and situation, was considered as the capital of all Hyrcania; he resolved to make

himself master of that city. Advancing, therefore, with his army, he extended his forces round it, and began the siege. The chief part of his labour was employed in preparing tortoises, for the purpose of filling up the intrenchments. For the city was surrounded by three ditches; each of which contained not less than thirty cubits in breadth, and fifteen in depth. Upon the top of each was a double palisade, and beyond them a strong wall. It was here that continual combats passed without any intermission; so that neither the besiegers, nor the besieged, were able to remove the wounded and the dead. For they not only fought above the ground, but often met together in the mines which they had digged below. By the activity however of the king, as well as from the number of the troops employed, the ditches were in a short time filled, and the wall fell in the part that was undermined. The barbarians, unable any longer to make resistance, killed all the Greeks that were in the place; and, having pillaged the city of all the goods that were of greatest value, endeavoured to escape by night. But Antiochus, being informed of their retreat, ordered Hyperbasis to pursue them with the mercenaries. The barbarians, upon the first approach of these troops, threw away their baggage, and fled back into the city. And when they found that the heavy-armed forces had also entered the city through the breach, they despaired of any farther means of safety, and surrendered themselves to the king.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

The consuls Marcellus and Crispinus are lost through their own imprudence. Reflections of the historian upon this event.

THE consuls, Claudius Marcellus and Crispinus, being desirous to take a perfect view of those parts of the hill that looked toward the camp of the enemy, ordered the rest of the army to remain within the intrenchment, and, attended only by two troops of horse, some light-armed, and about thirty lictors, advanced to examine the ground. It happened, that some of the Numidians, who were accustomed to wait in ambuscade, and to attack by surprise those who came out to skirmish, or upon any occasion advanced from the Roman camp, had at this very time concealed themselves, lying close under the foot of the hill. As soon then as their scout gave notice by a signal, that some of the enemy were above them, they rose from their place, and, winding along the sides of the hill, intercepted the consuls, and cut off their return to the camp. The consul Claudius, and some others, were killed in the first onset: and the rest, being wounded, directed their flight by different ways among the precipices. The son

of Claudius, who was also wounded, very unexpectedly escaped, and with great difficulty. The Romans from their camp saw distinctly every thing that passed, but were not able to send any assistance. For while they cried aloud, and were struck with consternation at what had happened; while some bridled their horses, and others prepared their arms, the action was entirely finished. Thus was Marcellus lost through his own simplicity, and by not attending to the proper duty of a general.

I have often been forced, in the course of this history, to make some reflection upon faults like these. For, among all into which the leaders of armies are betrayed, there is none more frequent; nor any on the other hand that affords a clearer proof of ignorance. What good indeed can be expected from a man, who knows not that the commander of an army should keep himself, as much as it is possible, out of little combats which decide nothing with respect to the whole; and that, if ever any occasion should oblige him to take a part in such engagements, he ought to see many fall before the danger be suffered to approach himself? Let the base Carian risk his life, as the proverb expresses it, and not the general. To say afterwards, I did not think it; and, Who could have expected such an accident? is, in my judgement, the strongest proof that a general can give of his want of capacity and sense. I cannot, therefore, but consider Annibal, who was indeed, in

many other respects, an excellent commander, as most particularly admirable upon this account; that in all the long time which he passed in a hostile country, amidst much variety of fortune, and in the course of so many and so great battles, though upon many occasions he surprised the enemy, he never was himself surprised. So great was the prudence with which he provided always for the safety of his own person. And surely nothing is more commendable than such precaution. For though an army may have suffered an entire defeat, yet, if the general be unhurt and safe, many favourable occasions may arise for repairing the loss that has been sustained. But, when he, who is as the pilot in a vessel, falls; the army, though superior perhaps in the action to the enemy, cannot draw any advantage even from victory; because the hopes of every man are all centred in the leader. Let this then serve as a caution to those commanders who, through ostentation, youthful folly, a want of experience, or a contempt of the enemy, are apt to fall into such absurdity of conduct. For to one or other of these causes misfortunes like that which has now been mentioned must always be ascribed.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The conduct of Scipio in Spain. He is joined by Mandonius and Andobalis: defeats Asdrubal in battle; and forces him to leave the country. He rejects the title of king, which was offered to him by the Spaniards.

CHAP. I.

WHILE Scipio remained in winter quarters at Taraco, as we before have mentioned, he endeavoured to secure the confidence and friendship of the Spaniards, by delivering to them the several hostages which had fallen into his power. An accident happened, which greatly assisted him in this design. Edeco, a powerful prince in the country, no sooner heard that the Romans were become masters of New Carthage, and that his wife and children were in their hands, than he considered with himself, that it was highly probable that the Spaniards would in no long time revolt, and join the conquerors. He resolved, therefore, to set the first example of this change; being persuaded, that by such a measure, he not only should recover again his wife and children, but appear also to have embraced the friendship of the Romans, not through ne-

cessity, but by choice. Nor was he indeed disappointed in his hopes. As soon as the armies were fixed in winter quarters, he came to Taraco, with some of the nearest of his friends: and being admitted into the presence of Scipio, "he thanked the gods," he said, "who had permitted him to be the first in coming to him, of all the princes of the country. That others, indeed, extended their hands towards the Romans; but still turned their eyes towards the Carthaginians, and held a correspondence with them. But that he, on the contrary, was ready to surrender without reserve, not only himself, but his kindred also and friends, to the Romans. That, if Scipio would consider him as an ally and friend, he might draw from such compliance many great advantages, both now and in future times. That, with respect to the present, the rest of the Spaniards, as soon as they should find that he was treated as a friend, and had obtained what he desired, would hasten to follow his example; with the hopes of recovering again their families, and of being received into the same alliance. And that hereafter, likewise, possessed as they would be, with a sense of so great an honour as well as kindness, they would be ready to assist him without reserve in all the operations of the war. He entreated him, therefore, to restore to him his wife and children; to consider him as his friend; and to suffer him to return with that denomination to his own country; till some occasion should arise, in which he might

show, in the most effectual manner, the sincerity of his own attachment, as well as that of his friends, both to Scipio himself, and to all the interests of the Romans."

Here he ended his discourse. Scipio, who long before had viewed the thing in this very light, and had reasoned upon it with himself in the same manner as Edeco had done, immediately restored his wife and children, and gave him an assurance of his friendship. And when, in the course of many conversations which they afterwards held together, he had insinuated himself by various methods into the heart of the Spaniard, and had raised also in all his friends great expectations of future honour and advantage, he sent them back to their own country. The report of this transaction being soon noised abroad, all the Spaniards that lived on that side of the Iberus, and who before were enemies of the Romans, immediately with one consent embraced their party. When the success of this measure had so fully answered all his expectations, Scipio, having now no enemy upon the sea, disbanded his naval forces; and, selecting the ablest of the men, distributed them among the companies, and increased his land army.

CHAP. II.

MANDONIUS and **Andobalis** were two of the most powerful among the princes in Spain ; and had always been considered as the firmest friends of the Carthaginians. But they long had harboured a secret dissatisfaction in their minds, because **Asdrubal**, on pretence that he suspected their fidelity, had demanded their wives and children as hostages, together with a large sum in money, as we have already related. Conceiving, therefore, the present opportunity to be most favourable for carrying into execution the design which they had from that time meditated, they withdrew their troops from the Carthaginian camp by night, and retired to some fortified posts, in which they were secure from being attacked. This revolt was followed also by that of many others of the Spaniards ; who for a long time had supported with great pain the haughtiness of the Carthaginians ; and were ready to seize the first occasion that was offered to declare their real inclinations.

Examples of the same kind have been indeed extremely frequent. It is a great thing undoubtedly to obtain success in action, and to defeat an enemy in the field. But, as we have often taken occasion to observe, it requires much

greater skill and caution to make a good use of victory. There are many who know how to conquer; and but few, in the comparison, who use their conquest with advantage. The Carthaginians were among the first of these. As soon as they had defeated the Roman army, and killed the two consuls, Publius and Cnæus, being persuaded that they should now hold without dispute the sovereignty of Spain, they treated all the people of the country with the greatest haughtiness. Instead, therefore, of allies and friends, they made all who had submitted to their power their enemies. And how indeed could it be otherwise? They conceived, that one way was the best for gaining empire, and another for maintaining it. They ought, however, to have learned, that men most easily preserve their power, by persisting in the same course of conduct by which it was at first obtained. Now nothing is more evident, or more confirmed by a great variety of examples, than that the surest way of drawing any people to submission is to flatter them with kindness, and to allure them by the prospect of advantage. But if men, when they have gained the end which they desired, reverse this treatment, and load those that have submitted to them with rigour and severity, the inclinations of the subjects, as the Carthaginians now experienced, will not fail to correspond with the change of conduct in the governors.

In this dangerous condition of affairs the mind of Asdrubal was filled with many apprehensions,

and distracted by various thoughts. He was grieved at the revolt of Andobalis. The discontents of his own officers, and their opposition to his will, added much to his anxiety. He dreaded also the arrival of Scipio with his army. And as he judged that this would very shortly happen; perceiving likewise, that the Spaniards had deserted him, and were hastening with one consent to join the Romans; he at last resolved, that he would dispose all things in the best order that was possible, and try the fortune of a battle. That, if happily he should be victorious in the action, he might afterwards deliberate upon future measures in full security. If, on the other hand, he should be conquered; he would then retreat with the remains of his army into Gaul; and, being joined by as many of the barbarians as he should be able to draw together in that country, would from thence pass into Italy, to assist Annibal his brother, and to partake with him in the same common hopes.

While Asdrubal was forming this design, Scipio, having been joined again by Lælius, who brought to him the orders of the senate, drew all the troops from their winter quarters, and began his march. In every place through which he passed, the Spaniards were prepared to meet him, and joined themselves to the army with alacrity and joy. Among the rest, Andobalis, who had long before sent messages to Scipio, no sooner was informed of his approach, than he went out of his camp to meet him, attended by his friends.

And when he had joined him, he began with giving an account of his late connexion with the Carthaginians: displaying, on the one hand, the advantages which they had drawn from his alliance, and the fidelity with which he had always served them; and, on the other, the many injuries and insults with which his services had been requited. He entreated Scipio therefore to be himself the judge of what he had heard. That, if he should be found to have falsely accused the Carthaginians, it might with good reason be supposed, that he would not long maintain his faith in this new alliance. But if, on the contrary, he had only separated himself from his former friends, because a long course of injurious treatment had compelled him to abandon them; there was good ground to hope, that, having now embraced the party of the Romans, he would adhere to it with a firm affection. He said many other things upon this subject. And when he had ended, Scipio replied: "That he doubted not of the truth of what he had heard. That he could well judge what must have been the insolence of the Carthaginians towards him; not only from the manner in which they had treated all the people of Spain; but more particularly from the insults to which the wives and daughters of Andobalis and the other princes had been exposed. That himself, on the contrary, when these women had fallen into his power, not as hostages, but as prisoners and slaves, had observed towards them such strict fidelity, that even

they who were their parents scarcely could have equalled him in discharging that duty." Andobalis declared aloud, that he spoke the truth; and, prostrating himself before him, saluted him with the appellation of King. The rest that were present all applauded the word. But Scipio, inclining himself towards them, only exhorted them to take courage, and to be assured, that they should receive every mark of kindness from the Romans. He then delivered to them their wives and daughters; and on the next day concluded a treaty with them, in which the chief condition was, that they should be subject to the command of the Roman leaders, and obey the orders which they should give. The Spaniards, after this transaction, returned back again to their own camp; and, taking with them all their forces, came and encamped together with the Romans, and began their march with them towards Asdrubal.

The Carthaginian general was at this time encamped in the neighbourhood of Bætula, a city situated in the Castalonian district, at no great distance from the silver mines. But when he heard that the Romans were advancing towards him, he went into another camp, which was secured behind by a river. In his front he had a plain, which was bordered at the extremity by a rising ground; of a height sufficient to cover the camp; and of sufficient length also for drawing up the army in battle. In this place he remained; taking care only to

place continually an advanced guard of troops upon the rising ground. As soon as Scipio arrived, he was impatient to engage: but the great advantages of the ground in which Asdrubal was encamped filled him with perplexity. When he had waited however two whole days, and began to fear, that, if Mago and Asdrubal the son of Gesco, should advance also with their armies, he should then be enclosed on every side, he resolved to make some attempt at least to draw the enemy to a battle. Having ordered therefore the rest of the army to remain in the intrenchments, and to hold themselves in readiness to engage, he sent away a part of the light-armed troops, together with the extraordinaries of the infantry, to attack those bodies of the enemy that were posted upon the rising ground. This order was executed with vigour. The Carthaginian general remained for some time quiet, and expected the event. But, when he saw that his men were closely pressed by the Romans, and that they suffered greatly in the action, he drew out his army, and, trusting to the advantage of his situation, began to range them in order of battle upon the rising ground. Scipio then sent away all the light-armed forces, to assist those that were first engaged: and, at the same time, dividing the rest of his army into two equal bodies, he gave one of them to Lælius, and ordered him to make a circuit round the rising ground, and fall upon the right of the enemy, while himself with the

other wheeled round on the opposite side, and attacked their left. While this was done, Asdrubal was but just beginning to draw out his troops from the intrenchments. For to this moment he had remained quiet; not expecting that the Romans would risk a battle against him in so strong a post. And now, when the thing had happened, it was too late to draw up his army in proper order. The Romans therefore falling thus upon the wings before they had taken their respective posts, not only gained the top of the rising ground without resistance, but continuing also to advance, while the enemy was still in motion to be formed, killed those who presented their flank to them as they marched, and forced the rest, who had just formed themselves in front, to fly. When Asdrubal perceived, that his troops were repulsed in every part, persisting in the plan which he at first had formed, he resolved not to continue the battle to the last extremity. Taking with him therefore the money and the elephants, and collecting together as many as he was able of those that fled, he retreated towards the Tagus, with design to pass over the Pyrenæan mountains into Gaul.

Scipio, not judging it proper to pursue the enemy, lest the other generals should in the mean time advance towards him, gave permission to the soldiers to pillage the camp. On the following day, he assembled together all the prisoners, and gave the necessary orders

concerning them. Their numbers were ten thousand of the foot, and more than two thousand horse. The Spaniards through all the country, who had taken arms in favour of the Carthaginians, came and submitted themselves to the Romans at discretion. In the conversations which they held with Scipio upon this occasion, they all saluted him by the name of king. This appellation had first been given to him by Edeco, who had also prostrated himself before him. Andobalis used afterwards the same expression. The word at that time passed without any observation. But after the present victory, when Scipio found that all the Spaniards addressed him by that title, he thought it a matter that deserved his most serious reflection. Having assembled them therefore all together, he told them; that he should always desire to be, and to be esteemed by all, a man of a mind truly royal: but that he neither would be a king, nor would he be so called by any one; and that, for the time to come, they should address him by no other appellation than that of General."

The greatness of soul, that was displayed by Scipio upon this occasion, may very justly be thought to deserve applause. Though at this time he was extremely young, and fortune had so favoured him in his career, that a whole subject people made a voluntary offer to him of the royal title, he remained constant to himself, and was not to be tempted by so flattering a

show of honour. But this same greatness will appear in a degree much more exalted, if we turn our view upon the later period of his life. For when, after his exploits in Spain, he had subdued the Carthaginians, and brought the fairest and the largest provinces of Afric, from the Philænean altars even to the pillars of Hercules, into subjection to his country; when he had conquered Asia and the Assyrian kings; and forced the noblest and the most considerable parts of the whole known world to submit to the Roman sway; how many occasions arose, of establishing himself in royalty, in almost any part of the earth that he should choose? A situation like this might have inspired not only a human mind, but even divinity itself, if I may be allowed to say it, with ambitious pride. But so elevated, so superior was the soul of Scipio to that of other men, that, though sovereignty is regarded as the greatest blessing which the gods can give, and though it was thrown so often in his way by fortune, he rejected it with disdain; and preferred his own duty, and the interests of his country, to all the dazzling splendour and imagined happiness of power. But let us return from this digression.

Scipio, having separated the Spaniards from the rest of the prisoners, dismissed them without ransom to their several countries. He permitted Andobalis to choose for himself three hundred of the horses, and distributed the rest

among those who had none. He then took possession of the Carthaginian camp, because it was situated with so great advantage; and remained there with the army, expecting the other generals of the Carthaginians. He sent some troops also towards the Pyrenæan mountains, to observe the motions of Asdrubal. When the summer was ended, he again decamped; and returned back to Taraco, to take his winter quarters in that city.

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

The preparations of Philip for maintaining the war against the Ætolians, supported by Attalus and the Romans. A digression on signals by lighted torches.

CHAP. I.

THE Ætolians, having now conceived the greatest expectations from the arrival of Attalus and the Romans, struck a terror into all the Greeks, and were ready to attack them by land, while Publius Sulpitius and Attalus pressed them on the side of the sea. The Achæans, therefore, sent an embassy to Philip, to implore assistance. For, besides the danger which threatened them from the Ætolians, Machanidas also had drawn together an army upon the borders of the Argian territory. The Bœotians, apprehensive that the fleet would make a descent upon their coasts, demanded likewise from Philip a leader and a body of troops. The Eubœans pressed him with the greatest earnestness to take some measures for their defence. The Acarnanians urged the same request. An embassy came also from Epirus.

At the same time a report was spread that Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus were drawing together their forces: and that the Thracians, who were contiguous to Macedon, and especially the Mædians, had resolved to invade that kingdom, as soon as Philip should be removed to any distance from it. The Ætolians likewise had already secured Thermopylæ by ditches and intrenchments, and strong bodies of troops; and were persuaded that they had shut the entrance against Philip; and that it would not be possible for him to advance to the assistance of his allies that were within those passes.

Conjunctures like these, in which the leaders of armies are obliged to exert all their strength, and to bring into trial their whole ability both of mind and body, are those which most particularly deserve the attention of the reader. For as, in the diversions of the field, the force and vigour of the hunted beasts are never so conspicuously displayed as when they are pressed on every side by danger; just so it happened with respect to these commanders; and in this light it was that Philip now appeared. As soon, therefore, as he had dismissed the ambassadors, with assurance that he would assist them with his utmost power, he applied his whole attention to the war: turning himself on every side; and considering with the greatest care, to what part first he should direct his aim. Being informed that Attalus had passed over with his army to the island Peparethus, and was

master of the open country, he sent a garrison to secure the city. He ordered Polyphantas to march with a body of troops to cover Phocis and Bœotia. To Chalcis and the other cities of Eubœa, he sent Menippus with a thousand heavy-armed soldiers, and five hundred Agrianians. At the same time he began his own march towards Scotussa; having ordered the Macedonian troops to be assembled in that place. But when he heard that Attalus had sailed away to Nicæa; and that the Ætolian chiefs were assembled together at Heraclea, in order to deliberate concerning the operations of the war; he again left Scotussa, and marched with the greatest haste, that he might either prevent or disperse their meeting. But the assembly had separated before he was able to arrive. He therefore wasted the country; and when he had destroyed, or taken away, all the corn, that was found among the people who lived round the Ænian bay, he returned back to Scotussa, and, leaving there the body of his army, went himself to Demetrias with the light-armed forces and the royal troop, and attended to the designs of the enemy. And that the earliest knowledge might be obtained of all their motions, he sent orders to Peparethus, to the people of Phocis, and those of Eubœa, that they should inform him of every thing that should happen by signals of lighted torches raised upon Tisæum, a mountain of Thessaly, which stood commodious for conveying this

kind of notice from all the parts now mentioned. But as this manner of making signals is of the greatest service in war; and no perfect method has hitherto appeared of carrying it into practice; it will not be unuseful if we here pause a while, and bestow upon it such consideration as the importance of the subject well deserves.

CHAP. II.

IT is a thing well known, that opportunity, which has so great a share in the accomplishment of all designs, has the greatest in those that belong to war. Now, of all the inventions which have been contrived for securing opportunity, the most effectual is that of making signals by the means of lighted torches. By this method, things which have been just transacted, and others at the very time in which they happen, may be communicated to those who are concerned to know them; though they are distant perhaps three or four days' journey, and sometimes even many days from the place; and the requisite assistance be received, when it seems scarcely possible to expect it. In former times the manner of conveying this notice was too simple; and the invention, upon that account, lost much of its advantages. For the

method was, to settle by concert some fixed and determinate signals. But as the things which happen are infinite, the greater part were incapable of being signified by such a method. Thus, for example, that an army is arrived at Oreum, Peparethus, or at Chalcis, may be expressed by signals before concerted. But accidents of a different kind, such as the revolt of the citizens, the discovery of treason, massacres committed in the city, and other events like these; accidents which, though they are very frequent, cannot before be taken into account; and which, because they happen unexpectedly, require a speedier consultation and more quick relief; these accidents never could be signified by signals of torches before concerted. For it is not possible that signals should be concerted to give notice of events which cannot be foreseen.

Æneas, who composed a work on the Art of War, perceiving the defects of this method, added indeed some little improvement to this invention; but was very far from carrying it to that degree of perfection which the thing requires. The reader may judge of it from the account that follows.

Let those, says he, who intend to convey and to receive intelligence of what has happened by the means of lighted torches, take two earthen vessels, of a depth and breadth exactly equal. The depth of three cubits may commonly be sufficient, and the breadth of one. Let them

then take two corks, a little less in size than the mouths of the vessels, and in the middle of them fix two sticks; which must be divided, on the outside into equal portions, very distinctly marked, and containing three fingers' breadth in each. Upon each of the portions inscribe one or other of those events which usually happen in the time of war. On one, for example; "A body of cavalry is come into the country." On the next; "A body of heavy infantry." Upon a third; "Light-armed forces." On another; "A body of cavalry and infantry." Then again; "A fleet of ships." Afterwards; "Corn." And in the same manner upon the rest till all the portions are severally filled with those events, which are capable of being foreseen, and which the state and condition of the war may render probable. Particular care is to be taken, that the tapholes in both the vessels be exactly equal; that the water may be discharged alike from both. Let the vessels be then filled with water, and the corks with the sticks be placed upon the water; and then let the tapholes be opened. When this is done, it is clear, that, if all things are exactly equal in both vessels, the corks, together with the sticks that are upon them, will sink alike in both, as the water is discharged. When the experiment therefore has first been made, and the sticks are found to descend in equal time, let the vessels be carried to the respective places, in which the signals are to be given and received. And

when any one of those events, which are inscribed upon the sticks, has happened, let those on one side raise a lighted torch, and hold it till another torch be shown on the other side. Then let the first be dropped; and the tapholes of the vessels on both sides be opened. And when, by the sinking of the cork, that portion of the stick, which is inscribed with the event intended to be communicated, becomes level with the mouth of the vessel, let those on one side again raise a lighted torch, and those on the other stop the taphole of their vessel, and examine the inscription that is also level with the mouth. For the writing in this part will be the same in one vessel as in the other; if all things have been performed in exact and equal time.

But this method, though preferable, indeed, to that of making concerted signals with the help of torches, is far from being attended with sufficient certainty. For it is evident that all things cannot be foreseen: and, if they could, that it would be impossible to inscribe them all upon a stick. When an event, therefore, happens of which there was no suspicion, no notice can ever be given of it in this method. Add to this, that the inscriptions also upon the sticks are themselves too indeterminate. They neither show the numbers of the infantry or cavalry; nor into what part of the country they are come, nor the number of the ships arrived; nor the quantity of the corn. For as these are circum-

stances, which cannot possibly be known before they happen, it is by consequence impossible to ascertain or mark them. And yet this is the most important part of the whole. For, unless we know the numbers of the enemy, and the place into which they are come, how shall it be determined what assistance is necessary to be sent? Unless we are informed, how many ships the fleet contains, and what quantity of corn the allies have furnished, how can we frame a judgement with regard to the event, or how in a word be able to take any measures?

The last method which I shall mention, was invented either by Cleoxenus or Democlitus, but perfected by myself. This method is precise, and capable of signifying every thing that happens with the greatest accuracy. A very exact attention, however, is required in using it. It is this which follows.

Take the alphabet, and divide it into five parts, with five letters in each. In the last part indeed, one letter will be wanting; but this is of no importance. Then let those who are to give and to receive the signals, write upon five tablets the five portions of the letters in their proper order; and concert together the following plan. That he, on one side, who is to make the signal, shall first raise two lighted torches, and hold them erect, till they are answered by torches from the other side. This only serves to show, that they are on both sides ready and prepared. That afterwards, he again who gives the signal,

shall raise first some torches upon the left hand, in order to make known to those on the other side, which of the tablets is to be inspected. If the first, for example; a single torch: if the second, two: and so of the rest. That then he shall raise other torches also upon the right; to mark in the same manner, to those who receive the signal, which of the letters upon the tablet is to be observed and written. When they have thus regulated their plan, and taken their respective posts, it will be necessary first to have a dioptrical instrument, framed, with two holes or tubes; one for discerning the right, and the other the left hand of the person who is to raise the torches on the opposite side. The tablets must be placed erect, and in their proper order, near the instrument. And, upon the right and left, there should be also a solid fence, of about ten feet in length, and of the height of a man: that the torches, being raised along the top of these ramparts, may give a more certain light; and, when they are dropped again, that they may also be concealed behind them. When all things then are thus prepared, if it be intended, for example, to convey this notice; "that some of the soldiers, about a hundred in number, are gone over to the enemy;" it will be necessary in the first place to choose words for this purpose which contain the fewest letters. Thus, if it be said; "Cretans a hundred have deserted;" the same thing is expressed in less than half of the letters which compose the former sentence.

These words then, being first written down, are communicated by the means of torches in the following manner. The first letter is Cappa; which stands in the second division of the alphabet, and upon the second tablet. The person, therefore, who makes the signal, first holds up two torches upon the left; to signify that it is the second tablet, which is to be inspected: and afterwards five upon the right; to show that Cappa is the letter, which he who receives the signal must observe and write. For Cappa stands the fifth in the second division of the letters. Then again, he holds up four torches upon the left; because Ro is found in the fourth division: and two upon the right, to denote that it stands the second in that division. From hence, the person who receives the signal writes Ro upon his tables: and, in the same manner all the rest of the letters. By this method, an account of every thing that happens may be conveyed with the most perfect accuracy. It is true indeed, that, because every letter requires a double signal, a great number of torches must be employed. If the necessary pains however be used, the thing will be found to be very practicable. In both these methods, it is principally requisite, that the persons employed should first be exercised by practice: that, when a real occasion happens, the signals may be made and answered without any mistake.

With respect to the seeming difficulty of the method, it would be easy to show by many in-

stances, that there is a very great difference in the same things, when they are first proposed, and when they are afterwards rendered familiar to us by habit: and that many things which appear in the beginning to be not only difficult, but absolutely impracticable, in the course of time, and by continued use, are accomplished with the greatest ease. Among numberless examples, the art of reading may be mentioned, as one of the clearest and the most convincing proofs of the truth of this remark. Take a man, who has never learned to read, but is otherwise a man of sense. Set a child before him, who has learned: and order him to read a passage in a book. It is certain that this man will scarcely be able to persuade himself, that the child, as he reads, must consider distinctly, first the form of all the letters; in the next place their power; and, thirdly, their connexion one with another. For each of these things requires a certain portion of time. When he hears him, therefore, read four or five lines together without any hesitation, and in a breath, he will find it very difficult to believe, that the child never saw the book before. But, if to the reading some gesture also should be added; if the child should attend to all the stops; and observe all the breathings rough and smooth; it will be absolutely impossible to convince the man that this is true. From hence, therefore, we may learn, never to be deterred from any useful pursuit by the seeming difficul-

ties that attend it; but to endeavour rather to surmount those difficulties by practice and by habit. It is habit which gives to men the noblest acquisitions: even those which are upon many occasions the principal means of their safety. With respect to myself, what induced me to enter into a discussion of this kind, was the remark that was made in a former part of this work; that, in the present age, the sciences are advanced to so great perfection, that almost every thing is capable of being taught by method. Such digressions, therefore, deserve to be considered as some of the most useful parts of a history that is well composed.

EXTRACT THE EIGHTH.

The manner in which the Aspasians pass the Oxus.

THE wandering tribes that are called Aspasians, live between the Oxus and the Tanais. The first of these rivers discharges itself into the Hyrcanian sea, and the other into the Mæotis. Both of them are so large as to be navigable. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive, in what manner this barbarous people pass the Oxus without the help of vessels, and come into Hyrcania with their horses*. Two different accounts are given

* There is much geographical error in this account. For Hyrcania itself is situated between the Tanais and the Oxus. It might be imagined, that what the author calls the Oxus should mean the Araxes; which enters the Hyrcanian sea on the western side, as the Oxus does on the east. And these two rivers are often mistaken one for the other by the ancients. But on the other hand, what he afterwards says, that this river rises in mount Caucasus, and runs through Bactriana, agrees with the Oxus, but not with the Araxes. The truth is, the ancients, even after the expedition of Alexander, had a very imperfect knowledge of these parts of the globe. As this is almost the single mistake of this kind that I have observed in Polybius, I was willing to remark it. In general, he is more exact and accurate in the names of places, and descriptions of countries, than even the professed writers of geography.

of this fact: one of which is probable; and the other, though very extraordinary, not impossible. The Oxus takes its sources from mount Caucasus; and being increased by the addition of many large streams as it flows through Bactriana, rolls its waters over the plain with a full and impetuous course. From thence it passes through a desert to the top of a craggy precipice; whose height, together with the strength and the rapidity of the waters, throws the stream forward with such violence, that it falls upon the ground below, at the distance of more than a stadium from the rock. By this way, it is said, the Aspasiens enter Hyrcania; passing close along the rock, and under the fall of the river. But there is another account, which appears to be much more probable. This account affirms; that at the bottom of the rock there are some large cavities in the ground; that the river, forcing its way downward through these cavities, runs to a moderate distance under ground, and afterwards appears again; and that the barbarians, being well acquainted with the part that is left dry, pass over it with their horses into Hyrcania.

EXTRACT THE NINTH.

*Antiochus gains the victory in an engagement
against Euthydemus who had revolted.*

WHEN Antiochus was informed that Euthydemus had encamped with his whole army near Taguria, and, that he had stationed a body of ten thousand cavalry upon the banks of the river Arius, to defend the passage; he immediately raised the siege, and resolved to pass the river, and to advance towards the enemy. Being distant three days' journey from the place, during the first two days he moved with a moderate pace. But, on the evening of the third, having ordered the rest of the army to decamp and follow him at break of day, he took the cavalry and the light-armed troops, together with ten thousand of the peltastæ, and continued his march all night with the greatest haste. For he had heard, that the cavalry of the enemy, which guarded the passage of the river by day, retired, as soon as night came on, to a certain city, which was full twenty stadia distant from the river. As the country was a level plain, commodious for the march of cavalry, he arrived at the expected time, and passed the river with the greatest part of his forces before the day

approached. But the Bactrian cavalry, being now informed by their scouts of what had happened, ran towards the river, and were ready to attack the troops as they marched. The king, judging it to be necessary that he should receive their first charge, exhorted the two thousand horsemen, that always fought near his person, to perform their duty; and, having ordered the rest to range themselves in troops and cohorts, and to take their accustomed posts, led on his body of cavalry, and engaged with the foremost of the enemy. In this action he distinguished himself above all that were with him. Many fell on both sides: but the first squadron of the enemy was at last broken by the king. When the second, and afterwards the third squadron advanced to the charge, the troops of Antiochus were in their turn pressed, and began to fall into disorder. But Panætulus, bringing up the rest of the cavalry; who were now almost all completely formed, rescued the king from the danger; and forced the Bactrians, whose ranks were already broken, to fly in great disorder. Nor did they stop their flight, till they had reached the camp of Euthydemus: being still closely pursued by Panætulus, and having lost the greatest part of their men. The royal cavalry, when they had killed great numbers, and taken many also alive, at last desisted from the pursuit, and encamped upon the banks of the river. Antiochus had a horse killed under him in the battle; and was himself wound-

ed in the mouth, and lost some of his teeth. Nor was there indeed any action of his life, in which he gained so high a reputation for courage, as in this engagement. Euthydemus, disheartened by this defeat, retreated to Zariaspa, a city of Bactriana, with all his army.

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Asdrubal, having entered Italy, is defeated by the Romans. His death and character.

ASDRUBAL was, in all respects, dissatisfied with the state in which things appeared. But as it was now too late to take other measures, because the Romans were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he was constrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him, in order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in front; increased the depth of his files; and ranged his whole army upon a very narrow ground. He then took his post in the centre of the line, behind the elephants; and moved to attack the left of the enemy; having before determined that in this battle he would either conquer or die. Livius, leading on his troops with a slow and haughty pace, began the combat with great vigour. But Claudius, who commanded on the right, was unable to advance so

as to surround the enemy ; being utterly obstructed by those difficulties of the ground which have before been mentioned, and which had determined Asdrubal to make his whole attack upon the left. Anxious, therefore, and not willing to remain inactive, he had recourse to the measure which the occasion itself suggested to him. From having drawn away his troops for the right, he led them round the field of battle ; and, passing beyond the left of the Roman army, attacked the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this moment the success of the battle had remained doubtful. For both the Carthaginians and the Romans, well knowing that they had no hopes of safety but in victory maintained the fight with equal bravery. The service also which the elephants performed, had been the same to both. For these beasts, being enclosed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, spread no less disorder among the ranks of the Spaniards than among those of the Romans. But when Claudius fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement was no longer equal. The Spaniards, pressed at once both in front and rear, were almost all slaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants were killed, together with the men that conducted them ; and four, which had forced their way through the disordered ranks, were afterwards taken, but without their leaders. Asdrubal, who had so oft distinguished himself upon former occasions, displayed no less courage in this last action, and

fell in the battle. It would be unjust not to pause awhile, and give the praise that is due to the character of this great commander.

It has already been mentioned that he was the brother of Annibal; and that the latter, when he began his march towards Italy, left to him the care of the affairs of Spain. The many engagements which he sustained against the Romans in that country; the various difficulties in which he was involved by the jealousy of those commanders who were sent from time to time into Spain from Carthage; how truly he showed himself, upon all those occasions, to be the worthy son of Amilcar Barcas; and with what spirit and magnanimity he supported his misfortunes and defeats; these things have been all related in the former books. But his conduct, in the last scene of this contention, is that which especially deserves to be remarked, and is most worthy to be imitated.

The greatest part of generals and of princes, when they are ready to engage in a decisive action, place continually before their eyes the honour and advantages that may result from victory; and consider only, how they may best improve each circumstance, and in what manner they shall use the fruits of their success; but never turn their view upon the consequences of a defeat; nor form for themselves any rule of action in the case of a misfortune. And yet the conduct which the first of these situations may require, is sufficiently plain and obvious; but

the second demands great foresight. Now, from hence it has happened that commanders, through the want of this attention, and not having before determined in what manner they shall act upon such occasions, after the bravest efforts of their soldiers, have often been defeated with disgrace and shame; have dishonoured all their former actions; and loaded the remainder of their lives with reproach and infamy. How many have been lost by this fatal negligence; and how much one man is in this respect superior to another, may be learned with little pains. The history of past times is filled with such examples. But Asdrubal displayed a very different conduct. As long as any hope remained of performing actions not unworthy of his former glory, he attended to nothing so much in every battle as to the care of his own safety. But when fortune had taken from him every future prospect, and confined him to the last desperate extremity; though he neglected nothing that might secure the victory, either in the disposition of his army, or in the time itself of the engagement; yet he considered also with no less attention, in what manner, in case that he should be defeated, he might submit with dignity to his adverse fortune, and not suffer any thing unworthy of his former actions. Let other commanders then be taught by this example; as, on the one hand, not to frustrate the hopes of those who depend upon them, by throwing themselves unnecessarily into danger; so, on

other, never to add disgrace to their misfortunes, by cherishing an immoderate desire of life.

The Romans, as soon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp of the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and sleeping upon their straw, they slaughtered them as victims without resistance. The prisoners were then collected together: and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were brought into the public treasury. Not fewer than ten thousand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement; and about two thousand of the Romans. Some of the Carthaginians that were of eminent rank were taken alive; the rest were destroyed in the action.

When the account of this great success arrived at Rome, so vehement was the desire that it might be true, that it was not at first believed. But when messengers after messengers not only confirmed the news of the victory, but reported also all the circumstances of the battle, the whole city was transported with extravagant joy. Every shrine was then adorned; and every temple filled with libations and with sacrifices. In a word, so flattering were the hopes, and so strong the confidence, which possessed all the people, that even Annibal, whom they had hitherto so greatly dreaded, seemed no longer to be in Italy.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

The discourse of an ambassador exhorting the Ætolians to put an end to their war with Philip, and to be upon their guard against the designs of the Romans.

“WITH what earnestness, O Ætolians, king Ptolemy, and the cities of Rhodes and Byzantium, of Chios and Mitylene, have endeavoured to persuade you to conclude a peace with Philip, let the facts themselves demonstrate. For this is neither the first nor the second embassy that has been sent to you with that intention. Even from the moment when the war first began we have never ceased to follow you; and have taken every occasion that was offered to awaken in you an attention to your proper interests; being led to this measure, not only by the consideration of those evils which the Macedonians and yourselves at this time suffer; but by the foresight of the ruin which will hereafter fall upon our own countries also, and indeed upon the whole of Greece. For as a fire, when it has once been kindled, is no longer controlled by him who lighted it, but is directed in its course either by the winds that blow, or the combustion of the

matter with which it is fed; and as it often turns most unaccountably the first efforts of its rage against the person himself who raised it into a flame, just so it happens in the case of war. Once kindled, it first consumes the authors of it; and from thence, spreading itself upon every side, devours without distinction every thing that it meets; acquiring still new strength; and being blown as it were into a flame by the folly of the neighbouring people. You now, therefore, see before you all the Greeks of Asia, and the people of all the isles, imploring you to put an end to a war, the effects of which they have too great reason to fear will extend hereafter to themselves. Embrace the sentiments which prudence dictates; attend at last to our entreaties; and give a favourable answer to our just demand. If the war indeed in which you are now engaged, though attended like all other wars, with present disadvantage, had both been honourable in the first intention, and glorious also with respect to the events that have happened in it, this persevering obstinacy might perhaps be excused. But, if the motives that led you into it were most shameful; and if the conduct of it has been loaded with dishonour and reproach; how much does it now deserve your most serious consideration? For my part, I shall speak my sentiments without reserve: and you, if you are wise, will not be offended with this freedom. It is certainly much better, by censuring your conduct, to

preserve you before it be too late, than to sooth you with a flattering discourse, which in a short time would be followed by your own ruin, and by that of all the Greeks. Observe then the mistakes into which you have fallen. You pretend that you have taken arms against Philip, only to prevent the Greeks from falling under the absolute dominion of that prince. But the true design and tendency of your engagement is to destroy all Greece, and to bring it into a state of servitude. Your treaty with the Romans very plainly declares, that this is your only purpose. That treaty, which subsisted before in writing, and which now is carried into execution. While it was only written, it covered you with shame; and now, when it appears in the effects, your dishonour is become notorious to all mankind. The name then of Philip is only used, to cover your true intention. For this prince can suffer nothing from the war. His allies, the people of Peloponnesus, those of Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phocis, the Locrians, the Thessalians, and the Epirots, have alone any thing to dread from the conditions of your treaty. These are they, against whom it is stipulated; "that the people and the spoil shall be allotted to the Romans, and the cities with the territory to the Ætolians." If yourselves had taken any cities in open war, you neither would have set the places in flames, nor have exposed the free citizens to any injurious treat-

ment. Such cruelty would have been judged too horrible, and worthy only of barbarians. Yet you have made a treaty, which delivers all the rest of the Greeks into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and exposes them to the most shameful outrage. The fatal tendency of this transaction was for some time unobserved; but that which has happened to the Oritæ, and to the miserable people of Ægina, has now shown it in the clearest light. For fortune seems to have brought your imprudence into open view, like a machine upon the stage, to unravel the intricacy of your plot. Such was the commencement, and such to this time has been the event of the present war. And what, can it be expected, will be the end of it, if all things should succeed as you desire? Must it not be the beginning of the worst of evils, in which all Greece will be involved? for when the Romans shall have ended the war in Italy; and this, as Annibal is now shut up in a narrow corner of the Brutian district, must very shortly happen; it is manifest that they will then bring all their power into Greece: on pretence indeed of assisting the Ætolians against Philip; but, in reality, with a design to add this country to their other conquests. If, after they shall have become the masters of it, they treat the people with favour, the whole grace and honour of such indulgence will be their own. If, on the contrary, they are inclined to use severity, they alone will possess

the spoils of those that are lost; and alone will exercise the rights of sovereignty over those that are preserved. In vain will you then obtest the gods. The gods will not be willing, nor will men be able, to lend you any assistance.

These then are the fatal consequences, which you ought to have foreseen from the beginning. Your honour might then have been preserved. But since the events that lie in the bosom of futurity too often escape the eye of human foresight, yet now at least be warned by those that have already happened, and turn yourselves to more prudent counsels. With regard to us, as we have omitted nothing that was fit for true friends either to speak or to act in the present conjuncture; so, with respect to the future, likewise, we have declared our sentiments with a proper freedom. And we now conjure you, with the greatest earnestness, not to envy both yourselves, and the rest of the people of Greece, the blessings of liberty and safety."

When this discourse was ended, and seemed to have made some impression upon the people, the ambassadors from Philip came into the assembly; and, without entering into any particular discussion, said only, that they had received two orders from the king. The first, that they should conclude a peace, if the Ætolians would consent: and the other, that, if this proposal was rejected, they should immediately depart; having first called the gods to witness,

and the ambassadors that were present, that the Ætolians, and not Philip, must be considered as the cause of all the evils which should fall hereafter upon Greece.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The sentiments of Philopæmen concerning the brightness and neatness of arms. The character of this general. He gains a complete victory against Machanidas the tyrant of Sparta, in the battle of Mantinea.

UPON this occasion it was said by Philopæmen: "that the brightness of arms very much contributed to strike an enemy with terror; and that great advantage also arose in action, from having the several parts of the armour well fitted to the body. That it was much to be wished, that men would transfer that attention to their armour, which they now bestowed upon their common dress; and become as negligent in the care of their dress, as they had hitherto been in that of their arms. That such a change would both be serviceable to their private fortunes, and be attended likewise with manifest advantage with respect to the public safety. If a man, therefore," continued he, "be preparing himself for any military exercise, or for an expedition in the field, when he puts on his boots, let him be more careful in observing whether they are bright and well fitted to his legs, than in examining his shoes or sandals. When he

takes his buckler, his breast-plate, or his helmet, let him desire to see more splendour, and more costly ornaments, in these parts of his armour, than in his coat or mantle. For when men preferred mere show and ostentation to things of real use, it was easy to foresee, what would be their conduct in the time of danger. In a word, he said, he wished that they would be persuaded, that an affected nicety in dress was worthy only of women, and those, perhaps, not extremely modest: but, that a display of splendour and of costliness in arms, denoted a man of courage; ambitious of acquiring honour; and determined to employ his utmost efforts in the defence of himself and of his country."

All the people that were present, were so struck with this discourse, and with the good sense which it contained, that, as soon as the assembly was dismissed, they began to point out those that were elegantly dressed, and forced some of them to retire from the forum. And afterwards, in all their military exercises and expeditions, they were most particularly careful to bear in remembrance this advice. Such power is there even in a single exhortation, when delivered by a person of high authority, not only to deter men from bad habits, but to lead them into those that are the best. When the life especially of the speaker is known to correspond with his discourse, it is impossible not to give the fullest credit to his words. And such was the character of Philopœmen. Plain in his

dress, and frugal in his table, he bestowed but a very slight attention upon the care of his body. In his conversation he was agreeably concise, and never gave any offence. In the whole course of his life, it was his greatest study, always to speak the truth. A few words, therefore, which he at any time spoke, and which seemed to fall from him without design, were sufficient to gain an entire credit with those who heard him. The example of his life rendered a long discourse unnecessary. With some short sentences, supported by his credit, and by the opinion which his actions had inspired, he often overthrew the long and plausible harangues of those who opposed him in the government. But let us now return to the history.

When the assembly was dissolved, the people all returned back to their several cities; greatly applauding the virtue of the speaker, and the discourse which they had heard: and were persuaded, that, under the administration of such a governor, the state could never suffer any loss. Philopœmen then went round to the several cities, and inspected every thing with the greatest diligence and care. He assembled the people together; formed them into troops; and instructed them in the military exercises. And when he had employed almost eight months in completing the necessary preparations, he drew together his army to Mantinea, to defend the liberty of all the people of Peloponnesus against the Spartan tyrant.

Machanidas, filled with confidence, and considering this measure as most favourable to his own desires, as soon as he heard that the Achæans were so near, assembled the Lacedæmonian forces at Tegea; harangued them as the occasion required; and early on the following day began his march towards Mantinea. Himself led the right wing of the phalanx. Upon either side of the van were the mercenaries, in two bodies, parallel each to the other: and behind these, a great number of carriages filled with catapults and darts. At the same time, Philopœmen also drew his army, in three divisions out of the city. The Illyrians, the troops that were armed with coats of mail, the foreign mercenaries, and the light-armed forces, passed through the gate that led to the temple of Neptune. The phalanx through another gate that looked towards the west: and the cavalry of the city through a third that was near to the former. Upon a hill of considerable height, that stood before the city, and which commanded also the temple of Neptune, and the road called Xenis, he posted first the light-armed forces; and next to them, on the side towards the south, the troops that were armed with mail, and also the Illyrians. Next to these, and upon the same right line, the phalanx, divided into separate cohorts with the usual distances between, was ranged along the border of a ditch, which beginning at the temple of Neptune, was continued through the middle of the plain of Man-

tinea, as far as to those mountains which are the boundary of the Elisphasian territory. Upon the right of the phalanx stood the Achæan cavalry, commanded by Aristænetus, a citizen of Dyme. Upon the left was all the foreign cavalry, formed in close order, and without any intervals between the troops. At the head of these was Philopœmen.

When the time of engaging approached, and the enemy appeared in sight, this general, riding through the intervals of the phalanx, exhorted the troops to perform their duty, in few but very forcible words. But the greatest part of what he said was not even heard. For so strong was the affection which the whole army bore towards him, so great was their confidence, and such their ardour to engage, that the soldiers rather seemed to animate their general; and, with a kind of enthusiastic transport, called upon him to lead them against the enemy, and to be assured of victory. As often, however, as he had power to speak, he in general endeavoured to make them comprehend, that the object of the present contest was, on the part of the enemy, base and ignominious slavery; and, on their own part, glorious and immortal liberty.

Machanidas, as he at first advanced, made a show of attacking the right of the enemy with his phalanx formed in the oblong square. But when he approached nearer, and had gained the distance that was proper for his purpose, turning suddenly the whole body to the right, he

extended his front till the right of his line was equal to the left of the Achæans; and at the same time disposed his catapults along the whole front at proper distances. Philopœmen, perceiving that his intention was, by discharging stones, and wounding the cohorts as they stood, to throw the whole phalanx into disorder, allowed him not time to effect his purpose: but began the action vigorously with the Tarentines, who were posted near the temple of Neptune, upon a ground that was flat and level, and very proper for cavalry. Machanidas was then forced to send his own Tarentines also to oppose them. The charge was violent, and sustained on both sides with great courage. The light-armed forces came soon afterwards to support their respective bodies; so that all the mercenaries of both armies were in a short time engaged. And as the combatants fought man with man, and without regarding any order, the dispute was for a long time doubtful. Nor were the rest of the troops able to discern, to which side the dust was driven; because both parties had changed their ground, and were removed far from the place in which the action was first begun. At last, however, the mercenaries that belonged to the tyrant, who exceeded the others not only in numbers, but in the dexterity also which they had acquired in the use of their arms, prevailed.

It was reasonable indeed that this should be the issue; the same which is almost always

found to happen upon such occasions. For as much as the citizens who live under a democratical government display greater courage in action than the subjects of a tyrant, so much on the other hand are the mercenaries, which a tyrant retains in pay, superior to the foreign soldiers that serve in the armies of a democracy. The reason of this difference is, that the people, in the one case fight for liberty; and in the other, to be slaves: and that the zeal and courage of the mercenaries are rewarded, on the one side, with new advantages; and, on the other, tend only to their loss. For a democratical state, when it has once conquered those who attempt to subvert it, no longer employs mercenary troops, to guard its freedom. But a tyrant, in proportion as his successes are increased, has still greater need of such assistance. For, by accumulating injuries, he adds to the number of those whom he has reason to fear. The very safety therefore of every tyrant depends wholly upon the strength and the attachment of his foreign soldiers.

From these reasons then it happened, that the mercenaries of Machanidas, upon this occasion, maintained the action with so great force as well as courage, that not even the Illyrians, nor the heavy forces, which supported the Achæan mercenaries were able to stand against them; but fled in disorder to Mantinea, though that city was distant full seven stadia from the place of the action. This occasion afforded also

a very clear and convincing proof of the truth of a thing which some have doubted: that the issue of battles is most frequently determined by skill on one side, and by the want of it on the other. A chief, it must be acknowledged, displays no small ability, when, after having gained the advantage in the first part of a battle, he conducts the action to the end with the same success with which it was begun. But his capacity will be seen in a much more exalted point of view, if, when he has been defeated in the beginning, he is still able to retain a presence of mind; to observe the errors which his adversary commits in the course of his success; and to turn those errors to his own advantage. For it has often happened, that some, when they have seemed to have the victory already in their hands, in a short time afterwards have suffered an entire defeat: and that others, who have failed in the beginning, by some sudden and dexterous effort, have changed the whole fortune of the battle, and obtained an unexpected victory. The two generals, who commanded in the present action, afford very eminent examples of both these cases.

For when the whole body of the Achæan mercenaries was in this manner routed, and the left wing of their army broken and compelled to fly; Machanidas, whose duty it was to remain in the place, to finish what he had begun, to surround the left of the enemy; and to charge their main body both in flank and front, at-

tempted nothing of this kind; but, putting himself at the head of his victorious mercenaries, with an intemperate and childish valour pursued those that fled: as if their own fear alone, after they once were broken, would not have been sufficient to carry them even to the gates of the city. But the Achaean general, after he had employed all possible efforts to stop the flight of the troops, calling to the officers by name, and encouraging them to stand, when he perceived that they were forced to yield to the strength of the enemy, was not himself disheartened, nor quitted the action in despair: but, having posted himself on the wing of his phalanx, as soon as the enemy, by their pursuit of those that fled, had left the field clear where the action had passed, he turned to the left with his first cohorts, and ran in good order to take possession of the vacant ground. By this position, he both cut off the return of those that were engaged in the pursuit, and at the same time commanded the wing of the enemy. He exhorted the phalanx to fear nothing; and to remain in their place, till they should receive the signal to charge. At the same time he ordered Polybius the Megalopolitan, to collect together all the Illyrians and the mercenaries who had not fled with the rest; to post them behind the wing of the phalanx; and to observe with the greatest care the return of the enemy from the pursuit.

The Lacedæmonian phalanx, elated by the

first success, without waiting for the signal to engage, levelled their spears, and advanced towards the enemy. When they came to the bank of the ditch, whether because, as they were now so near, there was not time to change their purpose, or whether the ditch itself, being easy in the descent, and not having either wood or water in it, appeared contemptible, they continued their way through it without any hesitation. Philopœmen, perceiving that the moment was now come which he had long expected, ordered his phalanx also to level their spears, and to advance. The Achæans run together to the charge with loud and terrible cries. The Lacedæmonians, who had broken their ranks as they descended into the ditch, no sooner saw the enemy upon the bank above them, than they immediately began to fly. But great numbers of them were destroyed in the ditch: some by the Achæans, and some by their own men. Nor was this event to be ascribed to chance, or even to the interposition of a lucky moment; but wholly to the ability of the commander. For Philopœmen had covered himself with the ditch in front, not with any intention, as some suspected, to avoid a battle; but because his great skill and judgement had enabled him to foresee, that, if Machanidas, not regarding the difficulty of the ditch, should lead his phalanx to the charge, the event must happen which now had happened: and, if the tyrant, on the other hand, stopped by this im-

pediment, should change his purpose, and be forced to break the order of his battle, that his ignorance would be then confessed; and that he would leave to his enemies the honour of a victory, and carry away the shame of a defeat, even without having risked a general engagement. Such disgrace, the greatest indeed that can happen in war, has been the lot of many commanders: who, when they have formed their army, have been deterred from engaging with the enemy, either by the disadvantage of the ground, the superiority of numbers, or some other cause; and being forced to break again the order of their battle, have depended wholly upon the rear for victory, or for the opportunity at least of making their retreat with safety. With regard to Philopœmen, his foresight was proved true by the event; for the Lacedæmonians were completely routed.

When he found then that his phalanx had thus gained the victory, and that all things had succeeded most gloriously as he desired, he now turned his thoughts to the only remaining point, which was, to prevent the tyrant from escaping. Knowing him to be intercepted, together with his mercenaries between the city and the ditch, he stood expecting his return. Machanidas, at last coming back from his inconsiderate pursuit, and seeing the flight of his forces, was sensible of the mistake which he had committed, and at the same time perceived that all was lost. He ordered the mercenaries therefore that were

near him to form themselves into a close body, and to force their way through the enemy, who were spread loosely over the field, and busied in pursuing the routed army. Some of his troops obeyed this order, and remained for some time with him; conceiving this to be the only expedient by which they might be able to escape. But when they came to the bridge that was upon the ditch, and found it guarded by the Achæans, they immediately lost all hope, and all of them dispersed themselves, and sought their safety by different ways. Machanidas himself, laying aside all thoughts of attempting to escape by the bridge, rode along the bank of the ditch, and looked earnestly for some place in which he might pass it. Philopœmen soon discerned him by his purple habit, and by the trappings of his horse. Leaving, therefore, the care of the bridge to Aristænetus; with orders that he should spare none of the mercenaries, because they had always been the instruments of establishing tyranny in Sparta; and taking with him two of his intimate friends, Polyænus the Cyparisian and Simias, he passed to the other side of the ditch, and rode along the bank opposite to the tyrant, with design to stop him in his passage, and those who attended him. For he also was followed by two companions; Anaxidamus, and one of the mercenaries. Machanidas, having at last found a place that was easy of descent, spurred his horse, and drove him furiously through the ditch. But Philopœmen, in this

very moment turning himself to meet him, happily wounded him with a spear; and then shifting the spear in his hand, struck him again with the lower part of it, and killed him. One of his companions, Anaxidamus, was at the same time killed by the two friends who attended Philopœmen; and the other sought his safety in flight. Simias then spoiled the bodies; and, having cut off the head of the tyrant, ran to show it to those that were engaged in the pursuit: that the soldiers, perceiving that Machanidas was dead, might assume new confidence, and follow the flying enemy without any fear even to Tegea. This spectacle produced the effect that was desired; and raised so great ardour in the army that they even gained possession of Tegea upon their first approach. On the following day they encamped along the banks of the Eurotas, and were masters of all the open country. Thus the Achæans, who not long before had been unable to drive the enemy out of their own territory, had now all Laconia in their power, and ravaged it without resistance. They had lost but few of their men in the action, but on the side of the Lacedæmonians, four thousand were killed, and a greater number taken prisoners. All the baggage also, and the arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

Reflections on the great abilities of Annibal. The cause of his failing in his attempt to subdue the Romans.

IT is impossible to contemplate the length of the time in which Annibal was employed in action; the general battles, as well as little combats in which he was engaged; the sieges that were undertaken by him; the revolts of cities that had submitted to him; the difficult conjectures that often pressed him; and, in a word, the whole extent and greatness, both in design and execution, of his war against the Romans; and not to be struck with admiration of the skill, the courage, and the ability of this great commander. How wonderful is it, that, in a course of sixteen years, in which he maintained the war in the very heart of Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from the field; and yet be able, like a wise and prudent governor, to keep in subjection so great a multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they neither mutinied against him, nor broke into any sedition among themselves upon any occasion. Though his army was composed of people of various coun-

tries; of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, and Greeks; men who had different laws, different manners, a different language, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common; yet so dexterous was his management, that, notwithstanding this great diversity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this too he effected in the midst of very various fortune. For sometimes he was carried in his course by the most favourable gales; and sometimes he was involved in storms. How high as well as just an opinion must these things convey to us of his ability in war! It may be affirmed with confidence, that, if he had first tried his strength in the other parts of the world, and had come last to attack the Romans, he could scarcely have failed in any part of his design. But now, as he began with those with whom he should have ended, the people that was the first object of his conquest was the last also which he had the power to invade.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

*The defeat of Asdrubal, the son of Gesco, by
Publius Scipio.*

ASDRUBAL, having drawn together his army from the several cities in which they had remained during the winter, came and encamped at the foot of a mountain, not far from a city that was called Elinga; and threw up an intrenchment round his camp. In his front was a large plain, very proper for a battle. The number of his forces was seventy thousand foot, and four thousand horse; together with thirty-two elephants. At the same time Scipio sent away Marcus Junius to receive from Colichas the troops which that Spaniard had raised, and which consisted of three thousand foot and five hundred horse; while himself collected together the rest of the allies, as he advanced in his march towards the enemy. When he arrived near Castalo and Bæcula, he was met by Junius, with the forces which Colichas had sent. He was now involved however in very great perplexity. On the one hand, the Roman forces alone, without the assistance of the allies, were too few to engage in a general battle. On the other, to place any dependence upon these allies, in so decisive an action, appeared to be extremely hazardous and full of

danger. After much deliberation, therefore, as the necessity pressed him closely on either side, he at last resolved that he would employ the Spaniards in such a manner that they should appear to the enemy to bear a part in the action, but that only the Roman legions should be engaged. Having thus determined, he began his march with all the army, which consisted of forty-five thousand foot, and three thousand horse: and when he came near to the Carthaginians, and was in sight, he encamped upon some hills that were opposite to the enemy. Mago, judging this to be a favourable time for attacking the Romans before they had completed their encampment, took with him the greatest part of his own cavalry, together with the Numidians, with Massanissa at their head, and advanced with speed towards the camp, not doubting but that he should find Scipio wholly unprepared. But the Roman general, having foreseen that this might happen, had placed a body of cavalry equal to that of the enemy in ambuscade at the foot of one of the hills. When these troops then suddenly appeared, the Carthaginians were so struck with surprise at the unexpected sight, that many of them as they turned themselves to fly were thrown from their horses. The rest indeed stood firm, and maintained the fight with courage. But being closely pressed, and disordered chiefly by that dexterity with which the Romans were accustomed to quit their horses in the very time of action; and having lost also

many of their men, they were forced to turn their backs after a short resistance. At first they retreated in good order. But when the Romans followed closely after them, they broke their ranks, and continued their flight in disorder even to their own camp. This success inspired the Romans with greater eagerness to engage; and, on the other hand, depressed the ardour of the Carthaginians. During some days that followed they drew out their forces on both sides in the plain that was between the camps. And having tried their strength in many little skirmishes between their cavalry and their light-armed troops, they at last resolved to engage in a general and decisive action.

Upon this occasion Scipio employed two stratagems. He had remarked that Asdrubal always drew out his army at a late hour of the day; and that he placed the Africans in the centre, and the elephants before the Spaniards upon the wings. Himself, on the other hand, had been accustomed to bring his army into the field at his own time after the other, and to post the Romans opposite to the Africans, in the centre, and the Spaniards on the wings. On the day then in which he had determined to engage, he took in both these respects just the contrary method; and, by that change chiefly, procured to his troops the advantage which they gained against the enemy. For scarcely had the morning begun to appear when he sent orders to the tribunes and to all the army, that they should im-

mediately take their repast, put on their armour, and march out of the camp. The soldiers, conceiving what would follow, obeyed the orders with alacrity. He then sent away the cavalry and the light-armed troops; commanding them to advance boldly towards the camp of the enemy, and to engage in skirmishing: and the sun being now risen, he put himself at the head of the infantry, and began his march. And when he arrived near the middle of the plain, he then drew up the army in battle, but in an order contrary to that which he before had used. For he now placed the Spaniards in the centre, and the Romans upon the wings. The Carthaginians, surprised by the unexpected approach of the cavalry towards their camp, and perceiving that the rest of the army was drawn up in battle, and already in sight, had scarcely time sufficient to be armed. Asdrubal, therefore, before the soldiers had taken any repast, was forced to send away in haste his cavalry and light-armed troops against the Roman cavalry; and to draw up his infantry in the usual order upon the plain, very near to the foot of the mountain.

While the light troops were engaged in skirmishing, the Roman infantry remained for some time quiet in their place. But as the day was now advanced, and no great advantage was gained on either side, because the custom of these troops was to retreat when they were pressed, and then returning again to renew the fight; Scipio called

back his men from the engagement, and having made them pass through the intervals of the cohorts, ranged first the light-armed, and next to them the cavalry, behind the infantry upon each of the wings. He then ordered the whole line to move with equal pace towards the enemy. But when he came to the distance of about a stadium from them, having directed the Spaniards in the centre to keep their ranks, and to advance still with the same pace; he ordered the infantry and cavalry of the right wing to turn to the right, and those of the left to the left. He then took from the right wing three of the foremost troops of cavalry, with the accustomed number of light-armed in front; and three maniples of infantry, which the Romans call a cohort; while Lucius Marcius, and Marcus Junius took in the same manner as many from the left: and then turning, Scipio with his division to the left, and the others to the right, they led on the troops in a direct line, and with great speed against the enemy: the rest of the wings making also the same movement, and following close in the same line. In this manner, as the wings were brought near to the enemy, while the Spaniards in the centre advanced with a slow pace, and were still at a great distance, Scipio accomplished what he had at first designed, and fell direct upon both the wings of the enemy with only the Roman forces. The movements which were made afterwards by the troops that followed, in order to

fall into a right line with those that led, were contrary the one to the other, not only in the two wings, but in the cavalry also and the infantry of either wing. For, in the right wing the cavalry and the light-armed forces, by turning to the right, fell into the line with those that were before, and attempted to gain the flank of the enemy; while the infantry wheeled to the left, and joined their leaders. In the left wing the infantry turned to the right; and the cavalry and light-armed to the left. By these movements of the cavalry and light-armed forces, the troops changed their place, so that the right in either wing became the left. This change however Scipio considered as in itself of no great moment. His attention was fixed upon something more important: which was, to gain the flank of the enemy. And in this he judged right and reasonably. For though it is necessary indeed that a general should know the movements that may be made, it is of much greater moment to be able to apply those movements upon each occasion to their proper use.

As soon as the action was begun, the elephants, pierced by the darts of the cavalry and light-armed troops, and pressed closely on every side, were not less hurtful to their friends than to their enemies. For as they were driven from side to side in great disorder, they destroyed all without distinction that were within their reach. At the same time the infantry upon the wings of the Carthaginian army was vigorously attacked;

while their centre, composed of the Africans, which were the choicest of their troops, remained inactive. For as they dared not, on the one hand, to leave their station and succour the wings, lest the Spaniards that were in the centre of the Roman army should advance to attack them; so neither were they able, on the other hand, to do any thing in their post against the Spaniards, because the latter were still at too great a distance from them. Thus the action was maintained by the wings alone; and, as the whole stress of the battle lay upon them, was for some time maintained on both sides with equal bravery. But when the sun had now gained his greatest height, the Carthaginians, who had been brought hastily into the field, and before they had taken any repast, began to faint under the heat. The Romans, on the other hand, not only were superior in vigour and in spirit, but derived also another advantage from the prudence of their general, who had opposed the strongest part of his army to the weakest in that of the enemy. Asdrubal, therefore, unable any longer to resist, at first retreated slowly, and in good order. But after a short time, his whole army, turning their backs together, ran in crowds to the foot of the mountain: and from thence, being still violently pressed, they fled in disorder into their camp. And indeed, if some deity had not interposed to save them, they must afterwards have been driven also out of their intrenchments. But

suddenly the face of the heavens was changed ; and the rain descended in such violent and continual torrents, that the Romans were scarcely able to return back again to their camp.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The manner in which Scipio suppressed and punished a sedition that had happened in the Roman army.

THOUGH Scipio had now gained a sufficient experience in affairs, he was thrown however by this revolt into a state of great irresolution and perplexity. Nor was this indeed without good reason. For as, in the case of the human body, the causes of external injuries, of those for example which arise from heat and cold, from fatigue, or wounds, may either be guarded against before they happen, or afterwards be remedied without much difficulty; while the disorders on the other hand which are bred in the body itself, ulcers and diseases, are neither easily foreseen, nor easy to be cured; just so it happens with respect to governments and armies. When they are attacked by any enemy from without, if the necessary attention only be employed, it is no hard thing to take the measures that are requisite for their security and defence. But to appease the violence of intestine factions, to quell popular tumults and seditions, is a work of the greatest difficulty, and such as requires a very uncommon exertion both of address and

prudence. There is one precaution, however, which, in my judgement, would be greatly serviceable in the case of states and armies, as well as in human bodies; and that is, not to suffer in any of them a too long continuance in laziness and inactivity; especially when they enjoy the blessings of plenty and prosperous fortune.

Scipio then, who, besides that steady application to affairs which we before have mentioned, was very ready also and dexterous both in thought and action, contrived the following method for remedying the disorder that had happened. He called together the tribunes, and told them, that the stipends that were demanded should be paid. And, that his promise might gain the greater credit, he directed that the taxes, which had been before imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, should be levied publicly and with the greatest diligence: as if his only intention had been, to raise the sums that were now required. He ordered the tribunes also to go back again to the revolted troops; and to use all entreaties, to engage them to return to their duty, and to come and receive their stipends, either separately, if they should choose that method, or all together in a body: assuring them also, that when this was done, he would then consider in what manner all other things might be adjusted. Agreeably to this plan, the money was collected without delay. And when Scipio was informed, that the tribunes had discharged also their commission, he assembled the council

together to consider what was most proper to be done. The result of their deliberations was, that the troops should come all to New Carthage on an appointed day; that a general pardon should then be granted to the multitude; but that the authors of the mutiny should be punished with the last severity. These were in number thirty-five.

When the day was come, and the revolted troops were now on their way towards the city, to receive their pardon and the stipends that were due, Scipio gave secret instructions to the seven tribunes who had been before deputed to them, to meet them as they approached; and that each of them, taking five of the seditious leaders, and accosting them with a show of friendship, should press them to take a lodging in their quarters, or at least to accept of the entertainment of a supper. Three days before he had ordered the troops that were in the city to furnish themselves with provisions for a considerable time; on pretence that they were to march, under the command of Marcus, against Andobalis who had revolted. The seditious, being informed also of this order, were filled with still greater confidence. For they persuaded themselves that, as the rest of the army would be removed, they should have all things in their own power as soon as they should join the general.

When they were now ready to enter the city, Scipio sent orders to the other troops that they should begin their march with all their baggage

very early in the morning on the following day. But the tribunes and the prefects were at the same time secretly commanded to send the baggage forwards as soon as they should come out of the city, but to keep the soldiers in arms near the gate; to divide them afterwards into parties at every gate; and to be careful that none of the seditious should come out of the city. The tribunes, who had been appointed to receive the seditious leaders, met them as they arrived; and, having accosted them with much civility, carried them to their houses. The order given to them was, that they should immediately secure the persons of these men; and when supper was ended, should bind them, and keep them safe; and that no person afterwards should be suffered to go out of the houses, except only a messenger from each to acquaint the general that the thing was done. This order was punctually observed and executed. On the morrow, when the day appeared, and the seditious had already begun to come in crowds towards the forum, Scipio ordered the assembly to be called. As soon as the signal was made, the soldiers ran together, according to their custom; expecting eagerly to see again their general, and to hear what he would say to them on the present occasion. Scipio then sent orders to the tribunes who were without the gates, that they should bring the troops in arms and surround the assembly. At the same time he presented himself before them; and, in the instant, by his very first appearance, filled them

with extreme confusion. For they had supposed him to be broken with disease ; and they behold him vigorous and strong. His very aspect therefore, so different from all that they had conceived, struck them at once with surprise and terror. He then begun his discourse to them in the following manner.

He could not, he said, but wonder what motives, either of expectation or disgust, had led them into this revolt. That men usually rebelled against their country and their leaders, either because they were dissatisfied with the conduct of those who held the supreme command, or were displeased with the condition of affairs ; or lastly, perhaps, because they were ambitious of some greater fortune, and had filled their minds with aspiring hopes. "Tell me, then," continued he, "to which of all these causes is your revolt to be ascribed ? Is it with me that you are offended, because the payment of your stipends has been so long delayed ? The fault, however, is not mine ; for, during the whole time of my command, your stipends have been always fully paid. If it be Rome then that is in fault, and having neglected to discharge your former arrears, was it just that you should show this resentment, taking arms against your country, and declaring yourselves the enemies of her who had bred and nourished you ? How much better would it have been to have made me the judge of your complaints ; and to have entreated your friends to join together in obtaining for you the relief which you

desired? When mercenary troops indeed, who have no other object but their pay, desert the service in which they are engaged, such a conduct, in certain circumstances, may perhaps be excused. But in men who fight for themselves, their wives, and children, this defection is a most unpardonable crime. It is no other indeed, than if a son, on pretence that his parent had defrauded him in settling an account, should go armed to take away the life of him from whom himself had received his being. Or will you say then that I have employed you in more painful duties, or exposed you more frequently to danger, than the rest; and have given to others the advantages of the war, and the chief part of all the booty? You dare not say that I have ever made this distinction; and if you dare, you cannot show the proof. To what part of my conduct then can you impute the cause of your revolt? Speak, for I wish to be informed. There is not one among you that is able to declare, not one among you that can even form to himself in thought, the least matter of offence against me. Nor is it again in the condition of affairs that you can find any reasonable ground of discontent. For when were all things in a more prosperous state? At what time was Rome distinguished by so many victories? At what period were her soldiers flattered with a fairer prospect? But some of you, perhaps, are diffident of these appearances, and have fixed your hopes upon greater advantages, to be found among our enemies. And who are

these enemies? Mandonius and Andobalis? Do not all of you then know, that, when they first joined our army, they broke their treaty with the Carthaginians; and that now again they have no less violated the most solemn oaths, by commencing new hostilities against us? How honourable is it for you to place a confidence in men like these; and to become, for their sakes, the enemies of your country? You had surely never any hopes that with such allies you could render yourselves the masters of Spain. Neither assisted by Andobalis, nor separately by yourselves, would you ever be able to stand in the field against our forces. What then was your design? Let me hear it only from yourselves. Is it the skill, the courage of those leaders whom you have chosen to command you, that has filled you with this confidence? Or those rods and axes which are carried in solemn state before them, and which it even is shameful for me now to mention? No, soldiers, these are not the causes; nor can you offer even the smallest matter of complaint either against me or against your country. I must endeavour then to justify your conduct, both to Rome and to myself, by those common principles, the truth of which is acknowledged by all mankind. The multitude is easily deceived; is impelled by the smallest force to every side; and, in a word, is susceptible upon all occasions of the same agitations as the sea. For as the latter, though in itself it is calm and stable, and carries no face of danger, is

no sooner set in motion by some violent blast, than it resembles the winds themselves which raise and ruffle it; in the same manner the multitude also assumes an aspect conformable to the designs and temper of those leaders by whose counsels it is swayed and agitated. From this consideration all the officers of the army and myself have resolved to pardon your offence, and to engage our promise that no remembrance of it ever shall remain. But to those who excited you to this revolt we are inexorable. The crime which they have committed, both against us and against their country, shall be punished with the severity which it deserves."

As soon as he had ended this discourse, the troops that had surrounded the assembly in arms, upon a signal given, clashed their swords against their bucklers; and, at the same time, the seditious leaders were brought in, bound and naked. And while some of them were scourged, and some beheaded, the whole multitude was so struck with terror, both by the danger that encompassed them, and by the dismal spectacle that was before their eyes, that not one among them changed his countenance, or uttered a single word; but all of them stood fixed in silent astonishment and dread. The leaders, being thus put to death, were dragged through the midst of the assembly. The general then, and all the officers, gave a solemn assurance to the rest, that their fault should never be remembered. The soldiers, approaching one by one, renewed their oath before

the tribunes, that they would be obedient to their chiefs, and not engage in any designs against their country. In this manner Scipio, by his great prudence, stifled a danger in its birth which might have grown to be extremely formidable; and restored again his army to its former state.

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

The revolt of Andobalis. Scipio marches against that prince; defeats him in an engagement; and finishes the war in Spain.

SCIPIO, having called together without delay, and in the city of New Carthage, an assembly of all the troops, communicated to them the daring designs of Andobalis, and his perfidy towards them. Upon these topics he spoke so largely, that the minds of the soldiers were sharpened in the highest degree against that prince. Having then enumerated the many battles in which the Romans had been engaged, against the united forces of the Spaniards and the Carthaginians, with Carthaginian leaders also at their head; it would be absurd, he said, to think, when they had been always conquerors in those actions, that they could fail to obtain the victory against the Spaniards alone, commanded by Andobalis. That, upon this account, he would not have recourse to the assistance of any of the Spaniards, but would employ the Romans only in the present expedition; that from thence it might be known to all, that it was not by the strength of

the Spanish forces, as some pretended, that the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain; but that the Roman spirit alone, and the Roman bravery, had conquered both the Carthaginians and the Spaniards. "Banish then," continued he, "from among you all dissension; and, if ever you have engaged in any war with confidence, let me exhort you now to assume it. With regard to the success, myself, with the assistance of the gods, will take such measures as shall secure the victory." This discourse inspired such ardour into all the army that, by their countenance, they seemed as if they were already in sight of the enemy, and waiting only for the signal to engage. He then dismissed the assembly.

On the following day he began his march; and, arriving in ten days upon the banks of the Iberus, he passed the river on the fourth day afterwards, and encamped near to the enemy, having before him a valley which separated the two camps. On the next day, having ordered Lælius to hold the cavalry in readiness, and some tribunes to prepare the light-armed forces for action, he drove some of the cattle that followed the army into the valley; and, when the Spaniards ran hastily to seize this prey, sent a part of the light-armed to attack them. The action was soon begun; and, as greater numbers advanced on either side to support the first, a sharp and general skirmishing ensued. But Lælius, who stood ready with his cavalry, perceiving the oc-

casion to be favourable, fell suddenly upon the enemy ; and, having cut off also their retreat at the foot of the mountain, destroyed a great part of the Spaniards who were dispersed through the valley. The barbarians, enraged by the loss which they had sustained, and dreading lest they should seem to be disheartened, and to have suffered an entire defeat, drew out all their army as soon as the morning appeared, and resolved to engage in a general battle. Scipio on his part was no less ready. But as he perceived that the Spaniards showed so little skill and judgement, that they descended with all their forces into the valley, and ranged their infantry as well as their cavalry upon the plain, he waited for some time, that as great a number of them as was possible might come down. For though he placed great confidence in his cavalry, he depended still more upon his infantry ; because the latter, both from their bravery, and from the manner also in which they were armed, were far superior to the Spaniards, in close and set engagements. When he saw then, that as great a number had come down as he desired, he advanced in order of battle against that part of the Spanish army which was posted near to the foot of the mountain ; and sent away four cohorts, drawn up in close order, to attack the infantry in the valley. At the same time Lælius, having led his cavalry along the hills that extended from the camp to the valley, fell upon the cavalry of the enemy in their rear, and kept them closely engaged. The Spanish

infantry, being in this manner deprived of the assistance of the cavalry, by which they had expected to be supported, were unable to maintain the fight. The cavalry also laboured under no less disadvantage. Confined within a narrow ground, and disordered by the difficulties of their situation, they killed more of their own men than the Romans killed. For they were pressed in flank by their own infantry; by the Roman infantry in front; and by the Roman cavalry in their rear. Such then was the course of this engagement. The Spaniards who had come down into the valley were almost all of them destroyed: and the rest that were drawn up near the foot of the hills sought their safety in flight. These were the light-armed troops, which composed about a third part of the army. Among these Andobalis found means to escape; and fled to a certain fortified place. The war in Spain being thus entirely finished, Scipio returned back to Taraco full of joy; having achieved for his country a glorious conquest, and secured to himself the honour of a splendid triumph. Being then desirous to be present at the election of consuls, as soon as he had regulated all things in Spain, he committed the care of the army to Marcus and Syllanus, and sailed away with Lælius and the rest of his friends to Rome.

EXTRACT THE EIGHTH.

*Antiochus concludes a treaty with Euthydemus ;
and returns from his expedition into the upper
provinces of Asia.*

EUTHYDEMUS, who was himself a native of Magnesia, endeavoured to justify his conduct, and said that Antiochus had no reason for attempting to deprive him of his kingdom ; since he never had rebelled against him, but had only obtained possession of Bactriana, by destroying the descendants of those who had before revolted. He insisted long upon this point ; and entreated Teleas to mediate for him with Antiochus, that hostilities might cease, and that he might be allowed to retain the name of king. He urged, that such a reconciliation was even necessary for their common safety. That those wandering tribes, who were spread in great numbers along the borders of the province, were alike dangerous to them both ; and that, if ever they should gain admittance into it, the whole country must inevitably fall into a state of barbarism. With these instructions he sent back Teleas to the king.

Antiochus, who had been long desirous of putting an end to the war, acknowledged the

force of these reasons, and declared himself willing to accept the peace that was offered. And when Teleas had gone and returned again many times, Euthydemus at last sent his own son Demetrius to ratify the treaty. The king received him favourably; and, judging by his appearance and his conversation, as well as by a certain air of majesty that was conspicuous in his person, that the young man was worthy of a kingdom, he promised to give him one of his daughters in marriage, and to suffer his father to retain the name of king. The rest of the treaty was expressed in writing, and the alliance confirmed by oaths.

After this transaction, Antiochus, having first distributed a large quantity of corn among his troops, and taken the elephants that belonged to Euthydemus, began his march with all his army. Passing mount Caucasus, he came into India, and renewed his alliance with Sophagasenus, the Indian king. In this place he obtained more elephants; so that his whole number was now a hundred and fifty; and having furnished his army also with a new supply of corn, he again decamped; but left Androstenes behind him, to receive the money which the king had engaged to pay. He then traversed the province of Arachosia; and having passed the river Erymanthus, and advanced through Drangiana into Carmania, as the winter now approached, he sent his troops into quarters. Such was the end of the expedition of Antiochus into the upper provinces

of Asia; an expedition, which secured to him the obedience not only of those provinces, but of all the maritime cities and all the princes likewise that were on this side of mount Taurus; covered his own proper kingdom against invasion, and gave to all mankind the highest opinion both of his courage and his love of labour. For from this time, not the people of Asia only, but those also of Europe, considered him as a prince that was most worthy to reign.

BOOK THE TWELFTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

The mistakes of Timæus in his accounts of Afric and of Corsica. The manner of conducting herds of swine in Italy and in Greece.

AFRIC is indeed a country of wonderful fertility. How blameable then is Timæus, who not only neglected to acquire a proper knowledge in these matters, but with a childish weakness, destitute of judgement, and trusting to the credit of ancient stories, which have been long ago exploded, represents this whole part of the world as a dry and barren sand, incapable of producing any fruits. Nor is this country less remarkable with respect to the animals with which it abounds. For not only horses and oxen, but sheep also and goats, are found in it in greater numbers than any other part of the world perhaps can show. Upon this account it is, that many of the inhabitants of this vast country, neglecting the cultivation of the lands, live upon the flesh of their cattle, and among their cattle. Every one also knows, that Afric breeds elephants, lions, and leopards, in great

numbers, and of a surprising strength; together with buffaloes, which are extremely beautiful, and ostriches of an enormous size; and that none of these animals are found in any part of Europe. But Timæus is silent with respect to all these things; and seems indeed as if he had designed to give such a description of this country as should be most contrary to the truth.

The same want also of exactness and fidelity appears in his account of Corsica. Speaking of this island in his second book, he says, that the goats, the sheep, and the oxen, which are found in great numbers upon it, are all of them wild, as well as the deer, the hares, the wolves, and other animals; and that the inhabitants hunt them with dogs, and pass their whole lives in that employment. Now it is certain, that there is not any such thing in the island as a wild goat or ox; nor even a hare, a wolf, or a deer, or any other animal that is wild; except only some foxes, some rabbits, and a sort of wild sheep. The rabbit, at a distance, appears to be a hare of a smaller size; but, when taken, is found to be very different from the hare, both in figure and taste. This creature lives chiefly under the ground. It is true indeed that the animals in this island all appear to be wild: and the reason is this. As the island is rough and rocky, and covered also with woods, the shepherds are not able to follow their cattle into the places in which they are dispersed; but, when they have found a convenient pasture, and are

desirous of bringing them together, they sound a trumpet. Upon this signal, the whole herd immediately run together, and follow the call of their own shepherd, never mistaking one for another. When strangers therefore come upon the island, and attempt to take any of the goats or oxen which they see feeding by themselves, the cattle, not used to be approached, immediately fly. And if the shepherd, perceiving what has happened, at the same time sounds his trumpet, they all run towards him with the greatest haste. From hence it is that they are supposed to be wild: and Timæus, having made only a slight and cursory inquiry, has fallen into the same mistake.

That the cattle should be thus obedient to the sound of a trumpet, is no very wonderful thing. In Italy, those who have the care of swine never enclose them in separate pastures, nor follow them behind, as the custom is among the Greeks; but go always before them, and from time to time sound a horn. The swine follow, and run together at the sound; and are so taught by habit to distinguish their own proper horn, that their exactness in this respect appears almost incredible to those who never heard of it before. As the consumption of these animals is very great in Italy, the herds that are raised to satisfy the demand are also very numerous; though fewer indeed than they were in ancient Italy, when the country was possessed by the Tyrrhenians and the Gauls.

At this time however, a thousand hogs, and sometimes a greater number, are reared from a single sow. In the morning they are turned out of their pens, in different troops, according to their breed and age. But when the herds meet together, it is not possible to keep them thus distinct; or to prevent them from being mingled one with another, either when they leave their pens, or as they feed in the pastures, or when they return back again at night. The horn therefore was invented, as a method of separating them without any difficulty. For as soon as the conductors go to different sides, and sound their horns, the herd separate themselves each from the rest; and run all of them with such alacrity to the sound of their own horn, that no violence is sufficient to stop them in their course. In Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet together in the forests, he who has the most numerous herd, whenever he finds a proper opportunity, drives away the cattle of his neighbour, which are thus mingled with his own. Or some robber perhaps, who has waited in ambuscade, carries away a whole herd unperceived; if the swine, as it often happens, have wandered too far from their conductor, in search of the acorns when they begin to fall. But this is sufficient upon this subject.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

The account given by Aristotle of the Locrians of Italy is confirmed by the customs and traditions which are found among that people.

I HAVE often visited the Locrians, and have even performed for them some considerable service. It was through my request, that they were excused from attending the Roman armies into Spain; and from furnishing the succours which they were bound to send to the Romans by sea, in their war against the Illyrians. Upon these accounts, considering me as a person whose good offices had exempted them from much fatigue, as well as from great danger and expense, they have always treated me with singular respect and honour. I should certainly therefore be inclined, rather to speak favourably of this people, than otherwise. Yet I cannot hesitate to declare, that the account which Aristotle has delivered to us concerning this colony, is nearer to the truth than that which is reported by Timæus. The Locrians themselves have indeed assured me, that their own traditions are more conformable to the account of Aristotle than to that of Timæus. Of this they mention the following proofs.

The first is, that all nobility of ancestry among them is derived from women, and not from men. That those, for example, alone are noble, who draw their origin from the hundred families. That these families were noble among the Locrians, before they migrated; and were the same, indeed, from which a hundred virgins were taken by lot, as the oracle had commanded, and were sent to Troy. That some women of these families came with the colony into Italy: and that those who have descended from them are still reputed noble, and are called the descendants of the hundred families.

Another instance is seen, in the appointment of the virgin called the *Phialephorus*. The account which the Locrians give of the institution is this. At the time when they drove the Sicilians out of this part of Italy, the latter had a custom of appointing a young man, who was chosen always from the noblest and the most illustrious of their families, to lead the procession in their sacrifices. The Locrians, not having received any religious ceremonies from their own nation, adopted many of those that were used by the people with whom they were mixed, and among others this that is here mentioned. But they changed it in one circumstance. For, instead of a young man, they appointed a virgin to perform the office; because nobility among them was derived from women.

The same people affirm, that they never had any treaty with the Locrians of Greece, and that there was no account remaining among them of any such treaty; but that they know by constant tradition, that they had a treaty with the Sicilians, which was executed in the following manner. When they came first into the country, and found that the Sicilians were struck with terror, and made no attempt to oppose their entrance, they concluded a convention with them in these words: "That they would live together as friends, and possess the country in common, as long as they should tread upon this earth, and carry the heads upon their shoulders." But the Locrians, at the time of taking this oath, had put some earth within the soles of their shoes, and some heads of garlick, which appeared not in sight, upon their shoulders. And having afterwards shaken the earth out of their shoes, and thrown away the heads, they seized the first favourable opportunity, and in a short time drove the Sicilians out of the country.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

An observation concerning truth and falsehood in history.

TIMÆUS says, that, as a rule, which is perhaps defective either in length or breadth, is still a rule, and deserves to be so called, if it be only straight and even; and, if it wants this chief and most essential property, ought to be called any thing rather than a rule; in the same manner those written memoirs which record events, however faulty they may be in style and disposition, and however defective in some necessary properties, yet, if the facts be true which are related, deserve to be called a History, and, if these be false, are utterly unworthy of that name. For my part, I am ready to acknowledge, that truth should be considered as the principal and most essential part in all such composition. I have even said in a former part of this work, that as an animal, when deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions, so, if we take away truth from history, what remains will be nothing but a useless tale. But there are two kinds of falsehood; one which proceeds from ignorance, and the other from design.

And as those writers may be excused, who offend against the truth through ignorance; so those, on the contrary, who pervert it with design, ought never to be pardoned.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

The malignity of Timæus censured.

WHEN men of sense revenge an injury, they examine, in the first place, what punishment it becomes them to inflict, and not what their enemies deserve to suffer. In the same manner, also, when we throw reproaches upon others, we ought principally to consider, not what is fit for them to hear, but what is proper for us to speak. For if our own passion and resentment be the rule, we shall set no bounds to what we say; but must fall into the most unwarrantable excess.

Upon this account it is, that I cannot allow any degree of credit to Timæus, in the things which he has reported against Demochares. His calumnies are indeed so gross that they are neither to be admitted nor excused. They show too plainly that the natural acrimony of his own temper has transported him beyond all the bounds of decency. Nor is the account which he has given of Agathocles, how much soever that prince may have exceeded all other tyrants in impiety, in any degree more justifiable. For in the conclusion of his history he writes, that Agathocles from his earliest youth

was a common prostitute, obedient to the call of the most debauched: that he was a jay and a buzzard; ready to act or to suffer, with all that offered, in the most infamous lust: and that, when he died, his wife, as she lamented over him, used these exclamations: "What have not I for you? What have not you for me?" In this instance again, not only the same spirit is discernible which appeared in his censure of Demochares; but such an excess also of rancour as is indeed astonishing. For, from the facts which Timæus himself has mentioned, it is evident that Agathocles was endowed by nature with very extraordinary talents. To leave the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and to come to Syracuse at the age of eighteen years; to follow his design with such success, as in a short time to become master of all Sicily; to render himself formidable and dangerous to Carthage; and lastly, to grow old in the sovereignty which he had gained, and to die with the title of king; are not these most signal proofs that he was born with wonderful abilities, and possessed all the powers that are requisite for the administration of great affairs? The historian then, instead of confining himself to those actions which might serve to villify Agathocles, and render him odious in the eyes of posterity, should have insisted likewise upon those parts of his conduct that were worthy of praise. For this is indeed the proper office of history. But Timæus, blinded by his own

rancorous spirit, takes a malignant pleasure in recounting with exaggeration the defects of this prince, but passes hastily over all his shining qualities; and seems not to have known, that to suppress facts in history, is no less a kind of falsehood than to report what never had existence.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

A law of Zaleucus concerning the occupancy of a thing contested. A remarkable institution of the same lawgiver.

TWO young men among the Locrians had a contest together concerning a slave. One of them had for a long time had him in his possession. The other, two days only before the suit, went into the country, took away the boy by force in the absence of his master, and carried him to his own house. The master, as soon as he was informed of what had happened, went to the house, and getting his slave again into his hands, carried him before the judges, and contended that, upon his giving sureties, the boy ought to remain with him till the right should be determined. For the law of Zaleucus, he said, declared; that the thing contested should remain, during the suit, in the possession of him from whom it was taken. The other young man insisted, on the other hand, that by this very law the boy ought to be left with him; because he was the person from whom he was taken; and that it was from his house that he was brought before the judges. The judges, conceiving that there was some difficulty in the

case, went and referred it to the cosmopolite: and this magistrate explained the law in the following manner. He said, that by the words, "from whom it was taken," was to be understood the person who had last held an undisturbed possession of the thing in dispute for a certain time: but that, if any one should come and take away a thing by force from another, and carry it to his own house, and the first possessor should come afterwards and take it from him again, the person from whom it last was taken was not the person intended by the law. The young man against whom the judgement was given was dissatisfied with this interpretation, and denied it to be the sense of the legislator. The cosmopolite then demanded whether any one would dispute with him concerning the intention of the law, in the manner which *Zaleucus* had prescribed. The manner was, that the two disputants should speak, each with a rope round his neck, in the presence of a thousand persons; and that he who should be judged to have contended for a wrong interpretation, should be strangled in sight of the assembly. The young man replied that the condition was not equal. For the cosmopolite, who was almost ninety years old, had only two or three years left to live; but that himself, in all appearance, had still the greatest part of his life before him. This facetious answer turned the whole matter into pleasantry; and the judges gave their sentence according to the opinion of the cosmopolite.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The gross absurdities of Callisthenes, in his description of the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

IN order to show the truth of what I have affirmed, I shall examine only one single battle: a battle, which is very much celebrated; which happened at no very distant time; and, because this also is a circumstance of the greatest moment, a battle in which Callisthenes himself was present. I mean the battle which was fought between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

In the account then which Callisthenes has given of this battle, he relates, that Alexander had already led his army through the passes which are called the Pylæ of Cilicia, when Darius, having advanced along the passes of the mountain Amanus, and being informed by the people of the country, that his enemy still continued his march forwards into Syria, resolved to follow him. That when he arrived near the passes of Cilicia, he encamped along the river Pyramus: that the ground which he occupied contained a space of only fourteen stadia from the sea to the foot of the mountain: and that the river, falling down the craggy sides of

the mountain, ran obliquely through this ground, and passing over the plain, between some hills that were rough and difficult of approach, discharged itself into the sea. After this description, he says, that, when Alexander returned back again with a design to engage, Darius and his officers drew up the whole phalanx in order of battle upon the very ground upon which they had encamped; and that they were covered in front by the river, which ran close to the camp; that they posted the cavalry near to the sea: next to these, in the same line, the mercenaries, along the bank of the river: and lastly, the peltastæ, adjoining to the foot of the mountain.

But it is not possible to conceive, that these troops could have been thus drawn up in order of battle between the phalanx and the river, if the river ran close to the camp; especially if we consider the numbers of which the several bodies were composed. For the cavalry, as Callisthenes himself affirms, amounted to thirty thousand; and the mercenaries to as great a number. Now it is easy to determine, what extent of ground this number of troops would require. The usual method of drawing up cavalry in the time of action is to range them eight in depth. It is necessary also to leave a certain space between each of the troops in front, that they may be able to perform their several motions. A single stadium then will contain eight hundred horse; ten stadia eight

thousand; and four stadia, three thousand and two hundred. According to this computation, a body of eleven thousand and two hundred horse would have filled the whole extent of fourteen stadia. And if the whole thirty thousand were formed in order of battle, there must have been three such bodies, within a very small number at least, drawn up each behind the other. In what place then were the mercenaries ranged? Was it behind the cavalry? But Callisthenes says no such thing. On the contrary he affirms, that the mercenaries were engaged against the Macedonians in the very beginning of the action. It is manifest, therefore, that one half of the ground that has been mentioned, the part that was on the side of the sea, was occupied by the cavalry; and the other half, which was next to the mountain, by the mercenaries. And from hence we may clearly judge, what must have been the depth of the cavalry; and, by consequence, how very distant the river must have been from the camp.

Afterwards he relates, that, when the enemy approached, Darius, who was in the centre of the line, called the mercenaries to him from one of the wings. But how was this possible? The very part in which the mercenaries were joined to the cavalry was itself the centre. If Darius then was among the mercenaries, how, or from whence, or to what place did he call them? He then adds also, that the cavalry upon the right wing advanced, and vigorously

charged the Macedonians: that the latter received them with equal courage; and that the fight on both sides was maintained with the greatest bravery. But he forgets that there was a river between this cavalry and the Macedonians; and such a river too, as he had just before described.

Nor is this writer more exact in his account with respect to Alexander. He says, that this prince first carried with him into Asia forty thousand foot, and four thousand five hundred horse; and that, when he was ready to enter Cilicia, a new supply arrived from Macedon, of five thousand foot, and eight hundred horse. If we take then from these three thousand foot and three hundred horse, which is the greatest number that can be allowed for occasional and absent services, there will remain forty-two thousand foot and five thousand horse. With this army Alexander, as the historian writes, being informed, after he had advanced beyond the Pylæ, that Darius had entered Cilicia, and was at the distance of only a hundred stadia behind him, immediately returned, and directed his march back again through the passes; having the infantry in his van, behind these the cavalry, and the baggage in the rear. As soon as he came into the open plain, he separated the army from the baggage, and formed the troops into a phalanx, by thirty-two in depth. At some distance afterwards, he ranged them by

sixteen in depth; and at last, when he was come near to the enemy, by eight.

Now these absurdities are even greater than those that were before remarked. For when a body of troops marches by sixteen in depth, if we allow the usual intervals of six feet between every rank, a stadium will contain only sixteen hundred men; ten stadia, sixteen thousand; and twenty stadia, thirty-two thousand. If Alexander therefore formed his phalanx by sixteen in depth, he must have filled a space of twenty stadia, and would still have wanted room for all his cavalry, and for ten thousand of his foot. Callisthenes then adds, that when this prince was at the distance of forty stadia from the enemy, he ordered the phalanx to advance in an extended front towards them. A greater absurdity than this is scarcely to be conceived. For where is the ground, especially in Cilicia, that will admit such a phalanx as is here described to advance in an extended front against an enemy, a ground containing twenty stadia in depth and forty in length? The impediments, also, which would inevitably break the order of such a disposition, are too many to be recounted. Callisthenes himself has mentioned one, which is alone sufficient. For he says, that the torrents, which descended from the hills, had formed so many pits in the plain, that the greatest part of the Persians were lost in those cavities as they fled.

But Alexander, perhaps this writer might say, was willing to be ready to receive the enemy in what part soever they should come to attack him. But nothing is more unfit for this purpose than the phalanx formed in an extended front, if this front be broken and disunited. And would it not also have been much more easy to have ranged the several parts of this great body in the very order in which they followed each of them the other in the march: instead of forming the whole army in a single line, in which there must have been many vacancies, and leading it in an extended front to action, over a ground that was covered with bushes and broken cavities. He ought rather then to have formed a double, or a quadruple phalanx. One part following behind another. For if the ground would have admitted this order in the march, there would have been time sufficient to draw up the troops in the same order in battle: especially as he might have received notice from his scouts of the approach of the enemy, even while they were at a considerable distance from him.

Another fault in this description is, that the historian, while he represents the phalanx as advancing in an extended front over a plain, forgets to make the cavalry march before; and places them upon the same line with the infantry. But the greatest of all his mistakes is this which follows. He says that Alexander, when he approached the enemy, drew up the

phalanx eight in depth. The whole line, therefore must have been equal in length to forty stadia. Or, let it be supposed, that the men stood so close together as even to be wedged one within another. In that case, they must have covered at the least twenty stadia. And yet Callisthenes had before affirmed that the whole length of the ground was less than fourteen stadia: that a part of it, which was nearest to the sea, was occupied by one half of the cavalry; that the other half was posted upon the right: and that between the whole line and the mountain there was left also a considerable distance, that the troops might not fall under a body of the enemy, which was posted upon the sides of the mountain. I know, indeed, that in order to oppose this body he here forms a part of the line in the figure called the forceps. Let us allow then ten thousand men; which is even a greater number than this purpose would require. In that case it is evident that there would remain, according to Callisthenes, eleven stadia only at the most, for the length of the whole line: and that thirty-two thousand men, contained in a space of this extent, how closely soever they were crowded, must necessarily have been formed by thirty in depth. And yet Callisthenes affirms, that at the time of action they were ranged by eight. Mistakes like these cannot even be excused. For what credit is to be given to things that are impossible? When a writer lays down the exact measure of the

ground, fixes the number of the men, ascertains the distance of one man from another, and gives afterwards an account which is wholly incompatible with all these circumstances; the falsehood is too glaring to be pardoned.

It would be tedious to examine all the errors into which this writer has fallen. One or two more however may just be mentioned. He says that Alexander took care to draw up his army in such a manner that he might himself be engaged against Darius: and that Darius also had at first the same intention with respect to Alexander; but that he afterwards altered his design. But he neither mentions how these princes knew in what part of their respective armies they severally intended to engage; nor to what other part Darius retired after he had changed his purpose. Now again was it possible for the phalanx to advance, in order of battle, up the bank of a river, which was broken and uneven, and covered also with bushes in almost every part? Such an absurdity can never be ascribed to Alexander, who is acknowledged to have been trained both in the study and the exercise of war from his earliest age. It must therefore be imputed to the historian himself; who, from a want of skill in matters of this kind, was unable to distinguish what was possible to be done from that which was impracticable. But this will be sufficient concerning Ephorus and Callisthenes.

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

Topics for a discourse in praise of peace.

IN the first place, he says, the assembly may be told, that men are wakened in the morning, in the time of war by trumpets, and in the time of peace, by the crowing of cocks. And again, that Hercules, when he instituted the Olympic games, as a remission after his toil, sufficiently declared this to be his meaning; that, whenever he had brought mischief upon any by making war, he was forced to it by necessity, and the commands of others; but that willingly he had never done harm to any person. To these arguments may be added the authority of the poet; who introduces Jupiter, expressing his displeasure against the god of war, in the following words:

Of all the gods that in Olympus dwell,
Thou art to me most hateful: for in strife,
In war, and battles, ever is thy joy*.

In another passage, the wisest of his heroes thus exclaims:

* Iliad, b. v. 890.

The man who stirs
The bloody horrors of intestine war,
No rights of kindred, or of family,
No laws of justice knows*.

Of the same kind also are the sentiments
of Euripides, expressed in the following lines:

Parent of wealth, celestial Peace,
Thou fairest of the heavenly train, O why,
Why this delay? Wilt thou again
These longing eyes ne'er visit? How I fear,
That age, insensible and cold,
My trembling limbs will seize, e'er I shall hail
The moment of thy blest return,
With the crown'd banquet, and the choral song †.

Again, it may be urged, that war resembles a disease, and peace a state of health. In one, the sick are recovered; but the other destroys those that are well. That in peace also the old are buried by the young, as the course of nature requires: but, in war, the young are buried by the old. And again; that, in the time of war, we are not safe within the walls of our cities; but that, in peace, there is full security, even to the farthest limits of the country. The other motives which he mentions are of a like kind with these.

* Iliad, b. i. 63.

† Chorus from the Cresphontes.

EXTRACT THE EIGHTH.

Men conversant in affairs are alone properly qualified for writing history.

THERE are two organs given to man by nature, through which all information, and all knowledge of things is derived, the hearing and the sight; and of these, the latter is by much the most conformable to truth. For the testimony of the eyes, as Heraclitus observes, is far more exact than that of the ears. But Timæus, in making his inquiries, had recourse to the easiest, though the least preferable, of these two methods; and never employed his eyes, but only his ears. And even still more; as the knowledge which is gained by hearing is also of two sorts: the one derived from reading books, and the other from interrogating other men; Timæus, as we have already shown, took no pains to obtain the latter. What determined his choice in this respect is not difficult to be discovered. The knowledge that is acquired by reading, is gained without any danger, or any kind of toil. If a man will only fix his residence in the neighbourhood of a library, or in a city that abounds with written memoirs, he may make his researches with perfect

ease ; and, reposing himself with full tranquillity, may compare the accounts, and detect the errors of former writers. But the knowledge which is drawn from personal examination and inquiry, is attended with great fatigue and great expense. It is this, however, which is the most important ; and which gives indeed the chief value to history. Historians themselves are ready to acknowledge this truth. For thus Ephorus says ; that if it was possible for the writers of history to be present at all transactions, such knowledge would be preferable to any other. To the same purpose is that passage of Theopompus ; that the experience which is gained in battle renders a man a consummate general : that practice in pleading causes forms the perfect orator ; and that the same observation is just with respect to the arts of navigation and of medicine. The poet also inculcates the same truth with still greater force. For designing to show, in the person of Ulysses, what kind of qualities would render a man fit for the administration of affairs, he describes him in the following words :

Sing, Muse, the man, for various arts renown'd,
Who wander'd long through many different climes.

And afterwards :

Oft through the deep with heartfelt anguish borne,
To distant nations he his course essay'd,
Their cities visited, their manners knew.

And in another place he says; that he had experienced

The rage of battles, and the boisterous wave*.

Now such a man also is it, in my judgement, that would alone be able to give a proper figure to history. It was said by Plato, that human affairs would then be well administered, when philosophers should be kings, or kings philosophers. In the same manner I would say; that history would be well composed if those who are engaged in great affairs would undertake to write it; not in a slight and negligent manner, like some of the present age; but regarding such a work as one of the noblest and most necessary of their duties, and pursuing it with unremitting application, as the chief business of their lives; or if those, on the other hand, who attempt to write, would think it necessary to be also conversant in the practice of affairs. Till this shall happen there will be no end of mistakes in history. Now Timæus never used the least endeavours to acquire such practice; but confining his residence to a single place, in which also he was a stranger, he even industriously renounced an active life; was acquainted neither with politics, nor war; nor ever exposed himself to the fatigue of visiting distant countries, and of making personal inquiries. And yet this man has gained

* Odyss. b. i. 1. and Iliad, b. xxiv. 8.

the reputation of being an excellent historian. I know not, for my own part, upon what such pretensions can be grounded; especially as he has himself acknowledged, that a good historian should possess the qualifications which have been here enumerated. For, in the preface to his sixth book, he takes notice of an opinion which some persons had advanced, that the demonstrative kind of writing required greater genius, greater labour, and a greater stock of knowledge, than history. This notion, as he says, had before given offence to Ephorus; and, because that writer had not been able sufficiently to refute it, he endeavours to state, and to compare together, these two kinds of composition. * * * *

BOOK THE THIRTEENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Avarice compared to a dropsy. Deceit and artifice are too generally practised in public affairs. The different conduct of the Achæans ; and in some degree also of the Romans.

AS in the case of those who are diseased with a dropsy, no application of liquors from without is sufficient to remove or allay the thirst, unless the internal disposition of the body be first changed by proper remedies ; in the same manner also the desire of gain is never to be satisfied, unless reason be employed to correct the vicious inclination in the mind.

There are many who employ that dark and treacherous policy which has now been mentioned ; and yet no one will deny that such a conduct is utterly unworthy of a king. But because arts like these are now common in the world, some men are willing to suppose, that the practice of them is become altogether necessary in the administration of public affairs. The Achæans, however, at all times were distinguish-

ed by different sentiments. So far were they from forming any secret designs against their friends, in order to enlarge their power, that they disdained even to subdue their enemies with the assistance of deceit. In their opinion, victory was neither honourable nor secure unless it was obtained in open contest, and by the force of superior courage. Upon this account they established it as a kind of law among them, never to use any concealed weapons, nor to throw darts at a distance; being persuaded that an open and close engagement was the only fair method of combat. From the same reason it was, that they not only made a public declaration of war, but sent notice also, each to the other, of their resolution to try the fortune of a battle, and of the place likewise in which they had determined to engage. In the present times a general is supposed to be ignorant in his profession if he discovers his intentions. Among the Romans alone, some slight traces of the ancient virtue still remain. For they make before-hand a denunciation of war; they seldom form ambuscades; and they fight always man to man in close engagement. But, in general, artifice so much prevails, that it is now become the chief study of men to deceive each other, both in the administration of civil affairs and in the conduct of war. And this it was which gave occasion to these reflections.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

*The designs of Philip against the Rhodians.
The character of Heraclides.*

PHILIP, being willing to give a proper subject to Heraclides for the exercise of his abilities, commanded him to contrive some method for disabling or destroying the Rhodian fleet; and at the same time sent some ambassadors to Crete, to excite the people of that island against the Rhodians, and prevail with them to join him in the war. Heraclides, whose nature was well adapted to any ill design, received this commission with joy; and, after some time employed in regulating his plan, sailed away to Rhodes. This Heraclides was originally from Tarentum; and was born of vulgar parents, who exercised some mechanical trade. He possessed all the qualities that are requisite to form a daring and licentious profligate. From his earliest age he abandoned himself to the most scandalous prostitution. He had a ready conception, and a strong memory; was bold and terrible to his inferiors, but a base flatterer of those who were above him. He had first been forced to leave Tarentum on account of a suspicion that was entertained against him, as if he had designed to betray the place to the

Romans. Not that he at that time possessed any authority in the city; but being an architect, under the pretence of making some repairs in the walls, he had gotten into his hands the keys of the gate which led into the country. He then took refuge among the Romans; and, while he remained in their camp, entered again into a correspondence with Annibal, and sent letters to Tarentum. But being discovered, and dreading the consequences of his treason, he fled into Macedon; and, having insinuated himself into the confidence of Philip, gained afterwards so great a power over him, that he was almost the principal cause of the ruin of that mighty kingdom.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The force of Truth.

FOR my part I am persuaded that there is not in nature a greater goddess, or any that has a stronger power over men, than Truth. For, though all unite in opposition to her, and though falsehood draws up a whole train of probabilities, and sets them in array against her, she triumphs, I know not how, single and unsupported, and forces her way into the heart. Sometimes her power is instantly discerned. Sometimes she is obscured for a while; but appears at last in perfect splendour, and surmounts by her own force alone the falsehood under which she has been oppressed.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

The cruelty of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta.

THE Lacedæmonian tyrant Nabis, though he had now for three years held the government, was deterred by the ill fortune of Machanides, who had so lately been defeated by the Achæans, from attempting any thing of importance; but employed himself in forming the design, and laying the foundations of a severe and lasting tyranny. With this view, he seemed determined to destroy all that were now left in Sparta: driving into banishment the citizens that were most distinguished by their wealth or families; and distributing their possessions and their wives among the chief of those that were attached to his party, and among the mercenaries that were retained in his service. These were all of them assassins, house-breakers, nightly thieves, and robbers. For he spared no pains to collect together persons of this sort from every quarter: men whose crimes had forced them to abandon their own countries. Of all these, he was the declared protector and the sovereign: and, as he had formed them also into a guard for his person, it was manifest that he had determined to maintain his power by wickedness and violence.

And indeed, not satisfied with driving the citizens into banishment, he resolved that they should find no safety even in the places to which they fled, nor any retreat secure. For some were destroyed upon the road by messengers whom he sent to overtake them; and others brought back again and killed. In the cities also in which they had fixed their abode, having hired by the means of unsuspected persons, the houses that were adjoining to those in which any of the exiles lived, he sent thither some Cretans, who made holes in the walls, and, shooting arrows through the openings, killed some as they were standing, and others as they reposed themselves in their own houses. Thus the unhappy Lacedæmonians were in no time or place secure: And in this manner great numbers of them were destroyed.

He contrived also a machine, if it may be called indeed by such a name; an image of a woman, magnificently dressed, and formed in a most exact resemblance of his wife. And when his intention was to draw money from any of the citizens, he invited them to his house, and at first with much civility represented to them the danger with which their country was threatened from the Achæans; the number of mercenaries which he was forced to retain in pay for the sake of the common safety; and the great cost of maintaining the worship of the gods, as well as the other articles of public expense. If these arguments prevailed, it was sufficient for

his purpose. But if all his solicitations were without effect, he then used to say: I want, it seems, the power of persuasion; but Apega, I believe, will be able to persuade you. Apega was the name of his wife. Upon these words, the image of the woman that has been mentioned immediately appeared. Nabis then, taking her by the hand, raised her from her seat: and folding afterwards his arms round the person whom he had been soliciting, brought him near by degrees to the body of the image, whose breasts, hands, and arms were stuck full with points of iron, concealed under the clothes; and then, pressing the back of the pretended woman with his hands, by the means of some secret springs he fixed the man close to her breast, and soon forced him to promise all that he desired. But there were some also who perished in this torture, when they refused to comply with his demands.

BOOK THE FOURTEENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

The conduct and exploits of Publius Scipio in Afric. He sets fire to the camps of Asdrubal and Syphax. The Carthaginians draw together a new army: and are defeated in a set engagement. They resolve to recall Annibal from Italy, and to continue the war.

CHAP. I.

WHILE the consuls were employed in these affairs, Publius Scipio, who remained still in Afric, having received information during the winter that the Carthaginians were getting ready a fleet, resolved to put his own fleet also in order, but not relinquish his design of laying siege to Utica. He still encouraged also in himself the hope which he had conceived, that he should be able to bring back Syphax again to the Roman party. With this view, taking advantage of the neighbourhood of the two armies, he urged him by continual deputations; and was persuaded, that he should at last be able to draw him away from his alliance with the Carthaginians. For, when he considered on the one hand, that it was the nature of the Numidians to pass soon from enjoyment to disgust; and, on the other, that they

were no less ready to break through their engagements to the gods and men; he had scarcely any doubt, but that this prince was already satiated, not only with his wife, for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians, but in general also with his new allies. But while his mind was thus filled with different cares, and agitated by no less various hopes, unable as he was to contend openly in the field against the enemy, whose numbers were far superior to his own, he took the occasion that was offered, to carry into execution an attempt of a different kind, in the manner which we are now going to relate.

Some of the messengers, whom he had sent to Syphax, informed him at their return, that the tents in which the Carthaginians were lodged during the winter were framed of wood of every kind, and of the branches of trees, without any mixture of earth: that those of the Numidians, who were from the beginning in the army, were composed wholly of reeds: that the rest of the Numidians, who had been drawn lately from the cities, had framed their tents only with branches; and that, though some of them were lodged within the intrenchment, the greatest part remained without. Having considered therefore with himself, that, if he could set fire to the camps, it would be an action not less surprising to the enemy than serviceable to his own designs, he began to take the measures that were necessary for that purpose. In the course of all the deputations, it

had still been urged by Syphax, that the Carthaginians should retire from Italy, and the Romans also from Afric: and that both of them should retain possession of all that they then held between those two countries. To this time, Publius had utterly rejected these conditions. But his messengers were now instructed to suggest some little hope to Syphax, that it was not impossible but that his offer might be accepted. The Numidian, softened by this expectation, was more earnest to continue the intercourse that was begun; and suffered the messengers to go and to return, more frequently, and in greater numbers than before. Sometimes they even remained whole days, without being observed, in either camp. Upon these occasions, Publius always sent among his messengers some persons of experienced prudence, and some officers concealed under a vulgar dress, or disguised in the habit of slaves; that they might carefully observe the approaches and the entrances of both the camps. For there were two different camps: one occupied by Asdrubal, with thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse; and another, at the distance of ten stadia from the former, possessed by the Numidians, whose numbers amounted to ten thousand horse, and at this time to about fifty thousand foot. The latter, as it was easiest of approach, was the best suited also to the purpose of being set on fire; because the Numidians, as I have already said, had framed their

tents, not of wood nor of earth, but only of straw and reeds.

When the spring then was come, Scipio, having obtained all the information that was requisite for carrying into execution this design against the enemy, set all his ships afloat, and stored them with military machines, as if his purpose had been to attack Utica on the side of the sea. At the same time he sent away a body of two thousand foot, who took possession again of the hill which commanded the city; and began to fortify it, and to throw up an intrenchment round it with the greatest diligence. By this measure likewise he induced the enemy to believe, that he had nothing in view but the siege. But his true intention was, to leave these men as a body of reserve; that they might be ready, when the time of the expedition should come, to intercept the garrison of Utica, if they should sally out after the departure of the army, and attack the camp that was near, or attempt to invest the troops that would be left to guard it. While he was employed in these preparations, he sent also again to Syphax, desiring to be informed, whether he was satisfied with the terms that had been proposed: whether the Carthaginians also were ready to receive them; or whether these last would not again pretend, that they wanted a longer time to deliberate upon them. He ordered the messengers also not to return, till they had received an answer to each of these demands. The Nu-

midian had now no doubt, but that Scipio was sincere in his desire of peace: both because he had ordered the messengers not to return without an answer, and had seemed likewise more particularly careful to be assured of the consent of the Carthaginians. He sent therefore immediately to Asdrubal, informing him of all that had been done, and urging him to accept the peace that was offered: and himself in the meanwhile passed his time without any care or caution, and suffered the Numidians, who came from time to time to the army, to remain without the intrenchment. Publius on his part also affected the same show of negligence; but in reality was still most intent upon the execution of his design.

As soon as Syphax had received notice from the Carthaginians that he might finish the treaty, he with great joy communicated the answer to the Roman deputies, who then returned back to their own camp, to inform their general what the king had done. But Scipio immediately sent them back again to acquaint him, that for his own part he was still firm and earnest in his desire of peace: but that his council were of a different opinion, and had resolved that the war should be continued. His design in sending this message was, that he might not be charged with any breach of faith, if he should commence hostilities while the conferences still subsisted for a treaty. This declaration being made, he thought that whatever he should

attempt would be free from all reproach and blame.

As Syphax had already conceived the strongest hopes of peace, he was much grieved at this unexpected change, and went himself to Asdrubal to acquaint him with the resolution of the Romans. The two generals, being thus filled with new disquietude, deliberated long together, concerning the measures that were now proper to be pursued. But both their apprehensions and their designs were very far distant from the truth. For they conceived not a thought of any danger threatening them, or of taking any precaution for their own security: but were intent only on the means of attempting something against the enemy; and earnest to contrive some method of drawing them to a battle in the open country.

Before this time Scipio, both by his preparations, and by the orders which he gave, had induced the whole army to believe, that his intention was to take Utica by surprise. But now having assembled together the ablest of the tribunes, and those that were most worthy of his confidence, he disclosed to them his design; commanded them to take their supper at the usual hour; and that, as soon as the trumpets should have all sounded, according to the custom, they should draw the legions out of the camp. For the Roman custom is, to sound all the trumpets of the army, immediately after supper, near the tent of the general; as the

signal for placing in their respective posts the guards of the night. He then ordered the persons also to be called, who had been employed as spies to inspect the camps of the enemy; compared together and closely examined their accounts of the ways and entrances; and took the opinion of Massanissa concerning all that they reported, because he especially was well acquainted with the country. And when all his measures were adjusted, having left a sufficient body of troops to guard the camp, he began his march towards the enemy, who were at the distance of about sixty stadia from him, at the end of the first watch; and, arriving near them about the end of the third, he allotted one half of the Romans, and all the Numidians, to Lælius and Massanissa, and ordered them to attack the camp of Syphax. He exhorted them to behave themselves like men of courage; to do nothing without due consideration; and to remember, that, in nightly expeditions, as much as the darkness was an impediment to action, so much should this disadvantage be compensated by valour and by prudence. Taking then the rest of the army, he advanced, but with a slow pace, towards the camp of Asdrubal. For his intention was, not to attempt any thing on his part, till Lælius should have first set fire to the Numidian camp.

This general then and Massanissa, having divided their forces into two bodies, approached

the camp of the enemy, and began the work. As the camp seemed framed, as I have said, for the very purpose of being set on fire, no sooner was the flame thrown by the foremost troops, and had seized the first tents, than in a moment, because the tents were crowded close together, and the quantity of the matter also, which fed the conflagration, was extremely great, the evil was such as could admit no remedy. Lælius, keeping his troops together, remained in his post, and stood as a reserve: while Massanissa distributed his men among all the passages, through which he knew that the enemy would endeavour to save themselves from the flames. Not any of the Numidians, nor even Syphax himself, had the least suspicion of the truth; but supposed that the fire had happened by some accident. With this persuasion, either wakened from their sleep, or starting, full of liquor, from their nightly revels, they leaped hastily from their tents. Many of them were trampled down in the crowds that filled the passages of the camp. Many were intercepted as they fled, and perished in the fire. And the rest, who escaped the flames, fell all under the sword of the enemy; and were destroyed before they knew either what they were doing or what they suffered.

The Carthaginians, when they beheld from their camp the greatness of the fire, and the height to which the flames were raised, supposed also that the misfortune had happened by

accident. While some of them therefore went in haste to carry assistance, the rest, running all out of their tents, stood without arms before the intrenchment, and viewed with astonishment the dreadful spectacle. Scipio, perceiving that all things had happened as he desired, fell upon those that were come out; killed one part, and pursuing the rest, at the same time threw fire also upon their tents. In an instant the same scene of conflagration and of slaughter appeared in the Carthaginian camp, as in that of the Numidians. Asdrubal used no endeavours to extinguish the flames. He now clearly perceived that the fire in the Numidian camp had not happened by accident, but from the bold attempt of the Romans. He began therefore only to consider by what means he might escape with safety; though indeed he had but little hopes of being able to accomplish even that design. For the fire had spread itself with great rapidity, and encircled every part. All the passages also of the camp were filled with horses, with beasts of burthen, and with men: some of them half dead, and destroyed by the flames; and some driven from their senses by astonishment and horror. Such disorder and confusion, which was sufficient to appal even the stoutest courage, seemed likewise to preclude every hope of safety. Syphax also and his officers were in the same condition. The two generals however at last found means to escape with a small body of horse. But the

other thousands, and ten thousands, of men, of horses, and of beasts of burthen, most miserably perished in the flames: or those among the men, who escaped the violence of the fire, were encountered by a foul and a dishonourable death. For they not only were without their arms; but some, even without their clothes, were cut down by the enemy naked as they fled. In a word, every place was filled with lamentable shrieks; with disordered cries, with frantic consternation; with confused and undistinguishable noise. With all these there was a devouring fire, and flames hurled to a tremendous height. Any one of these things alone would be sufficient to strike terror into the human heart: how much more all of them together? It is not possible indeed to show any thing like the disaster; or to form any image of the greatness of it by any comparison. So much do the most dreadful accidents that have hitherto been known fall below the horrors of this most astonishing scene. And in truth, though Scipio was distinguished by a course of many glorious actions, there is none, in my judgement, among all that he performed, so glorious, or so adventurous, as this exploit.

When the morning appeared, and the enemies were all either killed or dispersed in flight, he exhorted the tribunes, and pursued without delay after those that had fled. Asdrubal, though he received notice of his approach, remained for some time in the city to which he had retired,

trusting to the strength of the place. But when he perceived that the inhabitants were preparing to rise against him, not daring to wait the arrival of the Romans, he again continued his flight with the rest that had escaped. The number of these was five hundred horse, and about two thousand foot. The inhabitants were then quiet, and surrendered themselves to the Romans at discretion. Scipio spared the place; but gave two cities that were near to be plundered by the army, and then returned back again to his own camp.

CHAP. II.

THE Carthaginians were heavily affected by this great loss. The designs which they had formed were now entirely frustrated; and all their prospects fatally reversed. For they had flattered themselves with the hopes that they should be able to invest the Romans, both by land and sea, upon the hill adjoining to Utica, which was the seat of their winter quarters; and had directed all their preparations to that purpose. But now they are not only forced, by a most strange and unexpected accident, to leave the enemy in possession of all the open country; but have reason also to fear that their

whole state would soon be exposed to the most imminent danger. Their consternation, therefore, and their apprehensions were extreme. As the condition however of affairs required that something should be determined with respect to future measures, the senate met together, but in great perplexity, and was distracted by confused and different sentiments. For some were of opinion that Annibal should be called home from Italy; as if the only hope that now remained was in that general, and in his army. Some again advised that deputies should be sent to Publius to obtain a truce, and to enter into conferences for a treaty. But others exhorted the assembly to resume their courage; to raise new forces; and to send some messengers to Syphax, who had retired to Abba, a city at no great distance, and was employed in collecting together all those that had escaped from the late misfortune. And this was the opinion which at last prevailed. They ordered Asdrubal therefore to make new levies; and sent to Syphax, entreating him to assist them, and to remain firm to his first engagements; at the same time assuring him that their general very soon would join him with another army.

Scipio was at this time intent on his first design of forming the siege of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax remained in his post, and that the Carthaginians were raising a new army, he collected together all his forces, and encamped before that city. At the same time,

having made also a distribution of the spoil, he sent merchants to purchase it; which was done with very great advantage. For the soldiers, considering the late success as a certain assurance of the entire conquest of all the country, were ready to sell their shares of the booty at the smallest rates.

Syphax and his friends had at first resolved to continue their retreat, and to return back to their own country. But a body of four thousand Celtiberians, whom the Carthaginians had just now taken into their pay, having met this prince in the neighbourhood of Abba, he was so much encouraged by this additional strength, that he remained where he then was, and began to assume new confidence. And when his young wife also, the daughter, as we have said, of Asdrubal, joined all her power of entreaty, to prevail with him not to desert the Carthaginians in the present exigency, he at last suffered himself to be persuaded, and complied with all that she desired. The Carthaginians themselves had conceived likewise no small hopes from the arrival of these succours. Instead of four thousand, it was pretended that ten thousand Celtiberians were arrived: and, that their courage, and the manner in which they were armed, would render them invincible. This report, as it filled every mouth, and was spread universally among the people, inspired the troops especially with so great confidence, that they were impatient once more to take the field. At the end therefore of

thirty days, they came and joined the Numidians and the Celtiberians, and encamped in the place that was called the Great Plains; forming all together an army of thirty thousand men.

As soon as it was known in the Roman camp, that the enemy had again taken the field, Publius resolved to advance towards them. Having given the necessary orders therefore to the fleet, and to the troops that were employed in the siege of Utica, he began his march with the rest of the army, disencumbered of all their baggage; and, arriving on the fifth day in the neighbourhood of the Great Plains, fixed his camp upon a hill, at the distance of thirty stadia from the enemy. On the next day, he descended into the plain, and formed his troops in order, placing his cavalry at the distance of seven stadia before the rest. In this situation, both the armies remained during the two following days, and only made trial of their strength in little skirmishes. But on the fourth day, the generals, agreeably to their design, drew out their forces on both sides, and ranged them in order of battle. The disposition that was made by Publius was simply the common disposition of the Romans. The hastati were first placed in front; behind these the principes; and, lastly, the triarii in the rear. Upon the right wing stood the Roman cavalry: the Numidians and Massanissa upon the left. On the side of Asdrubal and Syphax, the Celtiberians were drawn up in the centre, opposite to the Roman co-

horts; the Numidians upon the left wing; and the Carthaginians upon the right. But the Numidians, even in the first onset, fled from the charge of the Roman cavalry; and the Carthaginians from that of Massanissa. So much was their courage broken by the late defeats. The Celtiberians alone stood firm, and maintained the fight with vigour: having but little reason to hope, either that they could escape by flight, as they were wholly unacquainted with the country; or, that their lives would be spared, if they should fall into the power of the Romans. For, as Scipio had committed no hostility against them in the course of the war in Spain, they seemed clearly to have violated the laws of good faith and justice, by taking arms in favour of the Carthaginians. When the wings, however, were broken, these troops were soon surrounded by the principes and the triarii, and were almost all of them destroyed in the place, after they had performed the greatest service for the Carthaginians, not only in the battle, but in securing also their retreat. For if the Romans had not been retarded by this obstacle, but had immediately pursued those that fled, scarcely any part of the army would have been able to escape. But while they were stopped by the brave resistance of these troops, Syphax, with his cavalry, found means to retreat to his own kingdom; and Asdrubal, with the rest that were saved, to Carthage.

The Roman general, as soon as he had given

the necessary orders concerning the prisoners and the spoil, called together his council, to deliberate on the measures that were next to be pursued. In this assembly it was determined, that Publius, with one part of the army, should go round to the several cities; and, that Lælius and Massanissa, with the Numidians, and a part also of the Roman legions, should follow Syphax, and not allow him time to stand, or to make any new preparations. These resolutions were immediately carried into execution. Among the cities, some were struck with terror, and surrendered themselves voluntarily to the Romans: and others, being invested by them upon their first approach, were immediately taken by storm. Through all the country indeed, so grievous were the distresses which the long continuance of the war had brought upon the people, and so heavy the tributes that were imposed, that all things were ready for a change.

In the city of Carthage, the minds of men, which had before been much disordered, were now filled with new and greater consternation. Their whole hopes indeed seemed at once to sink under this second blow, and to give place to voluntary despair. There were some, however, among the firmest of the senators, who advised, that they should send a fleet to Utica, and endeavour to raise the siege of that city, by attacking the Roman fleet, which was wholly unprepared for an engagement; and that Annibal also should be recalled from Italy, and a

trial be made of that resource without any farther delay. They insisted, that both these measures, as far as it could reasonably be judged, would be productive of very salutary consequences. But it was urged by others, that the times would not now bear any such remedy: that their present business was to fortify the city, and to put it into a condition to sustain a siege: that, if the citizens would only agree in sentiments, chance itself would afford many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. At the same time they advised, that a consultation likewise should be held concerning peace; and, that they should seriously consider, by what kind of treaty, and upon what conditions, they might be delivered from the present evils. After long and vehement debates, all these opinions were adopted by the senate. As soon, therefore, as the assembly was dissolved, the messengers that were to be dispatched to Annibal set sail for Italy: the commander of the naval forces went on board of the fleet: and the rest employed themselves in putting the city into a state proper for defence, and in holding constant deliberations together, concerning each particular measure that was fit to be pursued.

The Roman army, having marched through all the country, and not met with any resistance, was loaded with an immense booty. Publius, therefore, resolved to send away the greatest part of the spoil to be stored in his first camp; and, when he had thus lightened the army, to

march and invest Tunis, and to encamp in the very sight of the Carthaginians; being persuaded, that by this boldness, he should strike them most effectually with terror and dismay.

The Carthaginians, having completed in a few days their naval forces, together with the necessary stores, were just now ready to sail out to sea, and to carry into execution the design that has been mentioned. On the arrival of Publius at Tunis, the garrison fled from the place, and relinquished it to the Romans. Tunis is situated at the distance of a hundred and twenty stadia from Carthage; and may be seen from almost every part of the city. It has already been mentioned, that both art and nature had concurred in making it a place of very uncommon strength. But scarcely had the Romans finished their encampment, when they discovered the Carthaginian fleet directing their course towards Utica. Publius, therefore, being apprehensive that the consequences would be fatal to his own fleet, which neither expected such an attempt, nor was prepared against it, immediately decamped, and marched also towards Utica with the greatest haste. On his arrival, perceiving that his decked ships were well fitted indeed for the purpose of raising machines, and carrying them near the walls; and, in a word, for every other use that is requisite in a siege, but were in no respect prepared for an engagement upon the sea; considering also, on the other hand, that the Carthaginians had em-

ployed the whole time of winter in preparing their fleet for this very design; he resolved not to engage in a naval action : but, having drawn up the decked ships close to the shore, he covered them with a line of the transport vessels, which were ranged by two and by three in depth.

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BOOK THE FIFTEENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Scipio sends ambassadors to Carthage, to demand a restitution of some vessels which had been taken by the Carthaginians during the truce. The perfidious attempt of the Carthaginians against the ambassadors. The war is renewed on both sides. The preparations of Annibal and Scipio. The interview between these two generals. The battle of Zama.

CHAP. I.

PUBLIUS was in no small degree disturbed by this perfidious action. Not only his own provisions were lost, but the enemy also were at the same time furnished with a very plentiful supply. But the chief cause of his concern was, that the Carthaginians, in making this attempt, had been guilty of an open violation of the late solemn treaty; and that the war again was kindled. He sent, therefore, Lucius Servilius, Lucius Bæbius, and Lucius Fabius, ambassadors to Carthage, to complain of this transaction; and at the same time to acquaint the Carthaginians,

that he had received letters from Rome, with an account that the treaty had been ratified by the Roman people. When the ambassadors arrived, and were introduced first into the senate, and afterwards into an assembly of the people, they discourse on the whole state of affairs with very great boldness. They began with telling the Carthaginians, "that when the ambassadors, who had been deputed by them to the Roman camp, arrived at Tunis, and were admitted to appear before the council, they not only made libations to the gods, and adored the earth, as the custom is among other men, but prostrated themselves also in an abject manner upon the ground, and kissed the feet of all the assembly. That afterwards, when they arose again, they made a voluntary confession of their guilt; and acknowledged, that they from the first had violated the treaties which subsisted between the Carthaginians and the Romans. That they were sensible, therefore, that the latter might most reasonably inflict upon them every evil. That they implored them however, in the name of the common fortune of mankind, not to punish them with too great severity; but rather to suffer their inconsiderate folly to become a lasting monument of the Roman generosity and virtue." The ambassadors then added: "That Scipio, and all the members of the council, who remembered this transaction, were now struck with surprise, and not able to conceive what confidence it was, that had induced the Carthaginians to forget all which they had at

that time spoken, and to violate again their treaties and their oaths. That it seemed indeed most probable, that the return of Annibal, and of the army that was with him, had encouraged them in this bold design. That nothing, however, could be more absurd and senseless. For do not all men know," continued they," that it is now the second year since Annibal, compelled to retire from every part of Italy into the neighbourhood of Lacinium, has been confined, and as it were besieged, in that narrow space; and has now brought away his forces with the greatest difficulty. But if he had even returned with conquest, and was ready to engage us; victorious as we have been against you in two successive battles, you ought surely to entertain very doubtful expectations of success; and, while you flatter yourselves with the prospect of a victory, to take also into your consideration the possible chance of another defeat. And if the latter should be the event, what gods will you then invoke; or what arguments will you employ in your distress, to draw the compassion of the conquerors towards you; when your perfidiousness and your rash attempt shall have rendered you alike unworthy of the protection of the gods and of men?"

The ambassadors after this discourse retired. There were but few among the Carthaginians who advised any adherence to the treaty. The greatest part, not only of those who directed the administration of the government, but of the rest also of the members of the council, beside that

they were dissatisfied with the conditions which the Romans had imposed, were incensed also by the boldness of the ambassadors. Add to this, that they were unwilling to lose the vessels that had been taken, and the supplies with which they were stored. But the chief and most prevailing reason was, that they had conceived the greatest hopes that, with the assistance of Annibal, they should now draw the victory to their side. The resolution, therefore, of the assembly was, that the ambassadors should be sent back without any answer. But the chief persons also in the government, having determined to leave no means untried that might serve to rekindle the war, concerted between themselves the following project. Pretending that some care at least should be taken, that the ambassadors might return back to their own camp with safety, they prepared two triremes to attend them. At the same time they sent orders to Asdrubal, who commanded their fleet, that he should hold some vessels in readiness not far from the Roman camp; and, as soon as these triremes should have left the Romans, that he should bear down upon the vessel in which the ambassadors sailed, and sink it. For the Carthaginian fleet was at this time stationed along those parts of the coast that were near to Utica. They then suffered the ambassadors to depart; having first ordered those that attended them in the triremes, that, as soon as they should have passed beyond the mouth of the river Macar, which was the place from

whence the camp of the enemy might be discerned, they should there leave the Romans, and return. Agreeably to these instructions, the commanders of the triremes, when they arrived at the appointed place, saluted the Romans, and directed their course back again to Carthage. The ambassadors had no suspicion of any ill intention ; and only were dissatisfied, because it seemed that the Carthaginians showed some contempt towards them in leaving them so soon. But as they held on their course alone, they were suddenly attacked by three triremes, which had been prepared for the design. As these vessels, however, could not pierce with their beaks the Roman quinquereme, because the latter easily withdrew itself from the stroke ; so neither were the men able to throw themselves on board, because the Romans resisted all their efforts with the greatest bravery. The Carthaginians, therefore, shifting their ships from side to side, and continuing the fight from every quarter, killed and wounded a great number of the Romans ; till the latter, perceiving that some soldiers from their own camp, who had been foraging near to the coast, were drawn together upon the shore, and ready to assist them, drove their vessel close in to the land. The greatest part of the men that were on board had been killed in the action ; but the ambassadors were most strangely and unexpectedly preserved. Thus was the war resumed with greater violence than before, and with a more implacable rage. For the Romans, incensed by

this perfidious action, were now most earnest in their desire to bring the Carthaginians into an entire subjection. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, being conscious of their guilt, resolved to attempt and suffer every thing rather than fall into the power of the Romans. When such was the disposition on both sides, it was manifest that the contest could only be decided by a battle. The minds of all men therefore, not in Italy alone and Afric, but in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia, were held in suspense, and distracted by an anxious expectation of the event.

As Annibal was at this time in great want of cavalry, he sent to a certain Numidian named Tychæus, whose territory was contiguous to that of Syphax, inviting him to seize the very moment of his safety, and to join him with his forces. For he could not but know that if the Carthaginians should be superior in the war, he might still be able to hold possession of his kingdom; but if the Romans, on the other hand, should remain the conquerors, the ambition of Massanissa would soon deprive him not only of his dominions but of his life. Tychæus was prevailed on by these reasons, and came and joined him, as he desired, with a body of two thousand horse.

Publius, having regulated all things that were necessary for the security of the fleet, left the command to Bæbius, and himself led the army round the country to reduce the cities; not suffering any to surrender upon terms of voluntary

submission as before ; but taking all of them by storm, and sending the inhabitants into slavery ; that he might show more strongly the resentment which he had conceived against the enemy on account of their late perfidy. He sent also continual messengers to Massanissa, to inform him of the manner in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty ; and urging him to draw together as large a body of forces as he was able to raise, and to join him with the greatest haste. For Massanissa, as we have already mentioned, as soon as the treaty was concluded, taking with him his own troops, together with ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, and some Roman deputies which he had obtained from Scipio, had gone from the camp, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the assistance of the Romans to add that of Syphax also to his own dominions. And this design he had now completely executed.

CHAP. II.

ABOUT this time it happened, that the ambassadors, returning back from Rome, arrived at Utica, where the fleet of the Romans lay. Bæbius sent away immediately the Roman ambassadors to Publius: but detained those of Carthage; whose minds, dejected as they were upon other accounts, were now filled with apprehensions of the greatest danger. For, having heard of the late wicked attempt of the Carthaginians against the Roman ambassadors, they expected to suffer all the vengeance that was due to so base an action. When Publius was informed, that both the senate and people had readily confirmed the treaty, and were disposed also to concur with him in every measure, he was filled with no small joy. He then ordered Bæbius to dismiss the Carthaginian ambassadors with all civility. This resolution was, in my judgement, very wise and commendable. For, as he knew his country had always paid the most sacred regard to the rights of ambassadors, he considered only what was fit for the Romans to do upon such an occasion, and not what the Carthaginians deserved to suffer. Suppressing, therefore, his own anger, and the resentment that was due to the late transaction, he endea-

voured to maintain, as the poet expresses it, "The glorious deeds of his progenitors:" and, by this conduct, he broke the spirit of all that were in Carthage, and even of Annibal himself; when they saw their own baseness opposed and conquered by such generous virtue.

The Carthaginians, impatient to behold their cities wasted and destroyed, sent some messengers to Annibal, entreating him not to admit any longer delay, but to advance towards the enemy, and to bring things to a decision by a battle. This general answered, that they should attend to their own business: that it belonged to him alone to choose the time for repose and the time for action. But, after some days, he began his march from Adrumetum, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Zama; a city, which stood at the distance of about five days' journey from Carthage towards the west. From this place he sent three spies, to examine into the situation and condition of the Roman camp. These men were discovered by the enemy, and were carried to the general. But so far was Publius from punishing them, as the custom is upon such occasions, that he ordered a tribune to attend them, and to show them distinctly every part of the camp. When this was done, he asked the men, whether the tribune had faithfully executed his order. And when they answered, that he had; having furnished them with provisions, and some troops also to conduct them, he ordered them to go back, and report

to Annibal, the exact account of all that had happened to them. The Carthaginian general, struck with the magnanimity and boldness of the action, conceived, I know not how, a desire to enter into a conference with Scipio; and sent a herald to acquaint him, that he should be glad to hold some discourse with him on the state of affairs alone. Publius, when he had received this message, told the herald, that he accepted the offer; and, that he would send notice to Annibal of the time and the place in which they might meet. On the following day, Massanissa arrived at the camp, and brought with him six thousand foot, and about the same number of horse. Scipio received him with great favour; and congratulated him upon his success, in having prevailed upon all the subjects of Syphax to receive him as their prince. He then put the army in motion, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Margarus; in a post, which, beside other advantages, had water within the throw of a dart. From this place he sent notice to the Carthaginian general, that he was ready to engage in a conference with him. On receiving this message, Annibal also decamped; and, approaching to the distance of no more than thirty stadia from the Romans, fixed his camp upon a hill, which, though in other respects well situated, was rather too far removed from water. And indeed the soldiers were upon this account exposed to very great hardship.

On the following day, the two generals came

out from their several camps with a small body of horsemen: and afterwards, leaving these, they advanced forwards, and approached each other, attended only by an interpreter. Annibal first saluted Scipio, and began in the following manner:

“ Well would it have been, if the Romans had never coveted any thing beyond the extent of Italy, nor the Carthaginians beyond that of Afric; but had both of them remained contented with the possession of those fair empires, which nature itself seems indeed to have circumscribed with separate bounds. But, since we engaged in war against each other, first to acquire the sovereignty of Sicily, and afterwards that of Spain; since at last, like men infatuated by fortune, we advanced so far together in our preposterous course, as to bring even the safety of our own native seats into alternate danger; that danger which you have so lately known, and to which we also at this moment are exposed; what now remains, but to endeavour, by ourselves, to deprecate the anger of the gods, and find some means, if it be possible, of putting an end to this most obstinate contention. I for my part, who have seen in the course of a long experience the great inconstancy of fortune, with how slight a turn she effects on either side the greatest changes, and that she sports with us continually as with children, am most ready to consent to a peace. But much do I fear, that you, Publius, who still are in the flower

of your age, whose designs both in Spain and Afric have all been attended with success, and who have never hitherto been driven back again in your course by any adverse blast, will be inclined to different sentiments, and not be moved by my persuasions, how worthy soever they may be of credit. Yet consider only and observe, at least in one example, the instability of human affairs; an example, not drawn from distant times, but which is present now to your eyes. In a word, view it in me who am before you. I am that Annibal, who after the battle of Cannæ was master of almost the whole of Italy; and, having advanced not long afterwards into the very neighbourhood of Rome, fixed my camp within forty stadia only of the city, and deliberated with myself in what manner I should dispose of you and of your country. Behold me now, returned back again to Afric, and holding a conference with you a Roman, concerning my own safety, and that of all the Carthaginians. Let this example incline you to embrace moderate sentiments; and to judge in this conjuncture, as it becomes a man to judge; that is, to choose always the greatest good, and the least of evils. And surely no man of sense would ever voluntarily meet the danger to which you are now exposed. For if you should gain the victory in the present battle, you will add but little either to the reputation of your country, or your own. But, if you should be conquered, the whole fame and glory of all

your former actions will be for ever lost. What then is the purpose of this discourse? It is to inform you, that the countries which have been the objects of our wars, Sardinia, Sicily, and Spain, shall be yielded to the Romans; and that the Carthaginians at no future time shall attempt to recover by arms the possession of those territories. To the Romans, likewise, shall belong all the islands which lie between Sicily and Afric. These conditions, while they leave Carthage in security, are at the same time, in my opinion, highly honourable both to yourself and to all the Romans."

Here Annibal ended his discourse; and Scipio answered in the following words:

"It was well known," he said, "that the Carthaginians, and not the Romans, were the cause both of the war of Sicily, and of that of Spain: that Annibal himself was most perfectly acquainted with this truth; and, that the gods also had borne testimony to it, by turning the success to the side, not of those who had unjustly attacked, but of those who had taken arms in their own defence." He then added likewise; "that no man was more strongly impressed than himself, with a just sense of the instability of fortune, and the uncertain course of human affairs. "But with respect," continued he, "to the terms which you offer; if, before the Romans had come into Afric, you had retired from Italy, and proposed to us the same conditions of peace, you would not perhaps have been

disappointed in your hopes. At this time, when you have been forced most reluctantly to abandon Italy, and we on the other hand have passed over into Afric, and have rendered ourselves the masters of all the open country, it is clear that the state of affairs is very considerably changed. But, beside this difference, there is something also of much greater moment. When your countrymen were defeated, and sued for peace, we refused not to accede to their request. A treaty was framed in writing; which, beside those concessions which you have now proposed, contained also the following articles: That the Carthaginians should restore without ransom all the Roman prisoners; should deliver up to us their decked ships; should pay a sum of five thousand talents; and, in the last place, that they should give hostages for the performance of all that was imposed. Such were the conditions, to which we on both sides gave consent. We then deputed jointly some ambassadors to Rome, to lay the treaty before the senate and the people: on our part intimating, that we approved of the conditions; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, requesting even with entreaty that they might be accepted. They were accordingly admitted by the senate, and were ratified by the people. But no sooner had the Carthaginians obtained what they desired, than they annul at once the whole treaty by an action of the grossest perfidy. After such a conduct, what remains to be done? Put yourself in my

place, and answer. Shall we release them now from all the heaviest of the conditions that were before imposed? This would, indeed, be an admirable method, by bestowing a reward upon their treachery, to teach them to deceive in future times the persons by whom they had been obliged. Or think you, if they could obtain their wish, that they would hold themselves indebted to us for the favour? They before obtained what with the most earnest supplication they desired. And yet, no sooner had they conceived some faint hopes from your return, than they again disclosed their enmity, and renewed hostilities against us. If you had added, therefore, some conditions still more rigorous, the treaty might have been once more carried before the Roman people. But since you have detracted even from those that were admitted, the terms which you now propose cannot so much as be referred to their consideration. To what then tends also my discourse? It is to acquaint you, that you either must submit yourselves and your country to us at discretion, or must conquer us in a battle." After these discourses, which left no hopes of an accommodation, the two generals parted from each other, and retired.

On the following day, as soon as the dawn appeared, they drew out their forces on both sides, and prepared to engage; the Carthaginians, for their own safety and the possession of Afric; the Romans, for the sovereignty of

the whole, and for universal empire. Is there any one that can forbear to pause at this part of the story, or remain unmoved by the relation? Never were there seen more warlike nations: never more able generals, or more completely exercised in all the art and discipline of war: never was a greater prize proposed by fortune, than that which was now laid before the combatants. For it was not Afric alone, or Italy, that waited to reward the conquerors; but the entire dominion of the whole known world. And this indeed was not long afterwards the event. Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following manner. He placed in the first line the hastati, leaving intervals between the cohorts. In the second, the principes; but posted their cohorts, not, as the Roman custom was, opposite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former line, and at a considerable distance from them, on account of the great number of elephants that were in the Carthaginian army. Last of all, in the third line, he drew up the triarii. Upon the left wing he stationed Caius Lælius, with the cavalry of Italy; and Massanissa and the Numidians upon the right. The intervals of the first line he filled with companies of the light-armed troops, who were ordered to begin the action; and, if they should find themselves too violently pressed by the elephants, that the swiftest of them should retire through the straight intervals, to the rear of all the army; and the rest, if they

should be intercepted on their way, direct their course to the right or left, along the open distances that were between the lines. When his disposition was thus completed, he went round to all the troops, and harangued them in few words, but such as the occasion seemed to require.

“Remember,” said he, “your former victories; and show now a courage worthy of yourselves and of your country. Let it be ever present to your view, that, by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will become the masters of all Afric, but secure to Rome the undisputed sovereignty of the rest of the world. If, on the other hand, you should be conquered, they who fall bravely in the action, will obtain an honour far more glorious than any rites of sepulture, the honour of dying for their country; while those that shall escape, must be condemned to pass the remainder of their lives in the extremity of disgrace and misery. For Afric will afford no place of safety; and, if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition must be, your own reason will easily instruct you to foresee. But may none of you ever know it by experience. When fortune then,” continued he, “has offered to us upon either side so noble a prize, universal empire or a glorious death, how lost must we be both to honour and to sense, if we should reject these the greatest of goods, and choose, through a esdire of life, the most insupportable of evils.

When you advance therefore against the enemy, carry that resolution with you into action, which is sure always to surmount the strongest resistance. Be determined either to conquer or to die. Retain not so much as a thought of life. With such sentiments, the victory cannot fail to be your own."

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Annibal, on his part, having placed the elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army, formed his first line of the mercenaries; who were a mixed multitude of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearics, and Maurusians, and amounted together to about twelve thousand men. Behind these were the Carthaginians and the subject Africans. The third line was composed of the troops which he had brought with him from Italy; and was placed at the distance of more than a stadium from the second line. The cavalry was posted upon the wings; that of the Numidian auxiliaries upon the left, and the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He ordered the officers who commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries, to exhort severally their own soldiers, and to encourage them to be assured of victory, since they were now joined by Annibal and his veteran forces. The leaders of the Carthaginians were instructed on the other hand, to lay before their view the fatal consequences of a defeat; and to enumerate all the evils, to which their wives and children would be exposed. And while these orders were

obeyed, he himself going round to his own troops, addressed them with the greatest earnestness, and in words like these :

“ Remember, soldiers, that we have now borne arms together during the course of seventeen years. Remember in how many battles we have been engaged against the Romans. Conquerors in them all, we have not left to the Romans even the smallest hope that they ever should be able to defeat us. But beside the other innumerable actions in which we always obtained the victory, remember also, above all the rest, the battle of Trebia, which we sustained against the father of that very general who now commands the Roman army; the battle of Thrasymene, against Flaminius; and that of Cannæ, against Æmilius. The action, in which we are now ready to engage, is not to be compared with those great battles, with respect either to the number or the courage of the troops. For turn now your eyes upon the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer; they scarcely make even a diminutive part of the numbers against which we were then engaged. Nor is the difference less with respect to courage. The former were troops whose strength was entire, and who had never been disheartened by any defeat. But these before us are either the children of the former, or the wretched remains of those very men whom we subdued in Italy, and who have so often fled before us. Lose not then, upon this occasion,

the glory of your general, and your own. Preserve the name which you have acquired; and confirm the opinion which has hitherto prevailed, that you are never to be conquered."

When the generals had thus on both sides harangued their troops, and the Numidian cavalry for some time had been engaged in skirmishing against each other, all things being now ready, Annibal ordered the elephants to be led against the enemy. But the noise of the horns and trumpets, sounding together on every side, so affrighted some of these beasts, that they turned back with violence against their own Numidians, and threw them into such disorder, that Massanissa dispersed without much difficulty that whole body of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian army. The rest of the elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces of the Romans in the space that was between the armies, suffered much in the conflict, and made great havoc also among the enemy: till at last, having lost all courage, some of them took their way through the intervals of the Roman army, which afforded an open and safe passage for them, as Scipio wisely had foreseen; and the rest, directing their course to the right, were chased by darts from the cavalry, till they were driven quite out of the field. But, as they occasioned likewise some disorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lælius also seized that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian cavalry: and, having

forced them to turn their backs, he followed closely after them; while Massanissa on his side was pursuing the Numidian cavalry with no less ardour.

And now the heavy-armed forces on both sides advanced to action with a slow and steady pace; those troops alone excepted which had returned with Annibal from Italy, and which remained still in the station in which they at first were placed. As soon as they were near, the Romans, shouting all together, according to their custom, and rattling their swords against their bucklers, threw themselves upon the enemy. On the other side the Carthaginian mercenaries advanced to the charge with confused and undistinguishable cries. For as they had been drawn together, as we have said, from different countries, there was not among them, as the poet expresses it,

One voice, one language found;
But sounds discordant as their various tribes*.

In this first onset, as the combatants were so closely joined that they were unable to make use of their spears, or even of their swords, and maintained the action hand to hand, and man to man; the mercenaries, by their boldness and dexterity, obtained at first the advantage, and wounded many of the Romans. But the latter,

* Iliad, IV. 437.

assisted by the excellence of their disposition and the nature of their arms, pressed forward, and still gained ground; being supported also by the rest of their own army, who followed and encouraged them from behind. The mercenaries on the other hand were neither followed nor supported. For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to assist them in the action, but stood like men who had lost all courage. At last therefore the strangers turned their backs; and thinking themselves manifestly to have been deserted by their own friends, they fell, as they retired, upon the Carthaginians that were behind, and killed them. The latter, however, fell not without a brave and vigorous defence. For being thus unexpectedly attacked, and compelled to fight both with their own mercenaries and with the Romans, they exerted their utmost efforts, and engaging with a frantic and disordered rage, made a promiscuous slaughter of friends and enemies. Amidst this confusion the hastati also were so pressed that they were forced to break their ranks. But the leaders of the principes, perceiving the disorder, brought up their troops close behind to support them: so that, in the end, the greatest part of the Carthaginians and the mercenaries were destroyed in the place; partly by themselves, and partly by the hastati. Annibal would not suffer the rest that escaped to be received into the third line, towards which

they fled ; but ordered the foremost ranks to point their spears against them as they approached. They were forced, therefore, to retire along the wings into the open plain.

As the whole ground that was between the forces which now remained was covered with blood, and slaughter, and dead bodies, the Roman general was in no small degree perplexed ; being apprehensive that this obstacle would prevent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it seemed to be no easy thing to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks, over bleeding and slippery carcases, thrown one upon another ; and over arms which were scattered in confusion, and preposterously intermingled with the heaps of the dead. Having ordered the wounded, however, to be carried into the rear of the army, he called back the hastati from the pursuit, and drew them up in order as they returned, in the forepart of the ground upon which the action had passed, and the opposite to the centre of the enemy. He then commanded the principes and the triarii to close their ranks, to form a wing on either side, and to advance over the dead. And when these troops, having surmounted all the intermediate obstacles, were come into the same line with the hastati, the action was then begun on both sides with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As the numbers were nearly equal ; as the sentiments, the courage, and the arms on both sides were the same ; the battle remained for a long

time doubtful. For so obstinate was the contention that the men all fell in the place in which they fought. But Lælius and Massanissa, returning back from the pursuit of the routed cavalry, arrived most providentially in the very moment in which their assistance was chiefly wanted, and fell upon the rear of Annibal. The greatest part, therefore, of his troops were now slaughtered in their ranks. And, among those that fled, a very small number only were able to escape; as they were followed closely by the cavalry through an open country. Above fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action. But, on the side of the Carthaginians, more than twenty thousand were killed; and almost an equal number taken prisoners. Such was the battle between Annibal and Scipio; the battle which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world.

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had for some time pursued those that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned back to his own camp. Annibal, with a small number of horsemen, continued his retreat without stopping, and arrived safe at Adrumetum: having performed, upon this occasion, all that was possible to be done by a brave and experienced general. For first, he entered into a conference with his enemy; and endeavoured by himself alone to terminate the dispute. Nor was this any dishonour to his former victories; but showed only that he was diffident of fortune,

and willing to secure himself against the strange and unexpected accidents which happen in war. In the battle afterwards, so well had he disposed things for the action, that no general, using even the same arms, and the same order of battle as the Romans, could have engaged them with greater advantage. The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken; because the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready always to present a front to their enemies, on which side soever they appear. For the cohorts by a single movement turn themselves together, as the occasion requires, towards the side from whence the attack is made. Add to this, that their arms also are well contrived, both for protection and offence; their bucklers being large in size, and their swords strong, and not easily injured by the stroke. Upon these accounts they are very terrible in action, and are not to be conquered without great difficulty. But Annibal opposed to each of these advantages the most effectual obstacles that it was possible for reason to contrive. He had collected together a great number of elephants, and stationed them in the front of his army; that they might disturb the order of the enemy, and disperse their ranks. By posting the mercenaries in the first line, and the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to disable the Romans by fatigue, before the battle should be brought to the last decision; and render their swords useless by

continual slaughter. As he had thus placed the Carthaginians also between two lines, he compelled them to stand; and, as the poet has said,

Forced them by strong necessity to fight,
However loath*.

In the last place he drew up the bravest and the firmest of his troops at a distance from the rest; that, observing from afar the progress of the action, and possessing their whole strength, as well as their courage entire, they might seize the most favourable moment, and fall with vigour upon the enemy. If therefore, when he had thus employed all possible precautions to secure the victory, he was now for the first time conquered, he may very well be pardoned. For fortune sometimes counteracts the designs of valiant men. Sometimes again, according to the proverb,

A brave man by a braver is subdued.

And this indeed it was which must be allowed to have happened upon the present occasion.

* Iliad, IV. 30.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

The Carthaginians in the most abject manner sue for peace. The conditions upon which it is granted by Scipio. The sentiments of Annibal, and his behaviour in the senate of Carthage upon this occasion.

WHEN men, in lamenting the wretchedness of their fortunes, exceed in their actions all the customary forms of grief, if their behaviour seems to be the effect of genuine passion, and to arise only from the greatness of their calamities, we are all ready to be moved by the strangeness of the sight, and can neither see nor hear them without commiserating their condition. But, if these appearances are feigned, and assumed only with an intention to deceive, instead of compassion, they excite indignation and disgust. And this was now what happened with respect to the Carthaginian ambassadors. Publius told them in few words; "That, with regard to themselves, they had clearly no pretensions to be treated with gentleness or favour; since, by their own acknowledgement, they had at first begun the war against the Romans, by attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaties; and now lately again had violated the articles of a con-

vention, which they had ratified in writing, and bound themselves by oaths to observe. That the Romans, however, as well upon their own account, as in consideration also of the common condition and fortune of humanity, had resolved to display towards them upon this occasion a generous clemency. That such indeed it must appear to themselves to be, if they would view all circumstances in a proper light. For, since fortune, having first precluded them, by the means of their own perfidious conduct, from every claim to mercy or to pardon, had now thrown them wholly into the power of their enemies; no hardships which they should be forced to suffer, no conditions which should be imposed, no concessions which should be exacted from them, could be considered as rigorous or severe: but rather it must appear to be a matter of astonishment, if any article of favour should be yielded to them." After this discourse, he recited first, the conditions of indulgence which he was willing to grant; and afterwards, those of rigour to which they were required to submit. The terms which he proposed to them were these:

"That they should retain all the cities which they held in Afric, before the beginning of the last war which they had made against the Romans; and all the lands likewise which they had anciently possessed, together with the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them. That from the present day, all hostilities against

them should cease. That they should be governed by their own laws and customs; and not receive any garrison from the Romans." Such were the articles of favour: the others, of a contrary kind, were these:

"That the Carthaginians should restore all that they had taken unjustly from the Romans. during the continuance of the truce. That they should send back all the prisoners and deserters that had at any time fallen into their hands. That they should deliver up all their long vessels, ten triremes only excepted; and likewise their elephants. That they should not make war at any time upon any state out of Afric; nor upon any in Afric, without the consent of the Romans. That they should restore to king Massanissa, the houses, lands, and cities, and every thing besides, that had belonged to him, or to his ancestors, within the limits which should hereafter be declared. That they should furnish the Roman army with corn sufficient for three months; and pay also the stipends of the troops, till an answer should be received from Rome, confirming the conditions of the treaty. That they should pay ten thousand talents of silver, in the course of fifty years; bringing two hundred Euboic talents every year. That, as a security for their fidelity, they should give a hundred hostages; which should be chosen by the Roman general out of all their youth, between the age of fourteen and of thirty years."

As soon as Publius had finished the recital of
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these articles, the ambassadors returned back in haste to Carthage, and reported the terms that were proposed. Upon this occasion, when one of the senators was going to object to the conditions, and had begun to speak, Annibal, it is said, stepped forwards, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his seat. And, when the rest of the senate appeared to be much displeased at an action so injurious to the customs of that assembly, he again stood up, and said, "That he might well be excused, if his ignorance had led him to offend against any of their established forms. That they knew, that he had left his country when he was only nine years old; and had now returned to it again at the age of more than forty-five. He entreated them, therefore, not so much to consider, whether he had violated any custom, as whether he had been moved by a real concern for the distressed condition of his country. That what he had felt upon that account was indeed the true cause of his offence. For that it appeared to him to be a most astonishing thing, and altogether preposterous, that any Carthaginian, not ignorant of all which their state in general, as well as particular men, had designed against the Romans, should not be ready to worship his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now found himself treated by them with so great clemency. That, if the Carthaginians had been asked but a few days before, what their country must expect to suffer, if they

should be conquered by the Romans, they would not have been able to make any answer: so great, so excessive were the calamities which were then in prospect. He begged, therefore, that they would not now bring the conditions into any debate, but admit them with unanimous consent; offering sacrifices at the same to the gods; and joining all together in their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the Roman people." This advice appeared to be so sensible, and so well suited to the present exigency, that the senate resolved to consent to a peace upon the terms which have been mentioned; and immediately sent away some ambassadors to conclude the treaty.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The unjust designs of Philip and Antiochus against young Ptolemy; with a reflection on the manner in which those princes afterwards were punished.

IT is strange to consider, that, as long as Ptolemy lived, Philip and Antiochus were ready always to support him, though he wanted not their assistance; and yet no sooner was he dead, and had left an infant son, than these princes, whose duty it was, according to the laws of nature, to maintain the child in the possession of his kingdom, combined together to share his dominions between themselves, and to destroy the helpless orphan. Nor did they even endeavour, like other tyrants, to cover the shame of this proceeding, so much as with the slightest pretext; but prosecuted their design with such barefaced and brutal violence, as made the saying very applicable to them, which is commonly used concerning fishes; that the destruction of the small, though they are all of them of the same kind, is the life and nourishment of the great. We need only to turn our eyes indeed upon the treaty that was made between the two kings upon this occasion; and we shall behold,

as in a glass, the strongest picture of their avowed impiety, their savage inhumanity, and their ambition extended beyond all bounds. If any one, however, should be disposed to censure fortune, and indeed with good show of reason, for admitting such injustice in the course of human affairs; he will judge perhaps more favourably, when he considers, that afterwards she punished both these princes in the manner which their actions merited, and exposed them as a memorable warning, to deter all those who in future times might be inclined to follow their example. For, while they were practising all the arts of treachery against each other, and tearing away by pieces the dominions of the infant king; this deity, having raised up the Romans against them, inflicted upon them, with the most exact measure of justice, those very evils which they had unjustly meditated against others. Subdued, each of them in his turn, they were at first compelled to submit to the imposition of a tribute, and to receive orders from the Romans. And in the end, before any long time had elapsed, the dominions of Ptolemy were established again in full security: while, on the other hand, the kingdom and the successors of Philip were entirely subverted and destroyed; and those of Antiochus very nearly also involved in the same calamities.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

The Cianians, a people of Bithynia, are conquered and carried into slavery by Philip. Reflections on the cause of their misfortune, and the conduct of the king.

THESE great calamities, indeed, in which the Cianians were involved, ought not to be ascribed so much to fortune, or even to the unjust designs of others against them, as to their own want of wisdom, and the wrong administration of their government. For, as they raised continually the very worst men into the posts of honour, and punished all those that opposed their measures, for the sake only of enriching themselves with the spoils of the plundered fortunes, they threw themselves, as it may be said, with their own free consent, into all that wretchedness which is the necessary result of such a conduct. Examples of this kind are frequent and notorious: and yet men, I know not how, never cease to fall into the same imprudence. They seem not to entertain even the smallest diffidence upon such occasions; but are worse in this respect than animals that are destitute of reason. For these, not only if they have extricated themselves before with difficulty from any trap or

snare, but, even if they have seen any other animal in danger, are not easily led to the like again, but suspect the very place, and distrust every thing that is before their eyes. But men are strangers to all this caution. Though they have heard that many have been lost by the ill conduct that has now been mentioned; though they see others perishing through the same imprudence; allure them only with the prospect of enriching themselves with the spoils of others, they catch greedily at the bait, which they are assured has been in all times fatal to those who have tasted it, and pursue those very measures which are acknowledged to have been pernicious to every government.

Philip, when he had so well succeeded in this design, and rendered himself master of the city, was elated with no small joy. He thought that he had performed an honourable and a glorious action. For he had brought the speediest succour to his son-in-law in his distress; he had struck a terror into all those that were inclined to oppose him; and had gained, as he supposed, by the fairest means, a very great booty in prisoners and in money. But the circumstances that were opposite to these he never once considered, though they were indeed sufficiently notorious. For first, he had assisted his son-in-law, not when he was unjustly attacked, but when he had himself made war upon his neighbours in direct breach of treaties. In the next place, by involving a Grecian city, without any

just cause, in the most dreadful calamities of war, he confirmed the opinion which before was entertained concerning his inhuman treatment of his allies; and taught all posterity to consider him, upon both these accounts, as a man who paid no regard to the most sacred obligations. Thirdly, this action was a very gross insult upon the ambassadors, who had come to him from the cities, in order to rescue the Ciansians from their danger. For while they were encouraged to remain, and were soothed by him with daily conferences, they were forced to be spectators of those very evils which they had wished most earnestly not to see. Add to all this, that the Rhodians now held him in so great abhorrence, that they would not so much as suffer the name of Philip to be any more mentioned among them. Indeed chance itself conspired to raise against him this aversion. For when his ambassador, in a studied discourse which he addressed to the people in the theatre at Rhodes, was endeavouring to display the great generosity of his master; who, though he had at this time the city of the Ciansians almost wholly in his power, was willing, as he said, to yield it as a favour to the Rhodians, and to refute by such indulgence the calumnies of those that opposed his interests, as well as to give also a most signal proof of his affection towards their state; it happened that a certain man arrived from the fleet, and related in what manner the Ciansians had been carried into

slavery, and the whole cruelty that had been exercised upon the occasion. These news being reported to the assembly by the first magistrate, at the very time when the ambassador was delivering his harangue, struck all the people with such astonishment, that they were scarcely able to believe that Philip could be guilty of so black a perfidy. And yet this prince, when by his treacherous conduct he had been false rather to himself than the Cianians, was so destitute of judgement, as well as lost to all sense of duty, that instead of feeling remorse and shame, he on the contrary boasted of the action, as if it had been a glorious and great exploit. From this time, therefore, the Rhodians regarded him as an enemy; and resolved to hold themselves in readiness to begin hostilities against him. Nor was the resentment less which the Ætolians conceived against him upon the same account. For he had just before composed his differences with that people. And yet, in the very moment almost when he was extending his hands towards them, when not even any pretence could be urged to cover such a conduct, of the three cities, Chalcedon, Lysimachia, and Cianus, which had lately been received into a confederacy with them, he forced the two former to separate themselves from the alliance, and carried the inhabitants of the latter into slavery, though an Ætolian governor at that very time commanded in the place. With respect to Prusias, though he was pleased that his design had

been attended with success, yet was he on the other hand no less dissatisfied when he found that all the advantages of the conquest were possessed by another, and that nothing remained for himself but the bare ground of a ruined city. He was forced however to bear what he had no power to remedy.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

The lamentable destruction of Agathocles, the guardian of young Ptolemy, together with all his family, in a popular insurrection at Alexandria. His conduct and character. Some observations on the manner of relating tragical events in history.

CHAP. I.

AGATHOCLES, having ordered the Macedonians first to be assembled, appeared before them, bringing with him the young king, and attended by his sister Agathoclea. For some time he pretended that his tears flowed so fast that he was not able to speak. But when he had often wiped his face with his mantle, and seemed to have stopped the violent course of his grief, lifting up the child, "Receive," said he, "O Macedonians, this young prince, whom his father, when he was dying, delivered indeed into the arms of my sister, but intrusted to your fidelity. The affection of my sister can now but little avail. His preservation depends upon you alone: in your hands rests all his fortune. It was notorious long ago to all men of judgment, that Tlepolemus was forming designs too

high for his condition. He has now fixed the day, and even the hour, in which he has determined to assume the diadem. I ask not," continued he, "that you should give credit to me alone; but to those who have seen the truth, and who are just now come from being witnesses of the transaction." With these words, he introduced to them Critolaus, who declared that he had seen the altars ready, and the victims which the people had prepared for the celebration of the ceremony. But the Macedonians were so far from being moved with compassion towards him from this discourse that they did not even attend to what he said: but began to sneer and to whisper together; and insulted him with so much scorn that he scarcely knew in what manner he at last withdrew himself from the assembly. He then called together, in their proper assemblies, the other bodies of the soldiery; and was received with the same ill treatment by them all.

During the time of this confusion, many of the troops arrived continually from the armies that were in the upper provinces; and began to urge their kindred and their friends, to apply some remedy to the disorders of the state, and not suffer themselves any longer to be insulted by such unworthy governors. The people were the more easily engaged in this design, and began to fear that even the least delay might be attended with dangerous consequences, because Tlepo-

lemus was master of the port of Alexandria, and had it in his power to stop all the provisions that should be coming to the city. Agathocles also himself helped greatly at this very time to provoke the rage of the multitude, as well as to incense Tlepölemus. For, as if he had been willing that the whole city should know that a difference subsisted between this general and himself, he took Danaë, who was the step-mother of the former, from the temple of Ceres, and, having dragged her through the streets with her face uncovered, threw her into prison. This action so exasperated the minds of all men, that they no longer communicated their discontent in private confidence, and with secrecy, as before; but fixed up writings in the night in every part of the city; and in the day-time assembled together in parties, and declared aloud their detestation of the government.

Agathocles, perceiving this disposition of the people, began now to apprehend some fatal consequences. Sometimes he resolved that he would endeavour to escape by flight. But as he had been so imprudent as not to have made any of the necessary preparations for such a purpose, he was forced to desist from that design. Sometimes again, he was beginning to form associations of his friends; and seemed determined to make at least one desperate attempt: to destroy one part of his enemies; to seize the rest; and afterwards avowedly to usurp the tyranny. While he remained in this state

of suspense, one of his guards, whose name was Moeragenes, was accused of betraying all his secrets to Tlepolemus, through the means of a correspondence with Adæus, the governor of Bubaste. Agathocles immediately gave orders to his secretary Nicostratus, that he should take this man, and force him by every kind of torture to declare the truth. He was seized accordingly; and, being conducted by Nicostratus into a remote apartment of the palace, was at first interrogated, as he stood, concerning the facts with which he was charged: and when he refused to confess any thing, he was stripped. The guards, some of them were preparing the instruments of torture, and others, with rods in their hands, were taking off his clothes; when a servant came running into the apartment, and, having whispered something to Nicostratus in his ear, retired again with the greatest haste. Nicostratus immediately followed him; speaking not a word, but smiting continually his thigh. The situation in which Moeragenes now found himself was very singular and strange. The rods were already raised to strike him, and the instruments of torture lay ready at his feet; when the attendants, upon this departure of Nicostratus, stood motionless, and, looking one upon another, expected his return. After some time, as he came not back, they all gradually withdrew themselves from the apartment. Moeragenes, being thus left alone, passed through the palace unobserved, and

came, naked as he was, into a tent of the Macedonians that was near. It happened that the soldiers were assembled together to take their dinner. He related to them all that had been done, and the surprising circumstances of his escape. Though the story appeared to be almost incredible, yet when they saw that he was still naked, they could not doubt of the truth. Taking occasion therefore from this accident, he began now with tears to entreat the Macedonians, not only to afford protection to himself, but to take the measures also that were necessary for the preservation of the king, or rather indeed for their own safety. For the destruction of them all was imminent and certain; unless they would seize the moment, when the hatred of the people against Agathocles, and their desire of vengeance, were at the greatest height. And this, he said, was now that moment; and nothing was wanting, but that some persons should begin the enterprise. The soldiers were raised into fury by this discourse; and consented to all that was proposed. They went first into the tents of the other Macedonians; and afterwards into those of the rest of the army. For they were all contiguous one to the other, and stood together on the same side of the city. As the disposition to revolt had long been general, and waited only to be called into action, no sooner was this spirit set in motion, than it spread every way like a raging flame: so that, before four hours had passed, all orders and

ranks of men, both in the camp and in the city, were united in the same design. An accident also at this time happened, which tended greatly to facilitate the success of the undertaking. Some spies were brought to Agathocles, together with a letter which had been written by Tlepolemus to the army. The purport of the letter was, that Tlepolemus was preparing to join the army; and the spies declared, that he was now ready to come. On receiving these news, Agathocles seemed to be bereaved at once of all his understanding. For, instead of preparing himself for action, or taking any of the measures which such an exigency required, he calmly retired to his repast, and indulged himself in all the pleasures of his table in the usual manner.

But Cœnanthe, oppressed with grief, went into the temple of Ceres and Proserpine, which was now opened for the celebration of an annual sacrifice. At her first entrance, she fell upon her knees, and supplicated the protection of the goddesses with the most soothing prayers. She then sat down near the altar, and was quiet. Many of the women who were present beheld her grief and her dejection with a secret pleasure, and said nothing. The relations only of Polycrates, and some others of rank, not knowing the cause of her disorder, came near to her, and were beginning to comfort her. But Cœnanthe cried out with a loud voice, "Approach me not, wild beasts as you are; I

know you very well; you are enemies to our interests, and are praying the goddesses to inflict upon us the worst of evils: but I hope on the contrary, that they will force yourselves to feed upon your own children." With these words, she ordered her attendants to drive them from her, and even to strike those that should refuse to retire. The women therefore all left the temple; lifting up their hands to heaven, and imploring the gods, that Cœnanthe herself might feel those curses which she had imprecated upon others. And as the men already had determined to revolt, this resentment of their wives, being now spread through every house, added new strength to the rage with which they were before inflamed.

As soon as night was come, in the whole city nothing was to be seen but tumult, lighted torches, and people running to and fro in every part. For some assembled themselves together in the stadium with loud cries; some animated the rest; and some, running every way in disorder, sought for houses and secret places in which they might lie concealed. All the open spaces that were near to the palace, the square, the stadium, and the court that were round the theatre of Bacchus, were now filled with an innumerable multitude of people of every kind; when Agathocles, who had not long left his table, was awakened from sleep, full of wine, and informed of what had happened. Immediately collecting all his kindred, Philo only excepted, he went to

the king; and, after some few words of lamentation, took him by the hand, and carried him up into the gallery that was between the Mæander and the Palæstra, and which led to the entrance of the theatre. He fastened behind him the first two doors, and passed on to the third, with only two or three guards, the king, and his own family. The doors were framed in the manner of an open lattice, and were fastened with double bars.

The numbers of the people that were drawn together from all parts of the city were now so great, that not only the open places, but the steps also and the roofs of the houses were covered with them. A confused noise and clamour was heard, from the voices of women and children mingled with those of the men. For such is the custom at Alexandria, as well as at Carthage, that, in tumults of this kind, the children are no less active than the men. When the day fully appeared, amidst the many undistinguishable cries, it was heard, however, above all the rest, that they called for the king. The Macedonians, therefore, now first advancing together in a body from their tents, took possession of the gate of the palace, which was the place of the royal audience. And, after some little time, being informed to what part the king had retired, they went round to the place, forced open the first doors of the gallery, and, as they approached the second, demanded the child with loud cries. Agathocles, perceiving that the danger was so near, entreated

the guards to go, and to declare to the Macedonians; "that he was ready to lay down the guardianship of the king, and all his other power; to divest himself of all his honours; and even to abandon all that he possessed. That he desired only that his life might be spared; and that small allowance yielded to him, which would be necessary for his support. That when he should have thus gone back again to his first condition, it would no longer be in his power, whatever might be his will, to do harm to any person." But the guards all refused to be employed in this service, till at last it was undertaken by Aristomenes; the same who held afterwards the chief administration of the government. This man was an Acarnanian by birth; and having, as he advanced in life, obtained the supreme direction of affairs in Ægypt, he governed with a very high reputation both the king and kingdom; and demonstrated indeed no less ability in maintaining himself in that exalted station, than he had shown before in flattering Agathocles during the time of his prosperity. For he was the first who, at a banquet, had presented to Agathocles alone of all the guests a golden crown; an honour never accustomed to be paid to any but kings. He had the courage also to be the first who wore a portrait of Agathocles in a ring. And when he had a daughter born, he gave her the name of Agathoclea. But this may be sufficient to mark his character.

This man then, having received the orders be-

fore-mentioned, went out through a little wicket, and came to the Macedonians. He had scarcely spoken a few words, and begun to declare the intentions of Agathocles, when the soldiers attempted in the instant to strike their darts through his body. But some persons, having covered him with their hands, and appeased that first fury, ordered him immediately to return, and to tell Agathocles that he should either bring out the king, or not dare to come out himself. When they had thus dismissed him, they advanced against the second door of the gallery, and forced it open. Agathocles, perceiving both by the answer that was brought, and by this new violence, with what rage the Macedonians were inflamed, extended now his hands through the lattice of the farthest door. Agathoclea likewise showed her breasts, which she said had suckled the king. With the most suppliant words that could be uttered, they begged that at least their lives might be spared. But when neither their prayers nor their entreaties any thing availed, they at last sent out the child, together with the guards.

The Macedonians, when they had received the king, set him immediately upon a horse, and conducted him to the stadium. As soon as he appeared, the people broke together into the loudest shouts of acclamation and applause. They stopped the horse, took down the king, and conducted him to the seat in which their kings were accustomed to be seen. But the joy which the multitude showed was still mingled

with grief. For while they rejoiced that they had gotten the king into their possession, they were grieved, on the other hand, that the guilty persons were not taken, and brought to suffer a just punishment. They demanded, therefore, with continual clamour, that the authors of all the evils should be delivered up to the public vengeance. As the day was now far advanced, and the people still wanted the objects upon which they might vent their rage, Sosibius, who was the son of Sosibius, and was at this time one of the royal guards, had recourse to an expedient, the best indeed that could be devised, with respect both to the king and the public peace. Perceiving that the commotion was not likely to be appeased, and that the young prince also was uneasy at seeing himself surrounded by persons unknown, and terrified by the noise of a rude multitude, he went and asked him, whether he consented that those who had been guilty of crimes against his mother and himself should be delivered up to the people. And when he answered, that he consented, Sosibius ordered some of the guards to declare this resolution to the people, and at the same time carried the king to his own house, which was near, to give him some refreshment. As soon as the intentions of the king were known, the whole place again resounded with shouts of approbation and of joy.

During this time Agathocles and Agathoclea had retired severally to their own apartments.

Some of the soldiers from their own voluntary motion, and others urged by the people, soon went in search of them. But the first beginning of the slaughter that ensued was occasioned by the following accident. One of the parasites and servants of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came drunk into the stadium; and, seeing what was the disposition of the people, told those who stood near him that, as soon as Agathocles should appear, they would change their sentiments, as they had done before. Upon hearing these words, some began to revile him, and others punished him; and, when he attempted to defend himself, they tore his clothes; and some struck the points of their spears into his body. He was then dragged along, still breathing, and with many insults, through the midst of the multitude. As the people had now tasted of blood, they were impatient to see the others brought out. In a short time afterwards Agathocles came first, loaded with chains. As soon as he appeared, some persons ran towards him, and instantly killed him. In this they performed the office, not of enemies, but of friends; for they saved him from the more dreadful death which his crimes deserved. After Agathocles, Nico was brought out; then Agathoclea naked, with her sisters; and afterwards all the rest of their kindred. Last of all, CEnanthe also was torn from the temple, and was brought naked on horseback into the stadium. All these were now abandoned to the fury of the

multitude. Some bit them with their teeth; some pierced them through with weapons; and some tore out their eyes. And as each of them fell, they were divided limb from limb, till they were all torn into pieces. For the anger of the Ægyptians always is attended with most terrible cruelty. At the same time likewise, the young women who had been educated with Arsinoë, being informed that Philammon had come three days before to Alexandria from Cyrene, with a design to kill the queen, ran to his house: and, having forced their entrance, they murdered him with clubs and stones; strangled his son who was an infant; and then dragged his wife naked into the streets, and killed her. In this dismal manner perished Agathocles, Agathoclea, and all their kindred.

CHAP. II.

I AM not ignorant, indeed, with what pains some writers, in order to strike their readers with astonishment, have heightened this transaction into a most portentous story; and loaded it with a detail of studied observation, exceeding even the relation itself in length. Some of them ascribing every thing that happened to the sole influence of fortune, attempt to paint in the strongest colours the inconstancy of that goddess, and to show how difficult it is for men to secure themselves against her power. Others again, when they have represented all the circumstances to be indeed astonishing, endeavour afterwards to assign some probable causes of so wonderful an event. For my own part, I have resolved not to undertake the task of making any such reflections. For I cannot discover that Agathocles was distinguished either by his military skill and courage; or that he possessed in any considerable degree that happy dexterity in the administration of civil affairs which might deserve to be imitated; or lastly, that he ever excelled in that talent of courtly intrigue, that refined and crafty policy, by the means of which Sosibius and many other ministers preserved through their lives a supreme influence

over those princes who successively intrusted them with the management of their affairs. He was indeed in all respects the very reverse of these. For it was only the incapacity and weakness of Philopator which first raised him, with the astonishment of all men, into high authority. And when afterwards he had the fairest opportunity, upon the death of that prince, to maintain himself in his exalted station, he in a short time threw away, by the mere want of spirit and ability, both his power and his life. The story of a man like this needs no enlargement; nor affords any room for such reflections as might be drawn from the fortunes of that other Agathocles and Dionysius, the two tyrants of Sicily; and of some besides, who acquired a name by their ability and great exploits. The latter of the two here mentioned derived his origin from the very lowest of the people. The former left the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, as Timæus has said of him in the way of reproach, and came young to Syracuse. And yet each of them, in his time, raised himself to be the tyrant of that renowned and opulent city. Afterwards they became the sovereigns of all Sicily; and were masters likewise of many of the parts of Italy. Agathocles also formed still greater designs. For he even invaded Afric: and at last died in the full possession of all his honours. And from hence, it is said, when Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of Carthage, was asked what persons he judged to have been the most distinguished

by their skill in government, and their wisdom in conducting the boldest enterprises, he answered Dionysius and Agathocles. These then are the men from whose actions a historian may take a fair occasion to stop his readers with reflections; to remind them of the power of fortune; to remark the course of human affairs; and, in a word, to inculcate many useful lessons. But others, like the Agathocles whose fate we have described, are very unfit to be made the subjects of such discourse. Upon this account, I have related without any enlargement the bare circumstances of his fall. But there was also indeed another reason which determined me with no less weight, to reject all amplification in the recital of this story. Those changes of fortune, which are dreadful and astonishing, should be exhibited in a single view, and so far only as that they may be barely known. To keep them afterwards in sight, and to exaggerate them in a long description, not only is attended with no advantage, but must even be painful to those to whom they are shown. In every thing that is offered to the eyes or ears, the design should always be to convey either some utility, or some pleasure. All history especially should be directed constantly to these two ends. But an exaggerated description of astonishing accidents is certainly neither useful nor pleasing. It cannot be useful because no one would wish to imitate what is contrary to reason: nor pleasing because none can be delighted either with

the sight or the relation of such events as are repugnant both to nature and to the common apprehensions of men. We may desire indeed once, and for the first time only, to see or to hear of such disasters, for the sake of being assured that some things may happen which we conceived to be impossible. But when we have this assurance, any lengthened repetition, forced upon us, only fills us with disgust. A historian therefore should be contented barely to relate what may serve for imitation, or may be heard with pleasure. An enlarged description of calamity, which exceeds those bounds, may be proper indeed for tragedy, but not for history. Some indulgence however may be allowed perhaps to those historians, who, because they neither have considered the works of nature, nor are acquainted with the general course of things in the world, are ready to regard the events which themselves have seen, or which they have greedily received from others, as the greatest and most wonderful that have happened in any age. Misled by this persuasion, and not sensible of the mistake into which they have fallen, they set themselves to relate with large exaggeration, transactions which have not even the praise of novelty, since they have before been recounted by others, and from which their readers also never can derive either advantage or delight. * * *

BOOK THE SIXTEENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

*The naval engagement between Attalus and Philip
near the island of Chios.*

PHILIP was now filled with great perplexity, and began to be extremely anxious with respect to the event. His progress in the siege had in no degree answered his expectation: and the enemy also were lying at anchor near him, with a greater number of decked ships than his own. As there was therefore no room left for choice, he suddenly sailed away with all his fleet. This motion occasioned no small surprise in Attalus; who expected that the king would still have continued the work of his mines against the city. But Philip had persuaded himself, that, by getting first out to sea, he should be secure from being overtaken by the enemy; and directing his course along the coast, might be able to arrive safe at Samos. He was however very greatly disappointed in his hopes. For Attalus and Theophiliscus no sooner saw that he was getting out to sea than they resolved immediately to follow him. Their fleet was not

formed in order: for they had expected, as we have said, that Philip would still have persisted in the siege. They exerted however their whole skill in rowing; and when they had overtaken the enemy, Attalus attacked the right, which was also the van of their fleet, and Theophiliscus the left. Philip, finding himself thus intercepted in his course, gave the signal to his ships upon the right, commanding them to turn their prows towards the enemy, and to engage with vigour: and himself with some boats retired to the little islands that were in the middle of the strait, designing to observe from thence the progress of the battle. His fleet consisted of fifty-three decked ships; besides open vessels, such as boats and long galleys, which were in number one hundred and fifty. Some others were left at Samos, which he had not been able to get ready. On the side of his enemies were sixty-five decked ships, including those sent by the Byzantines; and, beside these, nine biremes, and three triremes.

The vessel in which Attalus sailed began the combat: and the nearest of the ships on both sides, without waiting for any signal, immediately engaged each with the other as they approached. Attalus, having attacked an octireme, laid open the side by a fortunate stroke below the surface of the water; so that the vessel sunk at last to the bottom, though the men upon the deck maintained the fight for some time with the greatest bravery. Another

vessel that belonged to Philip, carrying ten banks of oars, and which was the first ship in the fleet, was lost by a very strange accident. A bireme, having fallen under the prow of this large ship, was struck by the latter with so great violence, that all the art of the pilot was not able to draw out the beak, which was fixed fast in the middle of the hulk of the little vessel, just below the uppermost bank of the oars. At this very time two quinqueremes came up; and striking their beaks into both the sides of the large ship, which was so fixed in its position by the little vessel that was suspended from it that it was not able to move, sunk it to the bottom, together with all that were on board. Among these was Democrates, the chief commander of the fleet. About the same time likewise, Dionysidorus and Dinocrates, two brothers and commanders on the side of Attalus, were engaged, with circumstances not less singular, the one with a septireme, and the other with an octireme of the enemy. Dinocrates, who attacked the latter, having raised the prow of his vessel, received a stroke in the part that was above the water, and at the same time struck his own beak so deep into the lower part of the octireme, that he was not able to draw it back, though he many times attempted it by lightening his stern. In this situation, he was so closely attacked by the Macedonians, that he found himself in the greatest danger. But Attalus, perceiving what had happened, bore down upon

the octireme; and by the violence of the shock separated the two vessels, and set Dinocrates free. The Macedonians were all killed after a brave resistance; and the vessel remained in the power of the conquerors. Dionysidorus on his part, bearing down upon the septireme, missed his stroke; and, as he fell against the enemy, lost all the banks of his oars upon the right side of his vessel, and all the battlements of his deck. The Macedonians attack him on every side with loud shouts and cries. The vessel was soon sunk, together with all that were on board. Dionysidorus alone, and two others, saved themselves by swimming to a bireme that was near. Among the rest of the ships that were engaged, the contest was more equal. The advantage which Philip had in the number of his small vessels was balanced by the strength of the decked ships on the side of Attalus. And, though the hopes of success were the most promising on the side of Attalus, the vigour of the Macedonians in the right of the fleet rendered the victory at this time doubtful.

The Rhodians, when they first sailed out to sea, were at a very great distance behind the enemy, as we before have mentioned. But as they far exceeded them in the swiftness of their course, they soon reached the rear of the Macedonian fleet; and began to attack the vessels in stern, as they were sailing from them, and to break their banks. The Macedonians were then forced to turn, and assist the ships that

were thus attacked. And when the rest of the Rhodian vessels were come up, and had joined Theophiliscus, the whole fleets on both sides turned their prows, the one against the other, and amidst the sound of trumpets, and the noise of animating cries, engaged in set battle with the greatest ardour. The action however would have been determined in a very short time, and with little difficulty, if the Macedonians had not intermingled some small vessels among their decked ships, and by that measure frustrated in various manners the efforts of the Rhodian fleet. For no sooner was the order of battle broken by the first shock, and the ships mingled together in confusion, than these small vessels, falling in among the rest, either stopped them in their course, or prevented them from turning, and employing with advantage their proper strength; and, by obstructing sometimes the working of the oars, sometimes by attacking the prow, and sometimes again the stern of the larger ships, rendered the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers, alike unserviceable. When any of the ships were engaged beak with beak, the Rhodians indeed displayed their superior art. For setting their own vessels low upon the prow, while they received the stroke of the enemy above the water, they at the same time struck the adverse ships below it, and made such breaches as were irreparable. It was but seldom however that they availed themselves of this advantage. Deterred by the vigour which

the Macedonians showed, in maintaining the fight hand to hand against them from their decks, they in general declined the danger of a close engagement; and chose rather to run through the fleet of the enemy, and to break the oars; and then, returning again, to direct their strokes against the stern of the vessels, or against the sides, as they were turning themselves obliquely from them; and either pierced them with their beaks, or carried away some part that was necessary for the working of the ship. By this method they destroyed a very great number of vessels in the Macedonian fleet.

There were three Rhodian quinqueremes, that were distinguished in a very remarkable manner in this engagement. One of these was the vessel in which Theophiliscus sailed, who was the commander of the fleet. Philostratus was captain in the second. The third had Nicostratus on board, and was commanded by Autolychus. The last of these ships had struck one that belonged to the enemy with so great violence that the beak was left sticking in the vessel. The ship that was struck soon sunk with all the men; and the other, while the water flowed in fast at the prow, was surrounded on every side by the enemy. Autolychus defended himself for some time with the greatest courage; till, being covered with wounds, he at last fell with his arms into the sea. The rest that were on board maintained the fight with no less bravery, till they were all likewise killed.

At this time Theophiliscus advanced towards them. Not being able to save the vessel, which was already filled with water, he struck two ships of the enemy, and forced out all that were on board. But being soon surrounded by a very great number both of light and heavy vessels, he lost the greatest part of his men after a brave resistance. And having himself also received three wounds, and being pressed by the most imminent danger, he at last with great difficulty saved his ship through the assistance of Philostratus, who had the courage to take his place in the action. Being then joined by some other vessels, he returned once more to fight; and, though the strength of his body was much weakened by his wounds, yet such was the vigour of his mind, that he distinguished himself by more glorious efforts, and by a courage more astonishing than before.

In this battle there were properly two actions, at a great distance one from the other. For the right of the fleet of Philip, which was attacked by Attalus, having kept their course close along the shore, as they had at first designed, was not far distant from the continent of Asia; while his left, which had turned to support the ships in the rear, had approached the island Chios, and was engaged with the Rhodian fleet. The success of Attalus against the right had been almost complete; and this prince, as he pursued his victory, was now come near to those little islands where Philip was stationed, expecting the event of the

battle; when he perceived, that one of his own quinqueremes, which had advanced too far beyond the rest, was struck by a Macedonian vessel, and was ready to sink. He hastened, therefore, with two quadriremes to save this ship. And when the enemy, as he approached, declined the combat, and retired towards the land, he pursued with the greatest eagerness, and was earnest to render himself master of the Macedonian vessel. Philip, perceiving that the king was so far separated from the rest of his fleet, took four quinqueremes, three biremes, and some boats that were near, and stood ready to intercept him in his return. Attalus, finding his return cut off, and being filled with the greatest apprehensions for his safety, was at last forced to run his ship close in to the land, and escaped safe to Erythræ, with the rest that were on board; while the vessel, and all the royal furniture, fell into the hands of Philip. An artifice, indeed, which he had employed upon this occasion, very greatly facilitated his escape. He had ordered his most splendid furniture to be brought out, and placed upon the deck of the ship. When the Macedonians, therefore, first entered from their boats, and saw many rich goblets, a vest of purple, and all the utensils which accompany the regal pomp; instead of following the pursuit, they set themselves to pillage what was before them, and by that delay gave full time to the king, to continue his flight with safety to Erythræ.

Though Philip had been by much the greatest

sufferer in the whole of the engagement, yet so much was he elated with this success, that he sailed back again into the open sea, and began with great diligence to draw together his ships, and to encourage his men, as if he had now clearly obtained the victory. And indeed when his enemies on the other side perceived, that he was followed by the royal vessel bound fast to his own, they were all ready to believe that Attalus had perished. Dionysidorus among the rest was filled with that persuasion. He made the signal, therefore, for bringing together the ships of his own fleet; and, having soon collected them into a body, he sailed away to the ports of Asia without any danger. At the same time also, the Macedonian ships that were engaged against the Rhodians, having for a long time suffered greatly in the action, withdrew themselves separately from the fight, under the pretence of carrying assistance to some other part of the fleet. The Rhodians, when they had bound fast to the stern of their own ships one part of the vessels which they had taken, and broken the rest into pieces, directed their course to Chios. In the engagement against Attalus, Philip had lost one vessel of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of seven, and one of six; together with ten other decked ships, three biremes, and twenty-five boats. These vessels were all destroyed, together with the men that were on board. In the engagement against the Rhodians, ten of his decked ships were destroyed, and forty boats; two qua-

dreires were also taken, and seven boats, with all their men. On the side of Attalus, one bireme and two quinqueremes were sunk ; and the royal vessel was taken. Two quinqueremes of the Rhodians were destroyed, and some triremes ; but none of their vessels taken. No more than sixty men were killed on the side of the Rhodians ; and about seventy in the fleet of Attalus. But on the side of Philip, three thousand of the Macedonian soldiers, and six thousand of the naval forces, lost their lives. Two thousand also of the Macedonians and their allies were taken prisoners. Among these, seven hundred were Egyptians. Such was the end of the naval battle near the island of Chios.

When the action was finished, Philip assumed to himself, upon two accounts, the honour of the victory. The first was, that he had forced Attalus to run his vessel in to the land, and had made himself master of the ship ; and the other, because he had cast anchor, after the engagement, near the promontory Argennum, and taken his station in the very midst of the wrecks of the fleets. On the next day likewise, he endeavoured by his actions to support the same pretension. With this design, and in order to persuade men still more strongly that he remained the conqueror, he collected together the wrecks of all the ships, and took up the bodies of his own men that were to be distinguished among the dead. But it very soon appeared, that this was not his own opinion. For while he was employed in this very work,

Dionysidorus and the Rhodians, having joined their fleets together, came sailing towards the place where he was, and stood for some time before him in order of battle. And when he declined the engagement, they returned unmolested back to Chios.

In reality, this prince had never at any time before suffered so great a loss in a single action, either by land or sea. He felt himself very deeply affected with the misfortune; and was forced to abate much of his former ardour. He endeavoured indeed, by every method, to conceal his sentiments from others; but the very face of things alone rendered even this attempt impracticable. For, beside other circumstances, the objects that presented themselves on every side, after the engagement, struck all with horror who beheld them. So great had been the slaughter, that the whole strait at the time was covered with blood; and was filled with dead bodies, with arms, and wrecks of the ships. And for many days afterwards, these objects were seen mingled together, and thrown in heaps upon the shores. So dreadful a spectacle not only struck Philip with confusion, but filled all the Macedonians with extreme dismay. Theophiliscus, who survived only one day after the battle, wrote an account of the action to his country; appointed Cleonæus in his own stead commander of the fleet; and then died of his wounds; having merited immortal honour, not only by his courage in the engagement, but on account of the resolution also which

he had shown in conducting the whole design. For unless his spirit had determined him to be thus early in attacking Philip, so universally was that prince at this time dreaded, that the present opportunity would have been wholly lost. But he not only resolved to begin the war against him, but obliged his country also to seize the favourable moment; and forced Attalus likewise not to waste his time in preparations, but to enter immediately into action, and to try the fortune of a battle without any delay. It was not without good reason, therefore, that the Rhodians after his death decreed such honours to his memory, as were most proper to encourage, not those alone who were then alive, but the men also of future times, to render upon great occasions the most effectual service to their country.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

The reason why men often abandon their designs.

WHAT was it then which forced him to stop at once in the midst of this pursuit? It was nothing indeed but the mere nature of things. For we often see, that men, while they contemplate objects at a distance, and attend only to the great advantages that would follow from success, engage eagerly in designs which are impossible to be accomplished. The violence of their desires precludes altogether the exercise of their reason. But, when the time of execution is come, and the difficulties which appear upon a nearer view are found to be absolutely insurmountable, their thoughts are suddenly bewildered and perplexed; their understanding becomes confused; and the attempt is then abandoned with the same precipitation with which it had before been undertaken.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

Philip renders himself master of Prinassus by a stratagem.

AFTER some attacks, which the strength of this little city rendered fruitless, Philip desisted from the attempt; and, leading his army through the country, destroyed the citadels, and plundered the villages that were near. He then went and encamped before Prinassus: and, having in a short time finished his blinds, and completed the other preparations that were necessary for a siege, he began to undermine the wall of the city. But, when he found that the rockiness of the soil rendered this work altogether impracticable, he had recourse to the following stratagem. He ordered the soldiers to make a great noise under ground in the day-time, as if they were employed in digging the mines, and, in the night, to bring earth from distant parts, and to lay it along the mouths of the pits that were opened; that the besieged, on seeing a large quantity of earth, might be struck with apprehensions of their danger. At first, however, the inhabitants displayed a great show of bravery, and seemed determined to maintain themselves in their post. But, when Philip informed them

by a message, that the wall was undermined to the length of four hundred feet; and, that he left it to their choice, whether they would now retire with safety, or, remaining till he should set fire to the props, be then all destroyed amidst the ruins of the place; they gave an entire credit to his account, and delivered up the city.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

The situation of Iassus. The judgement of the author concerning wonderful stories.

IASSUS in Asia is situated upon the gulf, which is terminated on one side by the temple of Neptune in the Milesian territory, and, on the other, by the city of Mindus; and which by many is called the Bargylietic gulf, from the cities of the same name which are spread round the innermost parts of it. The inhabitants of Iassus boast, that they were originally a colony from Argos; but that afterwards their ancestors, when they had suffered a great loss in the Carian war, received a new colony of Milesians, which was brought to them by the son of Neleus, the first founder of Miletus. The city contains ten stadia in circumference. There is a report which is firmly credited among the inhabitants of the Bargylian cities; that no snow or rain ever falls upon the statue of the Cindyan Diana, though it stands in the open air. The people of Iassus affirm the same thing also concerning their statue of Vesta: and both these stories are related as facts by some historians. For my own part, I know not how it is, that I am still forced in the course of my work to take

some notice of such traditions, which are scarcely to be heard with patience. It is certainly a proof of a most childish folly, to relate things, which, when they are brought to be examined, appear to be not only improbable, but even not possible. When a writer affirms, for example, that certain bodies, though placed in the light of the sun, project no shade, what is it but a plain indication of a distempered brain? and yet, Theopompus has declared that this happens to those who are admitted into the temple of Jupiter in Arcadia. Of the same kind are the stories that have now been mentioned. I must confess, indeed, that, when things of this sort tend only to preserve in vulgar minds a reverential awe of the divinity, writers may sometimes be excused, if they employ their pains in recounting miracles, and in framing legendary tales. But nothing which exceeds that point should be allowed. It is not easy, perhaps, to fix in every instance, the exact bounds of this indulgence: yet neither is it absolutely impossible. My opinion is, that ignorance and falsehood may be admitted in a small degree; and, when they are carried farther, that they ought to be exploded.

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

Scipio returns to Rome. His triumph. The death of Syphax.

NOT long after this time, Publius Scipio returned back to Rome from Afric. As the greatness of his actions had raised in men a very high and general expectation, he was surrounded by vast crowds upon his entrance, and received by the people with the greatest marks of favour. Nor was this only reasonable, but an act also of necessary duty. For they, who not long before had not so much as dared to hope, that Annibal ever could be driven out of Italy, or the danger be removed from their own persons and their families, now saw themselves, not only freed from the apprehension of any present evils, but established also in a lasting and firm security, by the entire conquest of their enemies. Upon this occasion, therefore, they set no bounds to their joy. On the day, likewise, in which he entered the city in triumph, as the objects that were viewed in the procession represented most clearly to the senses of the people the dangers from which they had escaped, they stood as in an ecstasy of passion, pouring out thanks to the gods, and acknowledgements to

the author of so great a deliverance. Among the rest of the prisoners, Syphax also, the Massæsylian king, was led along a captive in the procession: and after some time he died in prison. When the solemnity of the triumph was finished, there was afterwards in Rome, during many days, a continual succession of games and spectacles; the expense of which was defrayed by Scipio, with a generosity which was worthy of him.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The prudent conduct of Philip after his defeat.

THERE are many men indeed, who may be observed to begin an action well, and even to redouble their ardour as they advance, till they have made a very considerable progress: but to conduct an enterprise completely to the end, and, even when fortune obstructs them in their course, to supply by prudence, whatever may have been defective in alacrity and vigour, is the portion only of a few. In this view, as the inaction of Attalus and the Rhodians, after their late victory may justly be censured; so, on the other hand, the magnanimity and the royal spirit, with which Philip persisted still in his designs, deserves not less to be applauded. Let it be remarked, however, that it is not my meaning to apply this commendation to the general character and conduct of this prince; but, that I am speaking only of the attention which he exerted upon the present occasion. Without this distinction, I might be charged, perhaps, with inconsistency; in having not long before applauded Attalus and the Rhodians, and censured Philip, and delivering now a contrary judgement. But for

this very purpose it was, that I observed expressly in the beginning of my work, that a historian often is obliged to applaud and to condemn the same persons, as different occasions may require. For the revolutions of affairs, and sudden accidents as they arise, are frequently seen to change the intentions of men from good to bad, or from bad to good. And even without the impression of external circumstances, the natural inconstancy of the human mind sometimes determines men to a right course of action, and sometimes to that which is altogether wrong. The force of one or other of these causes was now clearly visible in Philip. For, though this prince suffered no small concern from his late defeat, and was apt, almost at all times, to be hurried along by violence and passion, yet upon this occasion he accommodated himself with a most astonishing prudence to the exigency of the times. By this conduct, he was again enabled to resume the war against the Rhodians and king Attalus; and in the end accomplished all that he proposed. Such an instance of his prudence deserved not to pass altogether without remark. For some men, like bad racers, abandon their designs, when they are arrived even almost at the end of their course: while others, on the contrary, obtain a victory against their rivals, by exerting in that very moment more strenuous efforts than before.

EXTRACT THE SEVENTH.

The situation of Sestus and Abydus. The siege of this last city; and the desperate resolution of the citizens.

IT would be needless to enter into a long description of the situation of Sestus and Abydus, or to enumerate the conveniences which they possess. For these cities are so singularly placed, that there is scarcely any one, unless among the most vulgar of mankind, who has not acquired some knowledge of them. But it will not be unuseful upon the present occasion, to turn the attention of the reader to a general view of their position. And indeed whoever will compare and lay together what I am going to say, may obtain from thence a juster notion of these two cities than even from an examination of the ground upon which they stand.

As it is not possible then to sail from the Ocean, or, as it is called by others, from the Atlantic, into our sea, without passing through the strait of the Pillars of Hercules; so neither is there any way of sailing from our sea into the Propontis and the Pontus, unless through the passage that lies between Sestus and Abydus. In one respect, indeed, these straits are very

differently formed. For that of the Pillars of Hercules is much larger than the Hellespont, and contains sixty stadia in breadth; whereas the other, between Sestus and Abydus, has no more than two. But in making this difference Fortune seems to have acted not altogether without design. One reason of it, as far as we are able to conjecture, seems to be, that the exterior ocean is by many degrees larger than our sea. To this we may add, that the strait of Abydus is better adapted, upon this account, to the necessities of those who live upon it. For as both sides of it are covered with inhabitants, the narrowness of the passage serves as a kind of gate for their mutual intercourse. For this purpose they sometimes throw a bridge over the strait, and pass from one side to the other on foot. At other times, vessels are seen sailing continually upon it. But the strait of the Pillars of Hercules is very rarely used, and only by a few. For the people that live on both sides, in the extreme borders of Afric and of Europe, have but little communication one with another, and scarcely any knowledge of the exterior sea. The city Abydus is enclosed also on either side by the promontories of Europe; and has a harbour which affords a safe shelter to the ships that are stationed in it against every wind. But without the entrance of the harbour it is not possible for any vessel ever to cast anchor, on account of the rapidity and violence with which the waters are carried through the strait.

This was the city to which Philip was now laying siege both by land and by sea. On the side of the latter he had blocked the place closely by piles planted crossways: and, by land, had carried an intrenchment round the walls. The greatness of the preparations that were made, the variety of the works that were contrived, the skill and artifice that were employed in carrying into execution every usual method either of attack or of defence; these, however memorable, are not the things that are most worthy of admiration upon the present occasion. But the generous resolution and the extravagant spirit, which appeared in the besieged, were so singular and astonishing, that this siege, upon that account alone, deserves more than any other to be transmitted to posterity in lasting characters. At first, reposing an entire confidence in their own strength, they sustained all the attacks of Philip with the greatest firmness: disabling the machines that were advanced against the city from the sea, by stones thrown from their balistæ; or destroying them by fire; so that the Macedonians were scarcely able to withdraw even their ships from the danger. On the side of the land likewise, they repulsed the king in his approaches with so great vigour and success, that for some time they seemed to hope that they should force him to desist from his attempt. But when they saw the outer wall of the city fall down; and that the Macedonians had brought their mines very near also to

the wall which had been raised within the other, to supply the place of that which had fallen; they then sent Iphiades and Pantacnotus to treat with Philip, and offered to surrender the city to him upon these conditions: that the troops which they had received from Attalus and the Rhodians should be dismissed with an assurance of safety; and the free citizens be allowed to depart to what places soever they should choose, with the garments that were upon their bodies. But Philip ordered the deputies to go back again and tell the besieged, that they either must surrender at discretion, or continue to defend themselves with courage.

The Abydenians, when they had received this answer, met together in council, and, with minds agitated by despair, deliberated on the measures which they now should take. They resolved first, that the slaves should be made free, that they might assist without reserve in the defence of the city. In the next place, that all the women of the city should be assembled together in the temple of Diana; and all the children, with their nurses, in the Gymnasium. That all their gold and silver likewise should be laid together in the forum: and, in the same manner, all their valuable vestments, in the Rhodian quadrireme, and in the trireme of the Cyziceniens. These things, being thus decreed, were carried into execution with one consent. They then called together another assembly: and, having chosen fifty of the oldest

men, who were judged to be most worthy of such a trust, and who had strength sufficient also to accomplish all that was proposed, they made them swear in the presence of all the citizens, that, as soon as the enemy should become masters of the inner wall, they would kill the women and the children; set fire to the two vessels; and throw the gold and the silver into the sea. After this, the priests being called, all the rest of the citizens were engaged likewise by a solemn oath, that they would either conquer, or die fighting in the defence of their country. And to conclude the whole, having slain some victims in sacrifice, they obliged the priests and priestesses to pronounce upon the burning entrails, dire execrations against those who should neglect to perform what they had sworn. When all was finished, they no longer endeavoured to countermine the enemy; but resolved only, that, as soon as the wall should fall, they would exert their utmost efforts upon the breach, and continue fighting till they should all expire.

And now may it not be said, that both the desperate resolution of the Phocæans, which has before been mentioned, and the magnanimous spirit also of the Acarnanians, were surpassed by the daring courage which the Abydenians showed upon this occasion? For when the Phocæans entered into a like determination with respect to their families, they had still some hopes of saving themselves by a victory; having

an opportunity of engaging the Thessalians in a set battle. The Acarnanians likewise had in their power the same resource. For when they only expected an invasion from the Ætolians, they passed in their council a similar decree. We have before given a particular account of these transactions. But the Abydenians, already enclosed on every side, and having no means of safety remaining in their power, chose rather to perish, every man, together with their wives and children; than to live with the certain expectation of seeing their children and their wives fall into the hands of their enemies. The conduct therefore of Fortune, with regard to this last people, may well be charged with some injustice. She compassionated the distresses of the others, retrieved their affairs by a victory, and reinstated them in safety when they had almost lost all hope. To the Abydenians alone she showed no favour. The men all lost their lives; the city was taken; and the children with their mothers came alive into the power of the enemy. For as soon as the inner wall fell down, the citizens, in observance of their oaths, all mounted the breach, and opposed the entrance of the enemy with so great fury, that Philip, though he sent continually, even till night came on, fresh troops to the assault, was at last forced to desist, and began to apprehend that the whole design was irrecoverably lost. For the foremost of the Abydenians not only advanced with a frantic kind of desperation over

the dead bodies of the enemy, nor were contented to employ their spears and their swords alone with a most astonishing force; but, when their weapons were rendered useless, or were torn by violence out of their hands, grasping the Macedonians close, they threw some of them with their armour upon the ground; broke the spears of others; and, catching the fragments from them, turned the points against their faces, and against the other parts of their bodies that were uncovered; and by these means threw them into extreme consternation and dismay. But when the night had put an end to the combat, the greatest part of the citizens being left dead upon the breach, and the rest disabled by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus, having assembled together a small number of the oldest men, prevailed with them to abandon that most glorious and most admirable determination which they so lately had embraced, and to consider only their own present safety. They resolved therefore to save the women and the children alive; and, as soon as the day should appear, that they would send the priests and priestesses, dressed in their holy habits, to implore the mercy of Philip, and to deliver the city to him.

At the very time of this transaction, Attalus, having heard that the Abydenians were besieged, sailed through the Ægean sea to Tenedos; and Marcus Æmilius, who was the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, came to Abydus. For the

ambassadors that were sent from Rome, having received also at Rhodes the notice of this siege, and because they had orders likewise to obtain an interview with Philip, stopped their journey to the other kings, and sent Æmilius to Abydus to confer personally with that prince. The Roman, being admitted into his presence, declared to him the orders of the senate; "that he should not make war upon any of the people of Greece, nor invade any of the dominions that belonged to Ptolemy; and that he should engage to make an equitable compensation for the losses which Attalus and the Rhodians had unjustly sustained. That, if he would comply with these conditions, he might still remain in peace: if otherwise, that the Romans would declare war against him." The king endeavoured to convince the ambassador that the Rhodians had first attacked him. But Æmilius, interrupting him; "And what," said he, "did the Athenians? what the Carians? what, at this moment, the unhappy Abydenians? did either of these first attack you?" Philip, after some hesitation, told him, that for three reasons he would excuse the haughtiness of this address. First, because he was a young man, not yet experienced in affairs: in the next place, because he was the handsomest man of his age; which indeed was true: and lastly, because he was a Roman. He then added that it was his earnest wish that the Romans would still confine themselves within the bounds of their treaties, and lay aside all

thoughts of war. But if they determine otherwise, we shall then, continued he, invoke the assistance of the gods, and defend ourselves against them with our utmost strength. After this discourse they severally retired. The king then took possession of the city, and without any difficulty seized all the treasure which the Abydenians had before collected, and laid together in heaps. But how great was his astonishment when he saw the numbers of persons that destroyed themselves, together with their wives and children, with the most eager fury. Some stabbed, some strangled themselves; some plunged themselves alive into wells; and others threw themselves headlong down from the roofs of the houses. Filled with grief at this dismal sight, he ordered proclamation to be made that he would allow three days to those who should choose to hang, or otherwise destroy themselves. But the Abydenians had before determined their own fate, and adhered inflexibly to their first purpose. They considered themselves as guilty of a kind of treason against those brave citizens who had perished in the defence of their country: nor would any among them submit to live, except those whose hands were tied, or who were restrained by some other kind of force. The rest, with their whole families, without any delay, embraced a voluntary death.

EXTRACT THE EIGHTH.

The expedition of Philopæmen against Nabis.

PHILOPÆMEN, having first computed the respective distances of all the Achæan cities, and considered also which of them lay along the same roads in going towards Tegea, wrote letters to them all, and sent them in different parcels to the cities that were at the greatest distance from that place: the parcels being so composed that each of these cities, together with the letter addressed to itself, received those likewise that were written to the rest of the cities which stood upon the same road. The first letter was addressed to the chief magistrate of the city, and contained the following words: "As soon as you have received this letter, assemble together in the forum all the men of military age with their arms. Let them be furnished with provisions, and with money for five days; and, when they are formed into a body, conduct them to the next city. On your arrival there deliver the letter that is addressed also to the chief magistrate of that city; and let the contents of it in like manner be obeyed." This second letter contained the same orders as the former; and was different only in the name of the next city

to which the troops were to be conducted. The same method was observed through all the cities: and the result of this management was, that, as no one was able to conjecture what was the design and object of the expedition, so neither had the troops themselves any farther knowledge of their march, than that they were going to the next city; but remaining still in a state of doubt and ignorance, joined themselves each to the others, and continued to advance. As the first and most distant cities were not all situated at an equal distance from Tegea, care had been also taken that the letters should not be delivered to them all at once; but at different times, proportioned to their respective distances. And from hence it happened, that, when neither the Tegeans, nor the troops themselves, had conceived any expectation of such an accident, the Achæans all arrived at Tegea in the same moment in arms, and entered the city together by all the different gates. The design of Philopœmen was, to elude by this contrivance the observation of those spies and gatherers of news which Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, had dispersed through the country.

Having thus formed his project, on the day on which the Achæans were expected to arrive he sent away a select body of troops from Tegea; with orders that they should conceal themselves during the night in the neighbourhood of Selasia, and early on the following day make incursions into the Lacedæmonian territory. That, if the Spartan mercenaries should be drawn to-

gether to oppose them, they should then retreat towards Scotita; and in all other things obey the orders of Didascalondas of Crete, to whom he had communicated his whole design. This measure being carried into execution, he directed the Achæans to take their supper at an early hour, and then led them out of Tegea. Having continued his march all night with the greatest haste, he arrived at break of day, and took his post secretly in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The Spartan mercenaries that were stationed in Pelene, having received notice in the morning from their scouts that some troops of the enemy were making incursions in the country, immediately sallied out, and attacked them with their accustomed vigour. The Achæans observed their orders and retreated. The mercenaries pursued with the greatest eagerness; till, being at last arrived at the place where the rest of the Achæans lay concealed, they were suddenly surrounded by them, and were all either killed or taken prisoners.

BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH.

EXTRACT THE FIRST.

Conferences between Philip, Flaminius, and the deputies of the allies. They all send ambassadors to Rome. The Roman senate resolves that the war shall be continued against Philip.

CHAP. I.

WHEN the day appointed for the conference was come, Philip sailed from Demetrias in an armed sloop, accompanied with five boats, and came into the Malian gulf. He was attended by his two secretaries, Apollodorus and Demosthenes, both Macedonians; by Brachyllus of Bœotia; and by Cycliadas an Achæan, who had been forced to fly out of Peloponnesus, for the reasons that have before been mentioned. On the other side, with Titus Flaminius, came the king Amynander; Dionysodorus, on the part of Attalus; and deputies also from the other states and cities. On the part of the Achæans appeared Aristænetus and Xenophon; for the Rhodians, Acesimbrotus, their chief naval com-

mander; and, in the name of the Ætolians, Phæneas, their prætor, with many others that were employed in the administration of the government. When they were all come near together upon the coast of Nicæa, Flaminius steered his vessel close in to the land, and went and stood upon the shore. But Philip, though he also approached the land, stood aloof at some little distance from it; and, when the former called to him to come on shore, he answered from his ship that he would not do it. The other asked him, who it was that he feared? I fear no one, said Philip, except the gods; but I have just reason to be distrustful of many that are here present, especially of the Ætolians. Flaminius was surprised, and said, that the opportunity was the same, and the danger equal to all. The danger is by no means equal, replied Philip; for if Phæneas were to be killed, the Ætolians might find many other prætors; but, if the same thing should happen to me, the Macedonians would at this time be left without a king. This beginning gave no small offence to all that were present. He was desired, however, by the Roman general to speak what he had to say upon the subject of their meeting. Philip answered, that it belonged not to him to speak, but to the Roman. That for his own part, therefore, he only desired Flaminius to declare upon what conditions he might be suffered to remain in peace. The conditions, replied Flaminius, are clear and simple. I order you to relinquish every part of Greece; to send

back all the prisoners and deserters to their respective countries ; to restore to the Romans the places which you have conquered in Illyria since the treaty of Epirus ; and to Ptolemy all the cities which you have taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Then turning himself towards the other deputies, he bade them declare the orders which they had received from their several states. Dionysodorus began the first ; and demanded in the name of Attalus, that Philip should deliver to that prince all the ships and men which he had taken in the engagement near the island of Chios ; and restore also, in the same condition as before, the Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, which he had plundered and destroyed. Next to him, Acesimbrotus on the part of the Rhodians required, that the king should restore the district of Peræa, which he had taken from them ; withdraw his garrisons from Iassus, and the cities of Bargylia and Euromea ; allow the Perinthians to be united as before in the same common government as the Byzantines ; and, in the last place, that he should deliver up Sestus and Abydus, together with all the ports and places of traffic which he possessed in Asia. After the Rhodians, the Achæans demanded likewise the restitution of Argos and of Corinth. Last of all, the Ætolians insisted also, as the Romans had done, that Philip should relinquish every part of Greece ; and to this they added, that he should restore unhurt the cities which

had been before associated with them in their government.

These demands were made by Phæneas the Ætolian prætor. But there was a certain Alexander, surnamed the Isian, who was considered among the Ætolians as a very able speaker, and well versed also in affairs. This man then began to speak. "It was not," he said, "to be expected, that Philip would now employ any greater sincerity in making peace than he had at any time shown spirit in making war. That in conferences and negotiations, his endeavour was always to lay snares; to watch for some advantage; and to act even upon such occasions a hostile part. That his manner of making war was alike contrary to justice, and void of courage. That he never dared to look his enemies in the face, but fled always before them; pillaging and burning the cities in his flight; and depriving the conquerors by this dishonourable method of the just fruits of their victory. How different," continued he, "was the conduct of the former kings of Macedon? They engaged continually in set battles in the open field; and scarcely at any time destroyed or overthrew the cities. Such was the manner in which Alexander maintained his war in Asia against Darius, and achieved the conquest of that mighty empire. The same was the conduct of his generals who came after him, when they contended together for the same Asia against Antigonus. The same was that of all

the succeeding princes to the time of Pyrrhus. Eager always to encounter with their enemies in the field, they employed every effort to determine their disputes by arms; but spared the cities, that the conquerors might possess them, and gain subjects by whom they might be honoured. And indeed, to relinquish the war itself, and only to destroy those things for the sake of which it is made, what is it but the work of the very strongest madness? Yet this is the manner in which Philip acts. For since the time of his retreat, which was made with so great haste through the passes of Epirus, he has destroyed in Thessaly, among the people who are his allies and friends, more cities than their enemies have at any time destroyed." Many other things were urged by him in support of the same charge. And he then concluded his discourse with demanding of Philip, for what reason, when Lysimachia was confederated with the Ætolians, and governed by an Ætolian prætor, he had driven out that magistrate, and placed a Macedonian garrison in the city? Upon what pretences, even while himself was allied by treaty with the Ætolians, he had carried the Ceanians into slavery, who were associated also with the Ætolian state? And lastly, by what show of right he now held possession of Echinus, of the Pthian Thebes, of Pharsalus and of Larissa?

As soon as he had ended, Philip approached nearer to the land; and, standing forwards in his ship, "This is in truth," said he, "an harangue very worthy of an Ætolian, a declamation proper

only for the stage. For who does not know, that no man ever willingly occasions the destruction of his allies ; but that in certain conjunctures the leaders of armies are forced to take many measures that are repugnant to their inclinations." He was still speaking, when Phæneas, who was very near-sighted, roughly interrupted him, and told him that he was wandering from the subject ; for that he ought either to conquer in the field, or to receive the law from the conquerors. " Without doubt," replied Philip, turning himself quick towards him ; " even a blind man can see that." For this prince had a strong propensity to raillery ; and even at this time, when his affairs were in no very proper condition for jesting, he was not able to restrain his natural inclination. Afterwards, addressing his discourse again to Alexander ; " You demand of me," said he, " for what reason I possessed myself of Lysimachia ? It was to prevent the Thracians from taking advantage of your negligence to destroy that city ; the very thing which happened afterwards, when the war forced me to withdraw the troops which I had placed there, not as a garrison, but as a defence only against those invaders. Nor was it I that made war upon the Cians. But when Prusias had declared war against them, I assisted him indeed in conquering their city. If there was any crime in this proceeding, to yourselves alone the guilt must be imputed. For how often have we demanded of you, both myself and all the states of Greece, an abrogation of the law which

allows you to take spoils from the spoils? But you have always answered, that you would sooner separate Ætolia from Ætolia than relinquish that law." Flaminius was astonished, not being able to conceive the meaning of these words. Philip, therefore, explained it by informing him, that it was the custom of this people not only to pillage the lands of those with whom they were at war; but that when any other persons, even those that were the allies and friends of the Ætolians, were engaged in war against each other; the latter held it to be lawful for them to join their arms, though without any public decree, both to the one and the other of the contending parties, and to ravage the lands of both. That upon such occasions they knew not any difference between enmity and friendship: for that their neighbours, all equally without distinction, whenever any contention arose among them, were sure to have the Ætolians for their enemies? "With what show of justice then," continued he, "do they now urge it as a crime, that, when I was indeed in friendship with the Ætolians, but at the same time was allied to Prusias, I scrupled not to attack the Cians in support of my ally? But that which is most insufferable is, that these men now assume to themselves an equality with the Romans; and, like them, command the Macedonians to relinquish the whole of Greece. This language, haughty indeed as it is, may be borne however from the Romans;

but from the Ætolians it is intolerable. And tell me, I pray you, what is this Greece, from which I am commanded to retire? By what limits is it to be circumscribed? For a great part even of the Ætolians are not Greeks. The countries of the Agræans, the Apodotæ, the Amphilochians; these are no parts of Greece. May I be allowed to retain possession of these?" Flaminius smiled at this pleasantry. "But enough has been said," continued Philip, "upon the subject of the Ætolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, it would be thought more reasonable by any equitable judge, that they should restore to me the ships and the men which they have taken from me, than that I should restore their ships to them. But, if such be your pleasure, Alexander, I will restore the district of Peræa to the Rhodians, and to Attalus those of his ships and men which are still preserved. The Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, since they already are destroyed, it is not in my power, unless by one way only, to restore. I will send some plants to the place, and some gardeners also, who shall cultivate the ground, and make the trees grow that have been cut down." Flaminius laughed again at this droll conceit: and Philip, passing next to the Achæans, enumerated all the acts of kindness which they had received from Antigonus, and from himself. He then recounted also the many and great honours which this people had conferred upon the kings of Macedon. And having,

in the last place, recited the decree, by which they had renounced the friendship of the Macedonians, and embraced the party of the Romans, he from thence took occasion to inveigh largely against their ingratitude and their breach of faith. In conclusion he said, that he was willing however to restore Argos to them; but that with respect to Corinth, he would deliberate concerning it with Flaminius.

Having in this manner finished his discourse to all the rest, he now addressed himself, as he expressly declared, to Flaminius and the Romans: and desired to be informed, what places and what cities of Greece he was commanded to relinquish; those only which he had conquered, or the others also which had been transmitted to him from his ancestors. As Flaminius made no answer, Aristænetus immediately rose up to speak on the part of the Achæans, and Phæneas for the Ætolians. But the day being now almost closed prevented any farther debate. Philip then requested, that he might receive all together in writing the conditions upon which peace might be obtained. He was left, he said, alone, without a single person, by whom he might be advised; and that he wished to retire, and to consider with his best attention the concessions that were exacted from him. Flaminius had heard with pleasure the railleries which this prince had mingled with his discourse: and not being willing that it should be said, that he had nothing to reply,

he now rallied Philip in his turn. "You do well indeed," said he, "to complain that you are left alone: how can it be otherwise when you have put all those to death, who might at this time have assisted you with the best advice?" The king forced a kind of reluctant smile, and made no reply. The demands of the several states were then given to him in writing, and were the same that have been mentioned. After this the assembly separated; having appointed a second meeting in the same place on the following day.

On the next day then Flaminius came again to the place. All the rest also were present, Philip only excepted, who did not appear. But when the day was so far advanced, that there remained but little expectation of his coming, he at last arrived just in the evening, attended by the same persons as before. The conditions, he said, were so perplexing, and so full of difficulty, that he had wasted the whole day in the consideration of them. But the others believed, that his design in coming so late was, that the Ætolians and Achæans might not have time sufficient to accuse him. For he had observed, when he retired from the former conference, that they were both ready to enter into farther altercation, and to renew their complaints against him. And this indeed appeared to be the truth, when now, upon his first approach, he desired to be allowed a separate conference with Flaminius; that, instead of skir-

mishing any more together with words, some end might at last be put to their disputes. As he urged this request with repeated earnestness, Flaminius, when he had first asked the opinion of the rest, and received their consent for him to hear what the king would offer, took with him the tribune Claudius, and, having directed the other deputies to retire to a little distance from the shore, ordered Philip to come upon the land. The king accordingly left his ship, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes; joined Flaminius, and conferred with him for a very considerable time. What passed on both sides upon this occasion it is not easy for me to say. But Flaminius, after Philip had departed from him, informed the rest, that the king was ready to surrender to the Ætolians, Pharsalus and Larissa, but not Thebes; and to the Rhodians the district of Peræa, but not the cities of Iassus and Bargylia: that he would restore to the Achæans both Argos and Corinth: would deliver to the Romans all the places in Illyria, and all the prisoners; and to Attalus, the ships which he had taken from him in the late engagement, together with the men likewise that were at this time in his hands. These offers were rejected at once by all the assembly. They demanded that Philip should first consent to the condition which they all required; that of relinquishing the whole of Greece. Unless this was done, the concessions which he was disposed to make to particular states would be vain

and ineffectual. Philip, perceiving that the contest was likely to be vehement, and being apprehensive that he should again be forced to hear himself accused, desired that the assembly might be deferred to the morrow: that the day was already closed: and that he would either bring himself to yield to the conditions that were exacted from him, or prevail with the others to accept the terms which he had offered. Flaminius consented to this request, and appointed the shore near Thronium for the place of the third conference.

On the following day they all met together at an early hour. Philip, having first in a short discourse entreated all that were present, and Flaminius above the rest, not to obstruct the conclusion of the peace, when it was manifest that the greatest part were inclined to consent to some accommodation, said that he wished indeed if it was possible, that all their differences might be adjusted among themselves. But, if this was not to be accomplished, he then desired that he might be allowed to send ambassadors to Rome. That he either would engage the senate to yield to him the matters in dispute, or would submit to every thing which they should otherwise enjoin. The deputies all at once rejected this proposal, and cried out that the war must be continued. But Flaminius said, that he very well knew that Philip never would perform the conditions that were demanded of him: that their compliance, however, with this request would

bring no injury to their affairs: that the conditions themselves, as they had been now proposed, could not otherwise be ratified than by the authority of the senate: and that the present time was the most commodious for informing themselves of the inclinations of that assembly; for as the armies would not be able to attempt any thing during the winter, by employing that season of inaction in sending deputies to Rome, they would advance, and not retard, the end which they all desired. As it appeared from this discourse that Flaminius himself was not unwilling to refer the matter to the senate, the rest readily concurred in this design, and consented that Philip should send some ambassadors to Rome. At the same time it was determined that ambassadors should be deputed likewise from the other states, to lay their pretensions before the senate, and support their accusations against the king.

CHAP. II.

FLAMINIUS, having in this manner brought the conferences to an end most favourable to his own intentions, and the same which he had from the first designed, applied himself now to finish what remained of the work; and, while he took such measures as were necessary for his own security, was careful not to leave any handle of advantage to Philip. Granting, therefore, to him a truce for two months, he commanded him to send his ambassadors to Rome within that time, and immediately to withdraw his garrisons from Phocis and from Locris: at the same time taking also every other precaution that was requisite to prevent the allies from receiving any injury from the Macedonians during the continuance of the truce. He gave these orders in writing to Philip; and then made haste to finish what more particularly regarded his own design. He first engaged Amynander to go immediately to Rome; well knowing that this prince, who was of a flexible and pliant disposition, would easily be directed by his friends in the city; and that the title also of king would raise the public expectation, and give splendour to the negociation. He then deputed thither, on his own part, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of

his wife; Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius, whose surname was Nero. On the part of the Ætolians were sent Alexander the Isian, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicæarchus of Trichonium, Polimarchus of Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, and Nicomachus of Acarnania. The exiles that had been driven from Thyreum, and had taken refuge in Ambracia, sent also in their name Theodotus of Pheræ; who, after his banishment from Thessaly, had fixed his residence in Stratus. The Achæans deputed Xenophon of Ægium; king Attalus, only Alexander; and the Athenians, Cephisodorus.

When these ambassadors arrived at Rome the senate had not finally determined the allotment of the provinces to the magistrates of the year; but were making it the subject of their deliberation, whether both the consuls should be sent into Gaul, or one of them be charged with the war against the king of Macedon. But after some time, when the friends of Flaminius were at last assured that both consuls would remain in Italy, on account of the apprehension of a Gallic war; the deputies were then introduced into the senate, and declaimed with great acrimony against Philip. Their discourses were in general the same which they had made in the late conferences with the king. But the opinion which they chiefly laboured to impress upon the senate was, that as long as Philip should hold Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias in subjection,

the Greeks could never entertain so much as a thought of being free: that this was acknowledged by Philip himself, who used to call these places the fetters of Greece; and that no declaration ever was more true: for, while a royal garrison remained in Corinth, the people of Peloponnesus would be afraid to move. That the Locrians, the Bœotians, and the Phocæans, must in the same manner lose all courage, if the king should retain possession of Chalcis and the other parts of Eubœa. And lastly, if the Macedonians were allowed to hold Demetrias, that the Thessalians and Magnesians could never hope to obtain even the smallest portion of freedom. That the offer therefore that was made by Philip to relinquish any other places was merely an empty show, contrived only to elude the present danger: for, if he still should be permitted to remain master of those three cities, he would be able to bring the Greeks again into subjection, at any time that he should choose. Upon this account they requested of the senate either that the king might be forced to make an immediate cession of those places; or otherwise, that things might remain in their present state, and the war be continued with vigour against him. That the war indeed was at this time very nearly finished: since the Macedonians had been already twice defeated; and that their supplies by land were all exhausted. To these reasons they in the end added also their entreaties; and implored the

senate not to disappoint the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themselves of the honour of a glorious name.

When these and other things of the same kind had been urged by the deputies from the several states, the ambassadors of Philip were ready also to make a long harangue, but were stopped in the very beginning of it. Being asked if they would relinquish Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they answered, that they had received no instructions concerning those places. They were loaded therefore with reproaches from every side, and were forced to be silent. It was then decreed that both the consuls should be sent into Gaul, as we before have mentioned; and that the war should be continued against Philip, and Flaminius be intrusted with the affairs of Greece. And thus all things happened as Flaminius had desired. Nor was his success upon this occasion scarcely in any degree to be ascribed to chance, but chiefly to his own foresight and prudent management. For there was not in all Rome a man more dexterous, or that showed greater wisdom and ability, either in the conduct of public affairs, or in the advancement of his own particular interests. And yet he was at this time very young: not more than thirty years old. He was the first also of the Romans that led an army into Greece.

EXTRACT THE SECOND.

A reflection on the depravity of mankind.

IT seems that men, who in the practice of craft and subtlety exceed all other animals, may with good reason be acknowledged to be more depraved than they. For other animals are subservient only to the appetites of the body, and by them are led to do wrong. But men, who have also sentiments to guide them, are guilty of ill conduct, not less through the abuse of their acquired reason than from the force of their natural desires.

EXTRACT THE THIRD.

The difference between the Roman palisade and that of the Greeks. The motions of the Macedonian and Roman armies. The battle of Cynoscephalæ, between Philip and Flaminius. The Macedonian phalanx compared with the arms and order of battle of the Romans.

CHAP. I.

FLAMINIUS had not yet been able to discover, in what place the Macedonians were encamped. But being assured that they had entered Thessaly, he ordered all his soldiers to cut pales for the intrenchment, and to carry them with them, that they might be ready for use whenever occasion should require. This is a labour, which in the discipline of the Grecian armies is considered as impracticable; but the Romans perform it without much difficulty. For the Greeks, in their marches, scarcely can support the toil of carrying their own bodies. But the Romans, when they have slung their shields by the leathern braces behind their shoulders, take their javelins in their hands, and are able at the same time to carry the pales.

What renders the task indeed the easier is, that these pales are very different from those that are used by Greeks. For the Greeks esteem those to be the best, which have many, and very large branches all around the trunk. But the Romans choose those that have only two or three branches, or four at the most; and those also upon one side of the trunk, and not springing alternately from both. By this method, the carriage of them is rendered altogether easy; for three or four of them may be laid close together, and be carried by a single soldier. In this way also, they are much better contrived than the other for the security of the camp. The pales used by the Greeks are easily torn out of the ground. For, as they are planted singly, and each of them standing as it were alone, with many great branches spreading from the trunk, if two or three soldiers apply their strength to the branches, the trunk is soon drawn from the ground, and leaves a very spacious opening: and the adjoining pales also are at the same time loosened; because their branches are too short to be interwoven each with the other. But it is otherwise in the method of the Romans. Among them, the branches are so twisted together, that it is not easy to distinguish, what branches belong to the stems in the several pales, or what stems to the branches. Add to this, that the texture of them is so close, as to leave no room for a hand to pass; and that the points also of all the

branches are very carefully sharpened. And even when it is possible to lay hold on any part, it is still extremely difficult to draw out any of the pales: not only because they are very firmly fixed in the ground; but because the force also, which is applied to any single branch, must at the same time draw along many other branches, which are inseparably twisted with it. Nor is it scarcely ever practicable for two or three men to lay hold on the same pale together. And if a single pale, or if two, by the efforts of continual shaking, should at last be removed from their place, the opening that is made is so small that it is scarcely to be discerned. As these pales then have in three respects a very great advantage over the others; in being found almost in any place; in being carried with ease; and in forming, when they are used, a rampart the most stable and secure; it is manifest, at least in my judgement, that there is not any part of the Roman discipline, which so well deserves to be approved and imitated.

Flaminius then, having ordered the soldiers, as we have mentioned, to cut and carry the pales with them, that they might be ready for use, advanced slowly with all the army. When he arrived at the distance of about fifty stadia from the city of Pheræ, he there encamped: and, early on the following day, he sent out a body of his men, to discover, if it was possible, in what place the enemy lay, and what were their designs. Philip on the other hand, having

been informed that the Romans remained still in the neighbourhood of Thebes, decamped from Larissa at this very time with all his army, and, directing his march also towards Pheræ, arrived before the day was closed at the distance of thirty stadia from the city. In this place, he ordered the troops to take their refreshment and repose: and, on the following day, having sent forwards his advanced guard, before it was light, to take possession of the hills that were above the city, as soon as the day appeared, he began to draw out all his forces from the camp. The troops that were sent forwards from both the armies had almost met together, as they advanced on the top of the hills. But, perceiving the approach of each other through the dawn, when there was now but a very moderate distance between them, they immediately halted, and sent some to inform the generals of what had happened, and to receive their orders. The generals on both sides resolved to remain quiet in their respective camps; and recalled the troops that had advanced. On the next day, they sent away again on both sides about three hundred of their cavalry and light-armed troops to make discoveries. Among those that went from the Roman camp, were two troops of Ætolians, selected for this service by Flaminius, on account of their knowledge of the country. The two bodies met together on the road that leads from Pheræ to Larissa, and the engagement was begun with vigour. But, so stre-

nuous were the efforts of Eupolemus, who headed the Ætolians, and so well did he animate the troops of Italy to support the charge, that the Macedonians suffered very greatly in the action. When the skirmish, however, had continued for a considerable time, both parties returned back again to their several camps.

On the following day, the two generals, being alike dissatisfied with the ground in the neighbourhood of Pheræ, which was covered everywhere with plantations, gardens, and fences, resolved both of them to change their camp. Philip, therefore, having put his troops in motion, directed his march towards Scotussa: with design to draw from thence a plentiful supply of all provisions, and afterwards to encamp in some place more commodious for his army. At the same time Flaminius, suspecting that this was his intention, began his march also towards the same place with the greatest haste; that he might be able to arrive before the king, and destroy the provisions through the country. Between the two armies was a chain of lofty hills, which intercepted the view of each from the other: so that the Romans saw not the course in which the Macedonians directed their march, nor the Macedonians that of the Romans. At the end of the day, the former arrived near Eretria in Pthiotis, and the latter upon the banks of the river Onchestus, and remained there for the night; not knowing in either army, in what place the other had halted.

On the next day they continued their march forwards, and severally encamped; Philip, near the place called Melambium in the district of Scotussa; and Flaminius in the neighbourhood of Thetidium in Pharsalia; but were still alike unacquainted, each of them with the situation of the other. On the third day, at early dawn, came on violent storms of rain accompanied with thunder; and the whole earth was covered with so black a sky, that the soldiers were scarcely able to see a step before them. Philip, however, being earnest to accomplish his design, resolved to continue his march with all the army. But when he had advanced but a little way forwards, he found himself so incommoded by the darkness, that he again halted, and encamped; but sent away a body of troops, to take their post upon the top of the hills that were between the two armies. Flaminius remained still in his camp near Thetidium: but being solicitous to know in what place the enemy lay, he sent away ten troops of cavalry, together with a thousand of the light-armed infantry, to make discoveries; commanding them to direct their course with caution through the country. As this party advanced, they were betrayed by the darkness, and fell, without perceiving them, among the Macedonians who had taken their station upon the top of the hills. The two bodies being alike surprised, stood a while in suspense: but after a short time they began to engage together in action, and sent notice to

their respective generals of what had happened. As the engagement became more warm, the Romans were so unequally pressed by the Macedonians, that they were forced to send and request succours from the camp. Flaminius, therefore, sent away to their assistance Archidamus and Eupolemus, both of them Ætolians, and two Roman tribunes, at the head of two thousand foot and five hundred horse. On the arrival of these forces, the face of the action soon was changed. The Romans, encouraged by this new strength, continued the fight with double ardour. The Macedonians on the other hand, though they defended themselves with the greatest bravery, yet being now pressed in their turn, and incumbered with their heavy armour, were forced to retreat back again to the summit of the hills, and from thence sent and desired assistance also from their king. Philip, who, for the reasons already mentioned, had formed no expectation of engaging upon this day in a general battle, had sent out a great part of his troops to forage. But, being now informed of what had happened, and as the darkness also was beginning to be dispersed, he ordered Heraclides of Gyrtone, who led the Thessalian cavalry, Leon who commanded that of Macedon, and Athenagoras who was at the head of all the mercenaries except those of Thrace, to go and support the combatants. The Macedonians, reinforced by so considerable a strength, attacked the Romans with new vigour; drove

them down back again from the summit of the hills; and would have totally dispersed them, if the resistance chiefly of the Ætolian cavalry, who maintained the fight with an astonishing impetuosity and courage, had not prevented the disorder from being complete. For, as much as the infantry of this country, on account both of their arms and of the manner in which they are ranged in the field, falls below that of the rest of Greece in all general battles; so much on the other hand is their cavalry superior to all other, when they engage in separate actions, or man against man. At this time, therefore, they opposed with such success the efforts of the enemy, that the Romans were not driven quite into the plain; but turned their faces again, and stopped their flight at a little distance from it. Flaminius, perceiving not only that the cavalry and the light-armed forces were in this manner routed, but that their flight had spread a consternation also through the rest of the troops, drew his whole army out of the intrenchments, and ranged them in order of battle near the foot of the hills.

While the Romans were thus driven back, messenger after messenger, leaving the detachment upon the hills, came running to Philip, and cried aloud: "The enemies, O king, are flying; lose not the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us. The day is now your own: the very moment of victory is in your hands." These vehement cries forced the

king out to engage; though he altogether was dissatisfied with the nature of the ground. For the hills, of which we are speaking, are called *Cynoscephalæ*, from the resemblance which they bear to the head of a dog: being parted, round the summit, into ragged cliffs, and stretched upwards to a considerable height. Philip, therefore, who well knew that such a ground would be very disadvantageous to his troops, had not made from the beginning any disposition for a general battle. But, being now so urged and animated by the excessive confidence of those who brought the news of this first success, he at last gave orders to lead the whole army out of the intrenchments.

Flaminius also, having drawn up all his forces, as we have mentioned, in order of battle, and being now ready to support the detachment that was engaged upon the hills, at the same time went through all the ranks to encourage his men. The words which he employed were few, but very forcible, and such as the troops might perfectly understand. "Are not these," said he to the soldiers, as if the enemy had stood close before their eyes, "are not these the Macedonians whom you attacked upon the heights of *Eordæa*, advancing openly up the sides of the hills under the conduct of *Sulpicius*, and drove with great slaughter from their post? Are not these the Macedonians who, when they had taken possession of the passes of *Epirus*, which were thought impossible to be forced, were by your courage routed

and dispersed; and, throwing away their arms, continued their flight even to their own country? And can you have any thing now to fear in engaging the same enemy without any disadvantage? Does the remembrance of those successes offer any thing dreadful to your view? Ought it not rather, on the contrary, to inspire you with the strongest confidence? Rouse up then your courage, and advance boldly to the fight; for I am well assured that, with the assistance of the gods, the present action will soon be terminated in the same glorious manner as the past." When he had ended this harangue, he ordered the right wing of his army to remain still in their post, with the elephants before them; and moved slowly with the left wing and the light-armed forces towards the enemy. The Romans that were first engaged upon the hills, perceiving themselves to be now supported by the legions, returned back again, and renewed the fight with vigour.

At the same time Philip, when he had drawn up the greatest part of his army in order of battle before the intrenchments, putting himself at the head of the peltastæ, and the right of the phalanx, made haste to ascend the hills; and ordered Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to follow him without delay with the rest of the forces. As soon as the foremost of the troops had reached the summit, he began to form the right of his line upon the ground near to the top, which was now open and deserted. For the detachment from the Ma-

cedonian army, that was first engaged, had driven down the Romans to the lowest part of the hills. But while the king was still forming his right, the mercenaries that were in that detachment came running towards him in disorder, being driven back again by the Romans in their turn. For the latter, as soon as they were followed by the legionary troops, which were brought up, as we have said, to support them, were so strengthened by that new weight, that they pressed heavily upon their enemies, and destroyed great numbers of them. Philip, therefore, who, at his first arrival upon the hills, had beheld with pleasure that the place of the action was at no great distance from the Roman camp, now seeing his troops forced back again, and flying towards him for support, was compelled by this accident to advance, and engage in a general action; though the greatest part of his phalanx was still in march, and had not yet reached the summit of the hills. Having received then the troops that were forced back, he collected them all together, and placed them, both infantry and cavalry, upon his right wing; and gave orders to the peltastæ and the soldiers of the phalanx, to double their files, and close their ranks upon the right. When this was done, and the Romans now were near, he commanded the phalanx to level their spears and advance; and the light-armed forces to extend themselves, and attack the enemy in their flank.

Flaminius also, having received into the intervals of his army the troops that had been engaged,

at the same time advanced against the enemy. The first shock, which was on both sides violent, was attended likewise with a very great and unusual noise. For both bodies shouted at once together. The cries also of the rest that were at a distance were joined to those of the combatants; and filled all around with astonishment and horror. The right wing, however, of Philip had from the first onset very clearly the advantage. The higher ground from which they fought, the weight of their disposition, and the nature of their arms, well suited to the present action, all joined to give them a manifest superiority over the Romans. But with regard to the rest of the Macedonian army, the troops that were next in the line to the right stood at a distance from the enemy; and those of the left wing were not yet arrived, having but just now begun to appear upon the tops of the hills. When Flaminius, therefore, perceived that his troops were not able to maintain their ground against the phalanx, that great numbers were already killed, and the rest beginning to retreat; he went in haste, and joined the right wing of his army, which was now his only resource; and, having remarked the division and disorder of the Macedonians; that the next in the line to the troops that were engaged remained inactive at a distance; that some were just coming down from the tops of the hills, and others standing upon the summit; he placed the elephants at the head of this wing, and advanced against these several bodies. The Macedonians,

not having any leader from whom they might receive the command, and being unable to form themselves into a phalanx, both on account of the inequality of the ground, and because, as they were advancing towards that part of their army that was engaged, they were still rather in the order of a march, than in any order of battle, waited not to be attacked by the Romans, but were broken at once by the elephants, and immediately dispersed. The Romans pursued them with the greatest part of their forces, and slaughtered them as they fled. But one of the tribunes, at the head of no more than twenty companies, took at this time a measure which the occasion suggested to him, and which was chiefly the cause that rendered the victory complete. Observing that Philip had advanced far beyond the rest of his army; and that he continued to press the left wing of the Romans with a weight which they were wholly unable to sustain; he quitted the right, where the success was clear and uncontested, and making a circuit to one side, fell in behind the combatants, and charged the Macedonians in their rear. Now such is the disposition of the phalanx, that the soldiers never can turn, or engage singly man with man. The tribune, therefore, went on, killing those that were before him, till the Macedonians, having no power to defend themselves, threw away their arms, and were forced to seek their safety in flight. For the Romans also, who had before begun to retreat, now turned again, and charged them at the

same time in front. When Philip, who from his first success, had flattered himself, as we have said, with the expectation of a perfect victory, now saw his troops throwing away their arms, and the enemy attacking them in their rear, he retired, with a small body of infantry and cavalry, to a little distance from the place of the action, and surveyed the whole state of the battle. And when he perceived, that the Romans, who were pursuing his left wing likewise, had almost reached the summit of the hills, he collected together as many of the Thracians and the Macedonians as the time would allow, and resolved to leave the field. Flaminius, as he arrived upon the tops of the hills, saw some troops of the left wing of the Macedonian army, which were just now also ascending to the summit from the opposite side. He was preparing to attack them, but stopped when he observed that they held their spears erect. This is the custom of the Macedonians, when they either surrender themselves, or pass over to the side of the enemy. The Roman general, therefore, as soon as he was informed of the intention of this signal, held back his troops from advancing, and determined to spare the men who had not courage to resist him. But, in the instant when he was forming this resolution, some of his foremost ranks rushed down upon them, and killed a great part of them, while a very small number only threw away their arms, and escaped by flight.

The battle being now ended, and the Romans

victorious in every part, Philip directed his flight towards Tempe. Having rested the first evening in the place that is called the Tower of Alexander, he arrived on the next day at Gonni, which is situated in the entrance of the valley of Tempe. In this place he halted, in order to receive all those that had escaped after the action. The Romans, having for some time pursued the fugitives, began some of them to strip the dead, and some to bring together their prisoners. But the greatest part ran to pillage the camp of the enemy. On their arrival there they found that the Ætolians had already pillaged it. Supposing themselves, therefore, to have been defrauded of their just rights, they vented bitter complaints against that people, and even loaded their own general with reproaches. "You expose us," said they, "to the dangers of the war; but the booty you allot to others." They returned back, however, to their camp, and there passed the night; and on the following day, having collected together the prisoners and the rest of the spoil, they continued their march towards Larissa. The Romans lost in this action about seven hundred men. On the side of the Macedonians, eight thousand were killed; and not fewer than five thousand taken prisoners. Such was the end of the battle of Cynoscephalæ in Thessaly, between king Philip and the Romans.

CHAP. II.

HAVING left an assurance with my readers, in the sixth book of this work, that I would choose some proper time to compare together the arms and the orders of battle of the Macedonians, and the Romans, and to show in what respects they severally have the advantage, or are inferior each to the other, I shall here take the occasion which the action now described has offered, and shall endeavour to discharge my promise. For as the order of battle of the Macedonian armies was found, in the experience of former ages, to be superior to that of the Asiatics and the Greeks, and the Roman order of battle in the same manner surpassed that of the Africans and all the western parts of Europe; and as, in later times, these two several orders have been often set in opposition each to the other; it must be useful, as well as curious, to trace out the difference that is between them, and to explain the advantages that turned the victory to the side of the Romans in these engagements. From such a view, instead of having recourse to chance, and blindly applauding, like men of superficial understanding, the good fortune of the conquerors, we shall be able to remark with certainty the true causes of their success, and to ground our admiration upon the principles of sound sense and reason.

With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories which he obtained against the Romans, there is no need, upon this occasion, to enter into a long discussion of them. For it was not his arms, or his order of battle, which rendered that general superior to the Romans, but his dexterity alone, and his admirable skill. In the accounts that were given by us of those engagements, we have very clearly shown that this was the cause of his success. And this remark is still more strongly confirmed, in the first place, by the final issue of the war. For as soon as the Romans had obtained a general, whose ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the conquerors. Add to this, that Annibal himself rejected the armour which he first had used; and having furnished the African troops with the arms that were taken from the Romans in the first battle, used afterwards no other. In the same manner also Pyrrhus employed, not only the arms, but the troops of Italy; and ranged in alternate order a company of those troops, and a cohort disposed in the manner of the phalanx, in all his battles with the Romans. And yet, even with the advantage of this precaution, he was never able to obtain any clear or decisive victory against them. It was necessary to premise these observations for the sake of preventing any objection that might be made to the truth of what we shall hereafter say. Let us now return to the comparison that was proposed.

It is easy then to demonstrate by many reasons, that while the phalanx retains its proper form and full power of action, no force is able to stand against it in front, or support the violence of its attack. When the ranks are closed in order to engage, each soldier, as he stands with his arms, occupies a space of three feet. The spears, in their most ancient form, contained seventeen cubits in length. But, for the sake of rendering them more commodious in action, they have since been reduced to fourteen. Of these, four cubits are contained between the part which the soldier grasps in his hands, and the lower end of the spear behind, which serves as a counterpoise to the part that is extended before him; and the length of this last part from the body of the soldier, when the spear is pushed forwards with both hands against the enemy, is by consequence ten cubits. From hence it follows, that when the phalanx is closed in its proper form, and every soldier pressed within the necessary distance with respect to the man that is before him and upon his side, the spears of the fifth rank are extended to the length of two cubits, and those of the second, third, and fourth to a still greater length, beyond the foremost rank. The manner in which the men are crowded together in this method is marked by Homer in the following lines:

Shield stuck to shield, to helmet helmet join'd,
And man to man; and at each nod that bow'd

High waving on their heads the glittering cones,
Rattled the hair-crown'd casques : so thick they stood *.

This description is not less exact than beautiful. It is manifest then, that five several spears, differing each from the other in the length of two cubits, are extended before every man in the foremost rank. And when it is considered, likewise, that the phalanx is formed by sixteen in depth, it will be easy to conceive what must be the weight and violence of the entire body, and how great the force of its attack. In the ranks, indeed, that are behind the fifth, the spears cannot reach so far as to be employed against the enemy. In these ranks, therefore, the soldiers, instead of extending their spears forwards, rest them upon the shoulders of the men that are before them, with their points slanting upwards; and in this manner they form a kind of rampart which covers their heads, and secures them against those darts which may be carried in their flight beyond the first ranks, and fall upon those that are behind. But when the whole body advances to charge the enemy, even these hindmost ranks are of no small use and moment. For as they press continually upon those that are before them, they add, by their weight alone, great force to the attack, and deprive also the foremost ranks of the power of drawing themselves backwards or re-

treating. Such, then, is the disposition of the phalanx, with regard both to the whole and the several parts. Let us now consider the arms, and the order of battle, of the Romans, that we may see by the comparison in what respects they are different from those of the Macedonians.

To each of the Roman soldiers, as he stands in arms, is allotted the same space likewise of three feet. But as every soldier in the time of action is constantly in motion; being forced to shift his shield continually, that he may cover any part of his body against which a stroke is aimed; and to vary the position of his sword, so as either to push, or to make a falling stroke, there must also be a distance of three feet, the least that can be allowed for performing these motions with advantage, between each soldier and the man that stands next to him, both upon his side and behind him. In charging, therefore, against the phalanx, every single Roman, as he has two Macedonians opposite to him, has also ten spears, which he is forced to encounter. But it is not possible for a single man to cut down these spears with his sword, before they can take effect against him. Nor is it easy, on the other hand, to force his way through them. For the men that are behind add no weight to the pressure, nor any strength to the swords, of those that are in the foremost rank. It will be easy, therefore, to conceive that, while the phalanx retains its own proper

position and strength, no troops, as I before observed, can ever support the attack of it in front. To what cause then is it to be ascribed that the Roman armies are victorious; and those defeated that employ the phalanx? The cause is this. In war, the times and the places of action are various and indefinite. But there is only one time and place, one fixed and determinate manner of action, that is suited to the phalanx. In the case then of a general action, if an enemy be forced to encounter with the phalanx in the very time and place which the latter requires, it is probable in the highest degree, from the reasons that have been mentioned, that the phalanx always must obtain the victory. But if it be possible to avoid an engagement in such circumstances, and indeed it is easy to do it, there is then nothing to be dreaded from this order of battle. It is a well known and an acknowledged truth, that the phalanx requires a ground that is plain and naked, and free likewise from obstacles of every kind; such as trenches, breaks, obliquities, the brows of hills, or the channels of rivers; and that any of these are sufficient to impede it, and to dissolve the order in which it is formed. On the other hand again, it must as readily be allowed, that, if it be not altogether impossible, it is at least extremely rare, to find a ground containing twenty stadia, or more, in its extent, and free from all these obstacles. But let it however be supposed, that such a

ground may perhaps be found. If the enemy, instead of coming down upon it, should lead their army through the country, plundering the cities, and ravaging the lands, of what use then will be the phalanx? As long as it remains in this convenient post, it not only has no power to succour its friends, but cannot even preserve itself from ruin. For the troops that are masters of the whole country without resistance will easily cut off from it all supplies. And if, on the other hand, it should relinquish its own proper ground, and endeavour to engage in action, the advantage is then so great against it, that it soon becomes an easy prey to the enemy.

But farther; let it be supposed that the enemy will come down into this plain. Yet, if he brings not his whole army at once to receive the attack of the phalanx; or if, in the instant of the charge, he withdraws himself a little from the action; it is easy to determine what will be the consequence, from the present practice of the Romans. For we now draw not our discourse from bare reasoning only, but from facts which have lately happened. When the Romans attack the phalanx in front, they never employ all their forces, so as to make their line equal to that of the enemy; but lead on a part only of their troops, and keep the rest of the army in reserve. Now, whether the troops of the phalanx break the line that is opposed to them, or whether themselves are

broken, the order peculiar to the phalanx is alike dissolved. For if they pursue the fugitives, or if, on the other hand, they retreat and are pursued, in either case they are separated from the rest of their own body. And thus there is left some interval or space which the reserve of the Roman army takes care to seize, and then charges the remaining part of the phalanx, not in front, but in flank, or in the rear. As it is easy then to avoid the times and circumstances that are advantageous to the phalanx; and as those, on the contrary, that are disadvantageous to it can never be avoided; it is certain that this difference alone must carry with it a decisive weight in the time of action.

To this it may be added, that the troops of the phalanx also are, like others, forced to march, and to encamp, in every kind of place; to be the first to seize the advantageous posts; to invest an enemy, or be invested; and to engage also in sudden actions, without knowing that an enemy was near. These things all happen in war; and either tend greatly to promote, or sometimes wholly determine the victory. But, at all such times, the Macedonian order of battle either cannot be employed, or is employed in a manner that is altogether useless. For the troops of the phalanx lose all their strength when they engage in separate companies, or man with man. The Roman order, on the contrary, is never attended, even upon such occasions, with any disadvantage. Among the Romans every single soldier

when he is once armed and ready for service, is alike fitted to engage in any time or place, or upon any appearance of the enemy; and preserves always the same power, and the same capacity of action, whether he engages with the whole of the army, or only with a part; whether in separate companies, or singly man against man. As the parts, therefore, in the Roman order of battle, are so much better contrived for use than those in the other, so the success also in action must, in the same proportion, be greater in the one than the other. If I have been long in examining this subject, it was because many of the Greeks, at the time when the Macedonians were defeated, regarded that event as a thing surpassing all belief; and because many others also may hereafter wish to know, from what reasons, and in what particular respects, the order of phalanx is excelled by the arms and the order of battle of the Romans. I now return from my digression.

Philip, when he had done all that was possible in the battle, and had suffered an entire defeat, collected together as many of the troops as were able to escape, and directed his retreat through Tempe towards Macedon; but first sent away one of his guards to Larissa, in the very night that followed the action, with orders to destroy and burn all the royal papers. This attention which he showed, even in the very moment of his distress, not to leave so necessary a duty unperformed, was indeed highly worthy of a king.

For he knew that if these papers should fall into the hands of the Romans, they would afford many pretences that might be employed against himself and his friends. There are others, perhaps, to be found, who have not borne the power of prosperous fortune like men; but have stood firm under the pressure of adversity, and supported themselves by their caution and prudence. But this was very peculiarly the character of Philip; as it will be seen in the following parts of this work. For as we gave a distinct account of the happy disposition and virtuous tendency of this prince in the beginning of his reign; and showed afterwards from what causes, and in what time and manner, he changed his conduct, and pursued a different course of action; it will be no less our duty also to show, in what manner he returned again to a better mind, and by what wise management, when his misfortunes had inspired him with different sentiments, he adjusted all his measures to that necessity which the times in which he found himself imposed. The Roman general, when he had made the necessary disposition of the prisoners and the rest of the spoil, continued his march with the army towards Larissa.

EXTRACT THE FOURTH.

Men who are most practised in deceit are often deceived through want of caution.

IT is manifest then from this example that, though we are all so liable to be deceived, both by the same arts and the same instruments also of fraud, yet we are never sufficiently upon our guard against them. For this very artifice has been practised upon many occasions, and by many persons. It is not strange, perhaps, that mankind in general should so often fall into the snare. But that those men who are, as we may say, the very source of all deceit, should be themselves deceived, may reasonably be thought astonishing. But indeed this only happens to them because they do not recollect upon such occasions the wise admonition of Epicharmus. "Be sober, and distrustful; these are the nerves of the mind."

EXTRACT THE FIFTH.

*The conferences at Lysimachia between Antiochus
and the Roman deputies.*

ABOUT this time, with the rest of the ten Roman deputies, came Publius Lentulus from Barygia, and Lucius Terentius and Publius Vilius from Thassus; and within a few days afterwards, notice of their arrival having been immediately conveyed to the king, they all assembled together at Lysimachia. Hegesianax also, and Lysias, who had been deputed from Antiochus to Flaminius, were at the same time present. In the private interviews that passed between the Romans and the king, nothing was to be seen but frankness and civility. But when they were afterwards all assembled together, and brought their business into debate, the aspect of things was not so friendly. For Lucius Cornelius, as he desired the king to deliver up those cities in Asia which he had torn from the dominions of Ptolemy, at the same time pressed him also in the most peremptory terms to relinquish those that had belonged to Philip; since nothing, as he said, could be more absurd than that, when the Romans had maintained a war against that prince, Antiochus should come afterwards and carry

away the spoils. He exhorted him likewise not to assume any power over the cities that were free; and then added, that, upon the whole, he could not but wonder what design had induced him to pass into Europe with so powerful a fleet and army. That, if the thing were to be well considered, no other motive could indeed be assigned for such an expedition, but an intention to make war upon the Romans.

The king replied to this discourse: “That he knew not upon what grounds of reason his possession of the cities of Asia was now contested; and that the Romans, of all others, had certainly no right to bring his title into dispute. That he wished that they would abstain from meddling with the affairs of Asia; as much as he was careful not to meddle at any time with those of Italy. That his design in passing into Europe was to recover the Chersonesus, and the cities of Thrace, which were properly a part of his own dominions. That those places had belonged originally to Lysimachus; and, when that prince was attacked and vanquished by Seleucus, they had passed, with the rest of his kingdom, to the conqueror, by the just rights of war. That in succeeding times, while the attention of his ancestors was drawn away to other objects, Ptolemy had first usurped some parts of the dominions that were so acquired, and Philip afterwards the rest. That he did not, therefore, now possess them, as taking an advantage from the misfortunes of Philip; but only as improving an opportunity which was fair to himself, and favourable

for the recovery of his own proper right. That in bringing back the inhabitants of Lysimachia, when they had been driven out by the Thracians, and restoring the city to its former state, he had done no injury to the Romans, nor showed any intention to attack them; but designed only to make the place a seat of residence for his son Seleucus. That, with respect to the cities of Asia that were free, it was fit that they should owe their liberty to his grace and favour, and not to the command of the Romans. And lastly, with regard also to Ptolemy, that he should be ready without the interposition of others to adjust all disputes in the manner which himself should desire; for he had resolved not only to live in friendship, but even to contract likewise an affinity with that prince."

It was then proposed by Lucius, that the Lampsacenians and Smyrnæans should be called in and heard; and this accordingly was done. On the part of the former appeared Parmenio and Pythodorus; and on that of the latter Cœranus. But as they were beginning to harangue with great boldness and freedom, Antiochus, being uneasy that he should in this manner seem to give an account of his conduct before the Romans, stopped Parmenio from proceeding in his discourse, and said; that it was not the Romans, but the Rhodians, that were the proper judges of the matter in dispute. Upon this the conference was immediately broken up; and the parties all retired, being alike dissatisfied with each other.

EXTRACT THE SIXTH.

The death of Scopas, the Ætolian, at Alexandria.

THOUGH there are many indeed who would wish to draw glory from hazardous actions, there are but few who have the courage to undertake them. And yet Scopas had advantages far greater than Cleomenes, if he had been willing to try the fortune of some bold and desperate attempt. For the latter had been unexpectedly prevented by his enemies; and had no hope left, except in the assistance of his domestics and his friends. He resolved, however, to make trial of that hope, and chose rather to die with honour, than to survive with disgrace. But Scopas, on the contrary, though he had a strong force ready to support him, and though the infancy of the king rendered the opportunity also highly favourable, was prevented merely through his own irresolution and delay. For Aristomenes, having received notice that he had assembled his friends together at his house, and was holding a consultation with them, sent some of the guards to require him to attend the royal council. On receiving this message, Scopas was struck with such confusion that he had neither courage to

carry any thing into execution, nor resolution to obey the orders of the king. This was senseless in the highest degree. Aristomenes, therefore, being informed of his folly, surrounded the house with some troops and elephants, and at the same time sent Ptolemy, the son of Eumenes, with a body of young soldiers, to conduct him to the council, if he was willing to come, or otherwise to bring him by force. When Ptolemy entered the house, and told him that the king commanded his attendance, Scopas seemed not at first to pay any regard to what he said; but, fixing his eyes steadfastly upon him, for some time continued to survey him with a threatening air, as if he had been astonished at his boldness. The other, coming nearer, roughly seized him by his mantle; and Scopas then called upon his friends to help him. But as many of the soldiers were now come in, and some person also informed him that the house was surrounded by troops, he was forced to yield to the necessity, and followed Ptolemy, together with his friends. As soon as he appeared before the council, the charge against him having been opened in few words by the king, was then continued by Polycrates, who had lately arrived from Cyprus, and afterwards by Aristomenes. The chief heads of the accusation were the facts which have before been mentioned. To these only were added, the secret meetings which he had held with his friends, and his refusal to obey the orders of the king. Upon these facts he was condemned, not

only by the council, but by the ambassadors also that were present. For Aristomenes had called together upon this occasion, besides many other illustrious men from Greece, the ambassadors likewise that had been sent by the Ætolians to negotiate a peace. Among these was Dorimachus, the son of Nicostratus. When the accusers had ended, Scopas attempted indeed to say something in his own defence; but the guilt of his actions was so manifest, that what he urged made no impression. He was conveyed therefore to prison with his friends; and, in the following night, by the orders of Aristomenes, ended his life by poison, together with his friends. But Dicæarchus, by the same orders, after he had first been tortured, was whipped to death with rods; and thus suffered the punishment that was both suitable to his crimes, and due likewise to the common vengeance of all Greece. For this was the same Dicæarchus who, when Philip had resolved, in contempt of treaties, to invade the Cyclade islands, and the cities of the Hellespont, was appointed by that prince the commander of all his fleet, and chief leader of the whole expedition. Employed in a design so manifestly impious, he was so far from being shocked at the injustice of his undertaking, that he endeavoured, by an action of the most abandoned profligacy, to strike both the gods and men with horror. For, when he had brought his fleet to anchor, he erected two altars, one to Impiety, and the other to Injustice; offered sacrifices upon

them ; and adored those vices as if they had been divinities. It seems, therefore, that both the gods and men concurred to inflict upon him a most proper punishment. For it was reasonable that a man, whose life had been so contrary to nature, should die also a death that was unnatural. The rest of the *Ætolians*, who were willing to return to their own country, were dismissed by the king, and allowed to carry with them all their goods. With regard to *Scopas*, that passion for acquiring wealth, in which he was known during his life to surpass all other men, appeared still more conspicuously after his death, from the great quantity of money and of valuable goods that was found in his house. His custom was, to employ the debauched and profligate as the ministers of his rapine ; and, with the help of such associates, he forced his way into the strongest places through all the kingdom, and ransacked them in search of treasure.

When this disorder was so happily composed, the ministers of the court resolved to celebrate the *Anacleteria*, or proclamation of the king. For though this prince had not yet arrived at the customary age, it was thought that, if he should now seem to take the supreme authority into his own hands, the affairs of the kingdom would acquire a more settled form, and might be again brought back into a better train. The preparations upon this occasion were very sumptuous ; and the ceremony performed with a magnificence that was worthy of such a sovereign. It was

supposed that Polycrates was the person by whose means chiefly this measure was carried into execution. This Polycrates, under the reign of the father of the present prince, though he was then very young, had rendered himself, both by his services and his fidelity, one of the most distinguished persons of the court. Nor was the credit less which he had acquired in the present reign. For having been intrusted with the government of Cyprus, and the care of collecting the revenues of that country, in most difficult and unsettled times, he not only had preserved the island for the infant king, but amassed likewise a very large treasure; and now brought it with him to Alexandria, after he had first resigned his government to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. On account of this important service, he was received with great applause, and became afterwards very powerful. And yet this man, as he advanced in age, started aside from this honourable course, and plunged himself into a life of vice and profligacy. The same dishonour is said also to have attended the old age of Ptolemy, the son of Agesander. When we arrive at the proper time, we shall take care to give some account of the scandalous actions which they committed, after they had raised themselves into power.

THE END.

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